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Abstract 
 
Recent debate has questioned the validity of Zen as a school of Buddhism, claiming that the 
characteristic justification of apparently immoral acts by ‘enlightened’ individuals cannot be 
reconciled with the Buddhist eight-fold path, which emphasises ‘right’ actions and states of 
mind.  To simply dismiss Zen as deviant, however, ignores the ramifications of this problem 
for Buddhists more widely and overlooks parallels with the contemporary problem of 
nihilism. 
This thesis investigates the philosophical ground of the ‘Zen moral problem’ in ‘emptiness’ 
(śūnyatā), through the construction of a metaphysical framework based upon the related 
Mahāyāna Buddhist principle: ‘interdependence’ (pratītyasamutpāda).  In order to critique 
the validity of Zen as philosophy, I am guided by the goal of the Buddhist soteriological 
project; the promise of enlightenment in order to overcome the experience of suffering.  If a 
framework built up from base principles of Zen thought is capable of explaining and 
maintaining the Buddhist goal, then we must still determine how the moral problem arises. 
It is important to note that this thesis does not represent a Buddhist position, in a textual 
sense; instead it is a philosophical examination of Buddhist principles – addressing the 
problems that motivated specific historical positions.  Rather than an analysis of these 
historical positions as such, the current work takes them as responses to a common 
concern, and makes use of them as critical examples.  To this end the metaphysical 
framework developed here is used to analyse those foundations in contemporary thought 
which give rise to the moral problem.  
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Introduction 
 
The mind should be neither solemn nor agitated, neither pensive nor fearful; it should be 
straight and ample.  This is the state of mind that should be sought after.  The will should not 
be heavy, but the depth of one’s awareness should be; in this way you make your mind like 
water that reacts appropriately to shifting situations.  Whether it is a drop or an ocean with 
blue depths, it is water.  You should examine this well.   
- Miyamoto Musashi, (1641).1 
 
The above quotation illustrates an application of Zen2 philosophy, though it is not from a 
religious leader, rather it is a letter from one of the most eminent swordsmen in Japanese 
history; extolling the strategic benefits of this state of mind in combat.  The record of Zen 
reveals numerous examples of the practical application of Zen states of mind put to violent 
ends.  The ‘nothingness’ at the heart of Zen thought appears to allow such applications, or 
at least cannot be used to deny them.  Recent debate has questioned the validity of Zen as a 
school of Buddhism, claiming that the characteristic justification of apparently immoral acts 
by ‘enlightened’ individuals cannot be reconciled with the Buddhist eight-fold path, which 
emphasises ‘right’ actions and states of mind.  To simply dismiss Zen as deviant, however, 
ignores the ramifications of this problem for Buddhists more widely and overlooks parallels 
with the contemporary problem of nihilism. 
                                                      
1
 Musashi M., S.8 of Hyoho sanju go kajo (‘Thirty-Five Instructions on Strategy’), in Tokitsu, K., Miyamoto 
Musashi: His Life and Writings, P.203. 
2
 The Japanese term ‘Zen’ is here adopted rather than the Chinese ‘Ch’an’, since contemporary debate on the 
problem of morality has arisen specifically with respect to Japanese Zen, and also ‘Zen’ has become the 
dominant term in English (language) discussion (mainly due to early 20
th
 Century Japanese exchange).  This is 
not to claim that there is no difference between Ch’an and Zen; indeed it is on this point that some criticism 
focuses - see chapter 2 for details. 
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This thesis aims to investigate the philosophical ground of the ‘Zen moral problem’ in 
‘emptiness’ (śūnyatā),3 through the construction of a metaphysical framework based upon 
the related Mahāyāna Buddhist principle: ‘interdependence’ (pratītyasamutpāda).  In order 
to critique the validity of Zen as philosophy, I am guided by the goal of the Buddhist 
soteriological project; the promise of enlightenment in order to overcome the experience of 
suffering.  If a framework built up from base principles of Zen thought is capable of 
explaining and maintaining the Buddhist goal, then we must still determine how the moral 
problem arises. 
It is important to note that this thesis does not represent a Buddhist position, in a textual 
sense; instead it is a philosophical examination of Buddhist principles – addressing the 
problems that motivated specific historical positions.  Rather than an analysis of these 
historical positions as such, the current work takes them as responses to a common 
concern,4 and makes use of them as critical examples.  The success or failure of a particular 
system is measured against its success in addressing its motivating problem.  As a 
philosophical enterprise – seeking wisdom rather than mere cataloguing - priority is given to 
the current emergence of a problem over the historical occurrence thereof.  This should not 
be seen as a criticism of the original presentation, merely a recognition that the setting and 
expressions of perennial issues are impermanent and should be continually reassessed.  I 
consider this to be in the spirit of Buddhism, but this will be further elaborated below. 
 
                                                      
3
 Translations of key terms are given in Sanskrit unless otherwise stated.  Japanese and Chinese terms are 
rendered in Romanised transliterations: Jp. = Japanese, Ch. = Chinese (Pin-Yin). 
4
 With due recognition of cultural and historical influences. 
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The Zen Moral Problem 
The thesis examines two connected problems: the first is the aforementioned ‘Zen moral 
problem’, while the second is the issue of making sense of ‘a groundless metaphysics’, 
which arises in response to the moral problem.  The problem is seen to arise due to a 
distinction made between two ‘levels’ of reality – corresponding to ‘conventional’ and 
‘ultimate’ modes of understanding, also known as ‘two truths’ in the Buddhist tradition.5  
Examining the nature of the problem metaphysically, the connection and separation of the 
two modes should be explicable.  This connection is found in the principle of 
‘interdependence’.  Interdependence, it is argued, implicates a universe empty of intrinsic 
existence at any level.  The solution to the problem is to be found in a complete framework 
of interdependence. 
The motivating problem, the ‘Zen moral problem’, is simply that Zen is supposed to be moral 
and it appears not to be.6  How could this be so?  The first point to address is the normative 
claim, that Zen should be one way or another.  Indeed such a claim must be strongly denied 
from the basis of Zen thought – the enlightened state is beyond such deliberative 
distinctions as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – ‘Zen’, as an expression of the ultimate truth7, is amoral.8  
                                                      
5
 The development of this idea is credited to Nāgārjuna - See Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle 
Way, P.88. 
6
 Dale Wright points out that, “It is not that we see a history of moral error or atrocity, but rather that we do 
see a history of disinterest.”  (Wright, D., ‘Satori and the Moral Dimension of Enlightenment’, Journal of 
Buddhist Ethics, Vol.13 (2006), p.4.)  This has consequences for Buddhist soteriology; see for example the 
arguments made in the name of ‘Critical Buddhism’ from Matsumoto and Hakamaya.  An overview is given in 
Swanson, ‘Zen is not Buddhism’ in Numen, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 115-149. 
7
 Note that ‘Zen’ is used in the literature in two senses – First, ‘Zen’ is the cultural/ historical tradition.  Second, 
as alluded to in the noted sentence, ‘Zen’ refers to the ultimate truth.  For the distinction between historical 
Zen and ‘Zen as Zen’/ ‘understood from the inside’, see Suzuki, ‘Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih’, in Philosophy East 
and West, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Apr., 1953), pp. 25-46; in response to Hu Shih, ‘Chan (Zen) Buddhism in China Its 
History and Method’, Philosophy East and West, Vol.3, No.1 (Apr. 1953), pp.3-24.  The misinterpretation 
between the two is expanded in Sellmann, J.D., ‘A Belated Response to Hu Shih and D. T. Suzuki’, Philosophy 
East and West, Vol.45, No.1 (Jan. 1995), pp.97-104. 
8
 The position of transcendent ‘amorality’ is attributed to Suzuki, though this reading is contentious – see 
Brear, A.D., ‘The Nature and Status of Moral Behavior in Zen Buddhist Tradition’, Philosophy East and West, 
Vol.24 No.4 (Oct, 1974), pp.429-441.   
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This is the key issue, and is examined in depth in chapter 2 of this thesis, but the accusation 
levelled against Zen targets the conventional expression rather than the nature of the 
ultimate state of reality.  At the conventional level a Buddhist is supposed to abide by three 
modes of practice: meditation (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā) and morality (śīla).  If a Zen 
master is recorded as acting in an apparently immoral manner, then the validity of their 
‘enlightened’ realisation (wisdom) is brought into question, which in turn places the 
foundational principles of the Zen tradition at issue. 
The recent attacks on the validity of Zen have emerged from a new field of Buddhist analysis 
termed ‘Critical Buddhism’ (Jp. hihan bukkyō).9  In addition to claiming that ‘Zen is not 
Buddhism’,10 the adherents of this philosophy present an ideological attempt to return to 
the philosophical and practical foundations of Buddhism.  They maintain that only those 
who abide by the anti-essentialist principle of ‘dependent arising’ can be considered 
Buddhist.  As the current project takes interdependence as its key focus it would appear 
that I am in accord with the Critical Buddhists, however I must also criticise the extent of 
their attack on Zen, particularly in relation to the core principle of ‘Buddha-nature’.  For 
instance, Matsumoto claims that Dōgen is heavily influenced by the ‘dhātu-vāda tradition’ 11 
and his work is thus antithetical to Buddhism.12  In Chapter 5, I present a different 
interpretation of Dōgen based on the idea of an ‘empty’ Buddha-nature, thus maintaining 
both the principle of interdependence as well as Dōgen’s particular Buddhist expression, 
which, as will be shown, significantly benefits the current project. 
                                                      
9
 An anthology of articles on this topic are available in Hubbard, J. & Swanson, P. (Eds.), Pruning the Bodhi Tree. 
10
 For this discussion see Swanson, ‘Zen is Not Buddhism’, which is addressed in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
11
 The “theory of locus” – coined by Matsumoto, also a Sōto Zen adherent. 
12
 Matsumoto Shirō, ‘Comments on Critical Buddhism’, in Hubbard, J. & Swanson, P. (Eds.), Pruning the Bodhi 
Tree, pp.161-162. 
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In the same vein as the Critical Buddhists, it is important to examine the influences upon the 
development of Zen when assessing potential deviation from the Buddhist teaching.13  The 
focus here is philosophical rather than cultural/historical, so investigation will focus on 
those concepts which are compatible with the key principle of interdependence.  For this 
reason it is useful to briefly compare Daoist metaphysics (chapter 2) as well as the 
connection of Kegon (Ch. Huayan) philosophy to Dōgen specifically (chapter 5), both of 
which could be classified as falling into the essentialism of the ‘dhātu-vāda tradition’. 
A further point for consideration is that Zen ideas have been adopted across many fields, 
and in many cases unfortunately misappropriated leading to a widespread 
misrepresentation of Zen.  Titles integrating “Zen and the art of...”, after Herrigal’s 
autobiographical account,14 have become commonplace and associated more with new age 
spiritualism than Zen Buddhism.  The prominence of Zen concepts in popular literature have 
seen the concepts come to be associated with such topics as ‘how to make one’s fortune’, 
‘success in warfare’, and so on.15  The adoption of the term ‘Nothing’ to refer to the 
ultimate nature of reality, as well as a justification for selfishly motivated actions, has led to 
entanglement with the philosophical notions associated with the Western existential 
tradition; addressing ‘nothingness’ as ‘nihilism’.  
Nihilism can be seen as the wider problem of which the Zen moral problem is an instance.  
This connection has not gone unnoticed among Zen thinkers, the Kyōto school being a prime 
                                                      
13
 Not content with the developed scriptural tradition, Hakamaya Noriaki goes so far in legitimising their 
approach to say that “Buddhism is criticism”.  (Hakamaya N., ‘Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy’, in 
Hubbard, J. & Swanson, P. (Eds.), Pruning the Bodhi Tree, p.56.) 
14
 Herrigal, E., Zen in the Art of Archery. 
15
 Despite the widespread use and adoption of Zen concepts, no academic survey of Zen in popular literature 
has been undertaken (outside of the fine arts).  This is certainly owing to the often frivolous and uncritical use 
of such concepts, however the feedback into critical studies from the popular literature (such as that widely 
attributed to D.T. Suzuki) does modify cultural interpretation and so should be seriously considered. 
13 
 
example of engagement with the problem of nihilism as a cross-cultural phenomenon.  If 
the Zen moral problem is taken as a case study of the wider issue, the principles garnered 
from a study of interdependence would have direct implications for contemporary 
philosophical thought beyond Buddhism.  One such implication is the development of meta-
moral principles; guidelines for the development of a universally viable understanding of 
compassion (karuṇā), following the Buddhist soteriological project. 
The major point of contention is how to reconcile the experience of a conventional being 
with the enlightened perspective.  The characteristic of enlightenment is not merely 
knowledge of how the world is; an enlightened being is said to affect compassion towards 
all.  And yet, the concept used to best characterise reality from the perspective of this 
enlightened understanding is nothingness.  If both this wisdom and compassion are to be 
maintained, we must determine how it is possible that morality can emerge from nothing.   
At the end of his Zen at War, Victoria writes the following: 
Experienced Zen practitioners know that the “no-mind” of Zen does in fact exist.  Equally, 
they know that Samadhi (i.e., meditative) power also exists.  But they also know, or at least 
ought to know, that these things, in their original Buddhist formulation, had absolutely 
nothing to do with bringing harm to others.  On the contrary, authentic Buddhist awakening 
is characterised by a combination of wisdom and compassion – identifying oneself with 
others and seeking to eliminate suffering in all its forms.  Thus, the question must be asked, 
even though it cannot be answered in this book – How is the Zen school to be restored and 
reconnected to its Buddhist roots?  Until this question is satisfactorily answered and acted 
upon, Zen’s claim to be an authentic expression of the Buddha Dharma must remain in 
doubt.16 
                                                      
16
 Victoria, Zen at War, pp. 230-231. 
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I will, in this thesis, examine the philosophical basis of the misappropriation of Zen and 
explicate the correlation between Zen thought and the Buddhist soteriological project.  It is 
for this purpose I propose a metaphysical study. 
 
Metaphysical Method 
Metaphysical studies tend to be speculative when posited as self-contained systems,17 so it 
is not surprising to find metaphysics was shunned by Gautama Buddha and his followers, 
preferring instead to focus on more practical problems.18  Even a metaphysical framework 
built upon ‘interdependence’ has the potential to, ironically, become conceptually isolated 
from experienced reality and thus irrelevant to worldly concerns.  In this thesis the focal 
problem of explaining the philosophical distillation of the Zen position is both the 
motivation for the metaphysical framework and a test to its success or failure.  If this 
metaphysical framework is to make sense of Buddhist soteriology it must present practical 
outcomes. 
‘Metaphysics’ in the sense it is adopted here does not fall under a classical definition,19  
other than to simply state that I am concerned with revealing the nature of reality as it is.  
To this end the emphasis is on uncovering universally applicable principles which aid in 
                                                      
17
 Systems of metaphysics as ‘transcendent’ are free to spin their own ontological realities, which inform upon, 
but are not revised by, worldly discoveries.  Rudolf Carnap, trumpeting logical positivism, derided this 
detached creativity of metaphysicians as the recourse of “musicians without musical ability” (Carnap, R., ‘The 
Elimination of Metaphysics’, in Schlick, M., et al (Eds.), Logical Empiricism at its Peak, p.30) 
18
 A commonly cited analogy from Gautama Buddha is the parable of the arrow, (Majjhima-nikaya, Sutta 63), 
recounted in Bhikkhu Bodhi, In the Buddha’s Words, pp.230-233; whereby one should first tend to one’s injury 
(i.e. incarnate suffering) before inquiring after less immediate details. 
19
 The enterprise undertaken in this thesis certainly does not follow Aristotle; since to study ‘first causes’ or the 
‘unchanging’ nature of ‘being as such’ (or later, that which cannot be assigned to ‘the categories’) proves to be 
either antithetical or irrelevant to the Buddhist position.  However, the adoption of the term ‘metaphysics’ 
follows later developments, whereby “a philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once 
been seen as constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics—first causes or unchanging things—would now 
be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion.”  (van Inwagen, P., ‘Metaphysics’, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010.) 
15 
 
defining the interactions of the phenomenal world.   Following the implications of śūnyatā, 
these principles are not recognised as having any intrinsic existence of their own beyond the 
phenomenon they describe.  The content these principles refer to is absolutely contingent 
upon the particular characteristics of the world, without which they do not exist.  This is 
necessary, since any classical definition based upon ‘essence’ will be incompatible with 
śūnyatā.  For this thesis the simple definition of metaphysics just is a study of 
interdependence.20   
It is apparent that we are led to discuss metaphysics in two senses: first as a system of 
understanding, or ‘metaphysical framework’.  The second is to use the term ‘metaphysics’ to 
refer to reality as it is, indicating the underlying reality that enlightened, unobscured 
consciousness is privy to.  One apparent difficulty with using the term in the second sense is 
that metaphysics then has no content.  With interdependence as the key principle there is 
no transcendent set of laws which dictates the functioning of the universe, as there can be 
nothing separate from the universe - or the phenomenon in question would not be 
interdependent.  The referent of such a metaphysics is just the empty universe – nothing 
but absolute interdependence.  Attempting to take a further step, to speak metaphysically 
of metaphysics, is to attribute reality some existence that is not covered in the metaphysical 
explication itself – to assume that there is something implicit to reality untouched by our 
inquiries into metaphysics.  If this were accepted then the nature of reality as it is would 
become ineffable and so fall beyond our epistemological ability.  All we could say of reality 
would be transcendental, in Kant’s sense, referring to the necessary characteristics of reality 
which are absolutely unrealisable but through reasoned reflection.  Such a metaphysics 
                                                      
20
 As ‘pratītyasamutpāda’ - The scope of ‘interdependence’ will be set out in chapter 2, while the metaphysical 
study, examining the consequences of these limits, will begin in chapter 3. 
16 
 
would still, however, be bound by the conventionality of epistemological limitations.  In 
other words, it is still a ‘metaphysical framework’ which cannot capture the nature of 
reality, but moreover is not in accord with the Buddhist project. 
To avoid confusing ‘metaphysical reality’, as the manner in which reality functions, with the 
system that is set up to represent it, I refer to the ‘metaphysics’ developed from 
interdependence throughout as the ‘metaphysical framework’.21  I admit that this is a 
limited system that cannot capture reality as such,22 but it is proposed as an ‘empty’ system 
in order to revaluate our conventional interpretations, justifications and explanations 
overlayed on the world of our experience.  For this project to succeed we cannot properly 
talk of metaphysics without considering epistemology.23 
As stated previously, Buddhist metaphysics is intimately bound up with the concept of the 
‘two truths’.  The implications of this division does not allow for a simple conflation of truth 
into a single unity.  The reason for this is evident in the four noble truths: There is suffering, 
there is a root of suffering, there is a cessation of suffering, and the eight-fold path is this 
solution.  If reality were merely ultimate truth there would be no suffering.  If reality were 
merely conventional truth there would be no cessation.  If Buddhist metaphysics is 
misunderstood then its soteriological project cannot function.  
                                                      
21
 In this sense metaphysics is just the study of the implications of interdependence.  A similar argument, 
concerning the position of Dōgen, can be found in Schilbrack, K., ‘Metaphysics in Dōgen’, Philosophy East 
West, vol.50 no.1 (Jan, 2000), p.47. – Dōgen’s apparent denial of the possibility of entities independent of 
experience is not a denial of metaphysics, rather it invites a redefinition of metaphysics as the investigation of 
the features of necessarily impermanent, and thus interdependent phenomenon.  (See also ibid., P.40 – on the 
‘metaphysical’ significance of Dōgen’s other key concepts.) 
22
 At least, not in its metaphysical representation.  As a worldly phenomenon however it is as equally valid an 
aspect of interpenetrating reality as anything else– see chapter 5, ‘flowers in the sky’. 
23
 If this reasoning is followed through one should not find issue with the ultimate truth in Zen being described 
as ‘ineffable’ while, at the same time, the historical record reveals that; “Zen monks wrote many more books 
than those of any other Buddhist sect in China.”  (Chang, C., ‘The Nature of Ch’an (Zen) Buddhism’, Philosophy 
East and West, Vol.6, No.4 (Jan. 1957), p.338.)  If such records are understood as ‘empty’, no conflict arises. 
17 
 
Enlightenment is explained to be the perfection of wisdom24: i.e. ‘seeing reality as it is’.25  
The two interpretations of metaphysics I am dealing with could be consumed under the 
Buddhist ‘two truths’.  Metaphysics as a system is always conventional truth, whereas 
metaphysics as the nature of reality (not even as the study thereof) indicates ultimate truth.  
Maintaining this division, one must realise that there can be no explanation or 
systematisation of ultimate reality (reality as it is) that can escape conventional 
systematisation (reification).  Importantly in Zen this distinction does not involve a 
‘bracketing away’ or denial of some underlying reality, nor does it relegate reality to pure 
empiricism or phenomenology.  Ultimate reality is beyond conventional experience, and 
thus is conventionally ‘transcendent’, however reality is realisable qua reality (non-
obstructed) through the experience of awakening (Jp. satori). 
As absolute interdependence denies the possibility of metaphysical transcendence, where 
‘transcendence’ applies to the framework developed here it must be understood in 
accordance with the Buddhist soteriological project.  When a being becomes enlightened 
ontologically nothing has changed, but epistemologically their perspective has been 
transformed.  To unpack the complications arising from this ‘transcendence’ the inextricable 
interconnection between metaphysics and epistemology must be recognised.  One 
consequence of this is that when one changes one’s mind, in a real sense one changes the 
world.  (Though, it should be noted that this is an inter-causal connection and is not akin to 
simply re-interpreting the world and expecting the world to have changed to accord to this 
interpretation.) 
                                                      
24
 ‘Prajñāpāramitā’ – Diamond Sutra, Trans. Red Pine. 
25
 In reference to realizing the nature of the true self (non-self) - Suzuki, D.T., ed., The Lankavatara Sutra: A 
Mahayana Text, XVI, p.52. 
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So why then speak of ‘metaphysics’ at all, if it is equally applicable to all things (all entities, 
both mental and physical) and has no content?  Because every possible content for any 
possible context or system of understanding is explained to be metaphysically connected 
and can be explained as metaphysically (read epistemologically) separated.  Without such 
connection no communication is possible, nor is causation or understanding in any form.  
Without such separation no explanation is possible, nor is causation or understanding in any 
form.  With either denied, the myriad forms are condensed into a nihilistic ‘one’.  The 
metaphysical project undertaken here sets out to provide a common ground (touchstone) 
for inter-subjective dialogue, such as morality, through explaining reality as being both 
separated and connected concurrently. 
From the Buddhist position the simple metaphysical solution to the question of morality, as 
stated by Schillbrack, is that “Metaphysics provides the answer to the question: why should 
one be selfless and nonattached rather than otherwise? The answer is: because everything 
is impermanent, and attachment to self is thus inauthentic, a result of false views.”26  This 
metaphysical explanation is not enough however if it is to fulfil the requirements of the 
Buddhist soteriological project.  In order to overcome suffering one must not only recognise 
such a metaphysic, but express it.  The metaphysical understanding must tell us why a view 
is correct or false and it should allow the derivation of principles which can be applied to 
everyday action.  This is the goal of the thesis. 
To solve the Zen moral problem, the nature of ultimate truth must be investigated.  We 
must make sense of a groundless metaphysics, a ‘nothingness’ that is somehow manifest as 
the myriad phenomena making up our world, apparently incapable of providing a solid basis 
                                                      
26
  Schilbrack, ‘Metaphysics in Dōgen’, Philosophy East West, vol.50 no.1 p.43 
19 
 
for our beliefs.  Can a reading of nihilism be avoided?  Is it possible to transcend 
nothingness? 
 
Thesis Outline 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters, which can be further grouped into three stages: 
Chapters 1 and 2 set up the focal problem, its nature and limits.   
Chapters 3 and 4 develop the metaphysical framework, while chapter 5 applies a specifically 
Zen reading to complete the framework.   
Chapters 6 and 7 outline the implications and direct application of the framework. 
 
The discussion engages the themes of the chapters as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 – Nihilism.  As Zen apparently reduces Buddhist philosophy to the practice of 
meditation and a focus on ‘nothingness’, this will be used as the starting point for our 
metaphysical analysis and to introduce the problem at hand.  The character of ‘the moral 
problem’ is not unique to studies of the Zen tradition, and is shown to have arisen in 
‘existential’ thought,27 provoking interesting parallels and alternative responses.  Here, the 
wider problem of nihilism is set out and comparisons are made to Buddhist ‘śūnyatā’.  Of 
particular concern is the revoking of traditional morality in response to nihilism, for which 
Nietzsche’s ‘revaluation of values’ provides a problematic contrast to the Buddhist ideal.  
Following the Kyōto school, these issues are directly engaged with as a real existential 
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 The term ‘existential’ is adopted here as a designation of a particular characteristic philosophical enterprise, 
(commonly associated with those predominantly European, late 19
th
-20
th
 century philosophies) focused upon 
the human experience of existence, regardless of whether or not the particular individuals considered 
themselves ‘existentialist’ or not. 
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problem for Zen thought.  In this manner the emergence of nihilism serves as a guideline for 
philosophical analysis, illustrating the pitfalls of incomplete understanding. 
 
Chapter 2 – Transcendence.  With nihilism in focus, the historical emergence of the Zen 
moral problem is analysed.  In Zen literature the ‘amoralism’ associated with the actions of 
enlightened beings has been philosophically justified as transcendent.  I argue that this is the 
cause of the moral problem.  Nihilism indicates that all systems of understanding are 
necessarily limited, including Buddhist systems.  This prompts an examination of the 
Buddhist soteriological project to end suffering and the Daoist influences on Zen, in order to 
enquire into the purpose and, therefore, the validity of Zen thought with regard to this 
project.  To this end the connection of compassion and enlightened wisdom must be made 
sense of.  This prompts the question: with transcendence denied, upon what basis can we 
universally (and morally) respond to nihilism?  It is for this purpose that a metaphysical 
framework is proposed. 
 
Chapter 3 - Interdependent Entities.  In order to construct a metaphysical framework 
capable of addressing the problem of nihilism, interdependence is established as the key 
principle.  It is argued that without recognition of interdependence conventional experience 
cannot be understood.  Following Nāgārjuna, whose philosophy informed later Zen thought, 
emptiness is explained to be synonymous with dependent origination, avoiding the 
extremes of reification and nihilism.  The framework is proposed as an alternative to a 
reductionist account of reality, and explicitly denies the existence of any metaphysical 
foundation.  This implies a self-defining universe, with no external influences, whereby the 
‘laws’ attributed to reality also arise dependently. 
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Chapter 4 - Interdependent Minds.  The difficulty in proposing any universal metaphysical 
connection is that it tends to ignore the other side – the apparent separation of phenomena 
– the experience of which prompts such metaphysical investigations in the first place.  This 
is prominent when examining enlightened compassion, as the emergence of separate minds 
must be explained.  Specifically, the enlightened experience of ‘non-suffering’ must be 
reconciled with the conventional experience of ‘suffering’, without one overriding the other.  
The integration of the causal capacity of ‘mind’ into the groundless metaphysical framework 
presents a new understanding of epistemic levels, through which no particular level can be 
considered fundamental.  Thus presented, the metaphysical framework explains the 
possibility of coming to directly ‘see reality as it is’, giving credence to the Zen mode of 
Buddhist practice. 
 
Chapter 5 – Interpenetration.  At this point the framework of interdependent metaphysics 
is turned to examine the work of Zen master Dōgen.  Dōgen’s position, with regard to the 
problem of ‘original nature’, strikes at the heart of the Zen moral problem, and adds a 
further layer of complexity to the framework through the integration of interpenetration.  
This implicates an entanglement of both sides of any duality for enlightened epistemology.  
Together with Dōgen’s emphasis on the connection of practice and realisation, the basis is 
set for the awareness of conventional modes, including morality, from an enlightened 
perspective.  
 
Chapter 6 - Moral Implications.  The construction of a system of morality is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, however certain meta-moral principles can be drawn from the 
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metaphysics of interdependence, which can in turn be used to critique everyday actions.  
This is especially applicable to Zen concepts such as ‘no-mind’ and spontaneity, given their 
prominent position on the path to ultimate realisation and also in the creation of the Zen 
moral problem.  To resolve this issue I turn to Huineng’s discussions on the state of ‘no-
mind’ to determine a more complete reading than that appropriated in the popular 
literature.  An understanding of the metaphysics of interdependence together with 
recognition of the goal of ultimate realisation helps to explain the significance of ‘no-mind’, 
and why it should not be read as mere ‘mindlessness’. 
 
Chapter 7 - Practical Application.  Turning to pragmatic concerns, the problem of nihilism is 
re-introduced as the antithesis to the position pursued throughout the thesis.  It is argued 
that even if one is merely focussed on what is pragmatically useful, one must still recognise 
interdependence and thus the implications of the metaphysical framework follow.  In the 
spirit of the quotation opening this introduction, the martial art is examined as the 
paradigmatic example of the (mis)appropriation of Zen.  Here, if the concepts of Zen are to 
be practically applied, they must be adopted completely or ultimately fail.  Formlessness is 
established as a guiding pragmatic principle that is existentially realisable, in accordance 
with the groundless framework of metaphysics. 
 
This progression is set out to resolve the Zen moral problem by investigating the 
implications of interdependence metaphysically constructed.  In so doing we must make 
sense of Zen, which Suzuki describes as follows: 
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Psychologically, to become conscious of the unconscious; ethically, to be detached while 
attached; and metaphysically, to see the infinite in the finite. 
 - D.T. Suzuki, (1958).28 
  
                                                      
28
 Suzuki, D.T., from the series Wisdom, NBC 1958, quoted in Smith, H., ‘Foreword’ in Mitchell, D. (Ed.), Masao 
Abe: A Zen Life of Dialogue, p.x. 
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Chapter 1: Nihilism 
 
With a focus on ‘nothingness’ the Zen practitioner is forced to base their everyday 
interactions either on adherence to codes of conduct or uncritically continue their habitual 
actions, either of which would contradict the heart of the Zen position.  Examined as a 
philosophical position, with any positive affirmation apparently negated by ‘emptiness’, we 
may ask what it is that guides the actions of the Zennist?  From the position of ‘nothingness’ 
as ultimate truth, by what can we measure ‘good’?  Expressions of the Zen moral problem, 
to be examined in the next chapter, are characteristic of a wider problem, namely the 
problem of nihilism. 
Nihilism is the belief that there is no meaning, usually developed through a deep scepticism, 
denying the foundations of apparent core principles.  This perception of meaninglessness is 
either applied immediately to oneself or, and more significantly, to the world at large.  The 
term ‘nihilism’ covers a range of areas in which thought can be brought to nothing.  For the 
sake of the present study these can be divided into ‘ontological nihilism’, ‘epistemic nihilism’ 
and ‘moral nihilism’.  These demarcations are not exclusive, and in most respects are co-
entailing, however the manner in which they are addressed must differ according to their 
type.  Ontological nihilism denies existence, though through the act of positing non-
existence is self-refuting thus deferring the metaphysical question and falling into epistemic 
nihilism - a weak version denying external existence can be seen in Buddhist ‘mind-only’ 
interpretations of reality.  Epistemic nihilism denies comprehension, which is revealed as 
extreme scepticism.  Moral nihilism is the denial of meaning and of ethical bounds and is the 
closest to the earliest definitions of nihilism. 
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Nihilism posits an ontological void, in conflict with, and purportedly derived from the failure 
of, the human desire to make sense of the world.  Nihilism problematises ontology, but the 
problem of nihilism is not ontological.    Without the enquirer, the natural world is not 
nihilistic.  A quick survey of people on the street would illustrate that nihilism is not revealed 
through everyday interactions. Only when an individual turns philosophical and seeks the 
basis of their beliefs about the world (of meaning, morality or truth) and their scepticism 
probes deep enough to find such a basis lacking, does nihilism emerge.  Camus states the 
issue in the following way, “what is absurd is the confrontation of this irrational [world] and 
the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart.”29  The problem of 
nihilism, once the inquiry has begun, is that the world appears meaningless to us and yet, 
given the motivation of this very inquiry, we seem to require meaning.  Nihilism is an 
epistemological problem.   
As a philosophical mode nihilism is nonsensical, or at best necessarily ironic, since any claim 
made from the position of nihilism is undermined through its assertion of meaninglessness.  
The existentialist response reappraises the situation by claiming, in Sartre’s terms, that 
‘existence precedes essence’30, and yet as a refutation of fundamental essence, nihilism 
casts its shadow back over existence.  When existence begins to question the foundation of 
its own being, the characteristics of a nihilistic limit to the epistemological mode become 
reflected in that very existence.  Whilst this question appears to arise from an embodied 
mind, embedded in the world, the question of nihilism negates the nature of the 
questioning.  Nihilism refutes the process which brought it to realisation, and so nihilism can 
only be expressed as the problem of nihilism. 
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 Camus, A., The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, p.21. 
30
 Sartre, 1946, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, in Langiulli, N. (Ed.) European Existentialism, pp.391-416. 
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Moving towards a postmodernist reading of Nietzsche’s Will to Power, no assessment can 
be made of any valuation other than the effectiveness of a project at achieving its own ends.  
On this relativistic model the pursuit of capital, of happiness or the collection of stamps are 
all equally valid.  Of course one may argue that some values are more basic than others, 
purely relationally and without need of an ultimate basis, so that if we were to find that 
money does not buy happiness, or that happiness cannot buy money, one may be ditched in 
favour of the other.  If any dichotomy is reversible then a hierarchy is not apparent. 
With nothing as a basis we struggle to add ethics to self-defined systems and their specific 
ends (such as economics, scientific research, or simple hedonistic pursuits).  Prior to 
epistemic nihilation, the positing of a base, whether mistaken or otherwise, brought forth 
morality as a consequence of its foundational principles.  A prominent example is the 
foundation of a creator God – morality and meaning are derived from this underlying 
relation to a ‘greater purpose’ – but telos can also be grounded more generally.  If one point 
of meaning/morality is established then all further assessments can be built up from this 
foundation.  The determination that no such point can be established is the problem of 
nihilism.  Without foundations, the artificial addition of ethics to a system will certainly be 
undermined by the projected nihilism at its core.  Any such ethical system would then be 
judged, from the base of the system, as equivalent to any artificial valuation.  To avoid this 
relativism morality must become a consequence of the recognition of a shared reality.  How 
we, given the problem of nihilism, can come to realise such a reality (and indeed what this 
‘reality’ could possibly entail) is the subject of this thesis. 
This chapter examines the problem of nihilism through selected historical and cross-cultural 
responses in order to set the limits of the metaphysical project to commence from chapter 
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3.  Taken in conjunction with chapter 2, which pursues the related problem of 
‘transcendence’ and implications for meaning and justification, the present chapter also 
introduces the Zen distillation of Buddhist philosophy and the problems that stem from it.   
 
This chapter is divided into three sections: 
The first section, Nihilist Existenz, marks out the limitations of nihilism with reference to 
European existentialism.  Nietzsche characterises the problem historically as the ‘death of 
God’ through the failure of absolutist foundations (Christianity in particular) and proposes 
the Übermensch in order for humanity to overcome its nihilistic limitations.  Following 
Nietzsche, our contemporary reaction to the realisation of the problem of nihilism is to 
propose the creation of values, ignoring the abyss at their base, derived from an existential 
mode of affirmation. 
The second section, Śūnyatā, first addresses nihilistic attacks on Buddhism and how 
‘emptiness’ as a concept differs from simple ‘nothingness’, as expressed through the 
nihilistic perspective.  Nāgārjuna’s explanation of the entanglement of reification and 
nihilism leads our discussion to the recognition of the limitations of systems.  The existential 
nihilist account is shown to be just such a destructive entanglement.  Here, following 
Nāgārjuna, the importance of a perspective that avoids both the extremes is stressed. 
Finally, The Great Doubt; as the Kyōto school acts as an intellectual bridge between Buddhist 
and European existential modes, Nietzsche’s recognition of nihilism is reaffirmed.  According 
to Nishitani, nihilism must be existentially realised, and then passed through in order to 
realise ‘nothingness’ in the Zen Buddhist sense.  Because of this no system can analyse the 
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state beyond ‘nothingness’, however this realisation sets the stage for the metaphysics of 
interdependence that is to follow. 
 
Nihilist Existenz 
“God is dead” cries Nietzsche, and “we have killed him!” 31  As the creator of the universe 
God would not be missed, for an effect will continue after the extinction of the cause.  As 
the fundamental ground behind the forces of the universe there may be some difficulties.  If 
such a ground is necessary however, the difficulty turns out to be self-refuting; for if we 
exist to ask the question, to think rationally, then the world persists, and so must whatever 
forces allow it to do so.  On the other hand, the removal of God as the foundation of 
morality is truly a problem since, to echo the sentiment of Dostoevsky’s fiction; if God does 
not exist anything is permitted.32   
Countless philosophical proofs have used God, or some omnipotent equivalent, as an 
anchor for their thought – as a moral metre that stands behind and beyond the worldly foci 
under enquiry.  If this anchor is undermined then not only is anything morally permitted; 
every theory loses its grounding and is left ‘in the air’.  The simultaneous result of absolutely 
opening the possibility of meaning is to problematise the value of any one particular 
interpretation.  That is to say that since each interpretation is valued relatively there can be 
no absolute value, and so no universal morality. 
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 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 125 
32
 Dostoevsky, from the character Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov. A similar phrase is recounted by Nietzsche 
in Thus spake Zarathustra, IV. 69.   
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This is the situation which Nietzsche presented as a ‘catastrophe’33 for western thought.  
Not because a point had been reached where thought undermined itself, rather, that the 
entire history of western thought up to this point had been intentionally covering up the 
nihilism at the base of reality for the sake of universalising individual interpretations in what 
was really a pluralistic world.  Criticising the Christian mainstream specifically, and all 
thought generally, Nietzsche labelled the traditional moral conventions ‘slave morality’.  For 
Nietzsche this was a valuation of the weak against the natural supremacy of the strong 
(whom he termed the ‘masters’ of bygone eras).  His intention was to characterise these 
traditional moral values as the very opposite of what they presented themselves to be – 
they are selfish and ultimately have a negative effect on the whole of humanity.  But more 
than this, faced with the actuality that there is no absolute value, one finds nothingness.  “If 
one cannot confront the Abyss, the best thing is to chase it out of sight.  This is exactly what 
society/ religion achieves”,34 and they do this by relegating to ‘other-worldly’ values or, in 
our contemporary context, by pursuing pre-established ends and ignoring the question of 
nihilism. 
From the period of the Enlightenment onwards a trickle of scepticism became a flood of 
rebellion against the religious, absolutist and transcendent world-views.  Reinforced with 
the utility of scientific method,35 one no longer found the need to look beyond the world for 
explanation of worldly phenomena.  This shift did not end theological foundations within 
philosophical enquiry but it did initiate a move away from a reliance and justification based 
purely upon religious assumptions.  Characteristic of the age of reason was an attempt to 
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 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals III 27 
34
 Bauman, Z., 1995,  Life in Fragments, p.15 
35
 Indeed Nietzsche’s thought can be seen to be indebted to the development of evolutionary theory in his 
production of the world as ‘will to power’.  For further discussion see pp.78-9 below. 
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ground beliefs in a naturalistic teleology, yet this drive towards naturalism was to come into 
conflict with that reasoning which inspired it, that is, the naturalistic fallacy.  With all events 
in this world apparently limited to the immanent, the ‘other world’ is dismissed,36 and along 
with it the transcendent basis of morality.  Even if one were to ignore the scientific mandate 
and hold onto the ‘other-world’ one may well be forced to question what affect, moral or 
otherwise, this realm can have on the world in which we live.  Through such demonic 
scepticism, human imperfection takes on a decidedly different hue under the radiance of 
God’s impotence.  Camus asks us to contemplate; “When man submits God to moral 
judgement, he kills him in his own heart.  And then what is the basis of morality?”37  This 
should not be seen as a call to blind ‘faith’, instead, here lies a hint that the foundation of 
morality is not (simply) ‘out there’, but has something to do with individuals themselves.  
The significance of ‘the death of God’ should be understood in this way – as an existentially 
human dilemma. 
The dramatic ‘event’ of God’s death became the signifier of a turn into ‘post-modern’ 
thought and general non-absolutist morality.  Just as the ‘modernist’ movement in art had 
turned away from a symbolism that was predominantly religious, and philosophy of the 
Enlightenment claimed its focus on reason over Dogma, the ‘post-modern’ turn in both 
fields recognised multiple narratives and the opening up of interpretation, building upon the 
creation of meaning emphasised by the ‘modernists’.38  In modern thought the human being 
becomes the foundation of morality in place of God.  It is a radical shift in the history of 
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 Ala Ockham’s Razor, we select the solution which posits the least and dismiss speculation which does not aid 
our explanation. 
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 Camus, The Rebel, p.57. 
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 Jean-Paul Sartre – “Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself.”  (Sartre, J., ‘Existentialism is a 
Humanism’, in Langiulli, N. (Ed.), European Existentialism, p.395.)  Simone de Beauvoir - “the task of man is 
one: to fashion the world by giving it a meaning.” (‘An Existentialist Looks at Americans’, New York Times 
Magazine, May 25th, 1947 in Beauvoir, S., Philosophical Writings, p.325.) 
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ideas, from a search for ‘truth’ to a rebellion against dogma in pursuit of a new 
understanding and finally to a meta-theory that claims that every theory is created – 
selected – and could be otherwise, characteristic of the ‘post-modern’.  This is an existential 
phenomena, since as human beings we are constantly capable of selecting what we accept 
as reality, within limitations.  More importantly, any reliance upon transcendent or 
otherworldly values is undermined. 
The significance of Nietzsche’s cry is not that God does not exist, rather that God did exist 
but now we have destroyed the idea of God and, along with it, all explanation of meaning in 
the world.39  This is the problem of nihilism as Nietzsche sees it; a meaninglessness that we 
have brought upon ourselves and are unprepared for.  The solution to nihilism then is not to 
create a new system of otherworldly virtues, for this could not save us from nihilism and is 
itself ‘nihilistic’ (that is leading to nihilism).  Instead, according to Nietzsche, we must 
become consummate nihilists ourselves40.  Nihilism is not something which can be avoided – 
to attempt to do so would only result in a passive nihilism, a facade of ignorance.41  We 
must first embrace nihilism in order to overcome it.  The difficulties with this approach will 
become apparent later, though for Nietzsche we cannot fail to realise nihilism or we will be 
doomed to a really nihilistic existence – not living in fear of the Abyss, but living so as to 
deny the reality of the world by adhering to projected values.  To avoid this fate Nietzsche 
proposes that traditional values must be overcome in a ‘transvaluation of values’.  We must 
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 Camus remarks; “Contrary to the opinion of certain of his Christian critics, Nietzsche did not form a project 
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then find a position ‘beyond good and evil’42 from which these valuations are created.  The 
basis of this is the idea of ‘will to power’.   
All that exists for Nietzsche is an expression of will to power and humanity represents 
various expressions and reactions to this natural ‘law’.  Following Nietzsche’s distinction 
between two classes of individuals; historically, the masters, and their self-created goodness 
along with them, have been overcome by the slaves who, due to their weakness of will, 
band together to call ‘evil’ anything which stands over and above them.  “Man would rather 
will nothingness than not will”,43 and so their denial leads to false faith and falls into 
nihilism.  This is both a key characteristic of will, that it can revalue weakness into strength, 
and the apparent shortfall of the slave moralists.  They submit to values placed upon them 
by manipulators (with the church being Nietzsche’s primary example of such an institution).  
Now that those values have been swept aside (for whatever reason), the slave moralists 
have nothing to adhere to and the master moralists, torn down by slavish society, no longer 
exist.  Something new is needed to overcome nihilism, something that must emerge from 
among the ranks of the slaves yet exhibiting the characteristics of the masters of old.  This 
new form of humanity he dubs the Übermensch – ‘superman’ or ‘overman’.  Contrasted 
with the masters, who were blindly self-determinate, this new human has integrated a key 
characteristic of the slaves: introspection.  The Übermensch can be seen to differ from the 
master in a rather important respect; they are not only able to forge meaning for 
themselves, they are also self-aware.  Whether parallels can be drawn between the 
Übermensch and an enlightened being in the Buddhist or Daoist traditions along these lines 
remains to be seen. 
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 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Essay 1 S.28, p.163. 
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If nihilism is held to be true we are faced with a problem.  A belief in meaninglessness is self-
refuting; it is in effect a belief that all beliefs are baseless and thus false.44  Moreover, 
nihilism as a belief is impossible because we are beings of meaning, we live, we act, we 
think, and so nihilism becomes an existential paradox.  Nihilism comes into immediate 
conflict with our mode of being.  Simply to contemplate the possibility of nihilism forces us 
to rebel against the idea, to ‘chase the Abyss out of sight’, in order to continue our mode of 
being.  Descartes’ cogito ergo sum was founded on the principle of irreducible subjectivity; 
“I am, I exist, is necessarily true”45; Heidegger’s Dasein as the being who raises the question 
of Being; and Nietzsche’s fundamental principle on the inability of the will to negate itself – 
each an essential self-affirmation from which it is impossible to accept nihilism.  To invoke 
this nothingness at any of these levels is to attempt to deny that which brought about its 
contemplation, presence or desire.  Nihilism is not a characteristic of the world nor can it be 
our considered interpretation of it.  Nihilism is a fear that something is fundamentally 
flawed in one’s own worldview. 
Nietzsche’s position on nihilism has been described as ‘a condition of tension between what 
we want to value and how the world appears to operate.’46  This distinction, between our 
mental projection of the world and the way the world impacts upon us is not only an 
evaluative or epistemological issue, but also has a direct bearing on the positing and 
application of metaphysics.  From a purely reductive, materialist standpoint we can 
conclude that life itself is meaningless, yet it must be conceded that we are not.  The 
paradox of nihilism cannot be ignored when examining the nature of reality, for to explain a 
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 Descartes, Meditations, II, Trans. Veitch, J., in The Rationalists, P.119. 
46 Carr, K.L., The Banalization of Nihilism, p.25. 
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world without the individual conducting metaphysics (i.e. the metaphysician) included in 
that explanation, the call of metaphysics is certainly missed – to explain the nature of reality 
as it is.  Perhaps only one who posits metaphysics in order to explain the position of sentient 
beings should warrant the label ‘metaphysician’ (rather than ‘metaphysicist’).   
As nihilism is only a problem for us because there is a difference between our interpretation 
of the universe as a ‘whole’ and the practice of our own lives within it, we are presented 
with three possibilities.  First, we could ignore individualistic meaning and stoically go about 
life within a disinterested universe.  Second, we could be post-modern and ignore the 
nihilistic ‘whole’ to focus in on an arbitrary value system.  Or finally, we accept Nietzsche’s 
challenge to be consummate nihilists and only accept a universal ‘whole’ that includes 
subjective realities (various perspectives) as constituting the universe.  While Nietzsche 
followed this all the way, that there is nothing but perspectives47, I am inclined to be more 
hesitant and first situate the subject in the world before positioning the affectivity of 
subjective realities.   
While the self and the position of the will are certainly concerns for Nietzsche, they appear 
problematic given the nihilism at the ground of his philosophy.  To examine the possibility of 
a will consistent with an apparently nihilistic world, which Nietzsche saw as necessary, we 
will shortly turn to Buddhist thought regarding self and emptiness.  While Nietzsche’s 
perspective on Buddhism is technically deficient, it is interesting to compare his ideas of 
‘Buddhist nihilism’ to his own brand of nothingness.  It is widely believed that Nietzsche 
knew little of Buddhism outside of Schopenhauer’s interpretation, so as a result Nietzsche 
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accepts the characterisation of Buddhism as ‘world-denying’.48  With a focus on Nirvāṇa as 
the ‘extinguishing’ of this world, Schopenhauer saw Buddhism as akin to the nihilistic 
theologies of the west.  For Nietzsche, since the Buddhist soteriological project is focussed 
on escaping the very suffering which he saw as a key strengthening force49, he saw 
Buddhism as the very antithesis of the self-affirmative worldliness he wished to inspire.50    
There was another side to Nietzsche’s Buddhism that he saw as a potential positive force for 
his contemporary context.  In a notebook, Nietzsche remarked, “I could become the Buddha 
of Europe: 
yet this would of course be a counterpart to the Indian Buddha.”51  Buddha fails, according 
to Nietzsche, since he has built a religion with all the pitfalls of Christianity rather than 
pursuing nihilism and harnessing the empowerment it provokes of the will.52  Ignoring the 
orientalist imposition of ‘religion’ to various Buddhists throughout Asia, the implication of a 
‘weakness’ even greater than that of the Christian ‘slave moralists’ is really where Nietzsche 
condemns Buddhist practice as a fundamental ignorance of ‘will to power’.  From the 
Buddhist position, the question of power stems quite neatly from the positing of individual 
will, though the outcome is utterly opposed to Nietzsche’s as the individual is conceptually 
dissolved.  The result is a deeper ‘nihilism’ than Nietzsche proposed, undermining the 
apparently obvious natural ‘law’ of ‘will to power’.  
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Heidegger, in his voluminous commentary on Nietzsche, states that “Nietzsche’s 
metaphysics is not an overcoming of nihilism.  It is the ultimate entanglement in nihilism.”53  
Indeed, Davis reinforces the criticism saying, “it appears that it may, in fact, be Nietzsche 
who remained unable to let nihilism overcome itself.”54  For Heidegger it was the stagnation 
of metaphysics, as the mode of Nietzsche’s inquiry, which prevented Nietzsche from 
following through the implications of nihilism, one important aspect of which Davis hints at.  
If one who begins the inquiry into nihilism follows it through, without reifying the concept of 
nihilism into a metaphysical existent, then nihilism is found to be an impossible state of 
being.  A thesis which claims that all is meaningless is self-contradictory and an individual 
who justifies their actions as nihilistic is plainly deluded.  Was this due to some weakness of 
the will on Nietzsche’s part or a more insidious characteristic of his philosophy that held him 
within the grasp of an impossible nihilism?  I want to reiterate here that this ‘impossible 
nihilism’ is not unique to Nietzsche’s philosophy and is fundamental to our contemporary 
world. 
Of course there is the possibility that Nietzsche was right.  Like a coin that has lost its 
monetary significance and now appears as a simple metal disc,55 morality has become a 
mere token, holding the place of something lost.  The only valuation possible on this model 
is brought about through struggle and eventual triumph of the strong over the weak.  Power 
as a ‘right’ from nature overrides the traditional moral values, now mere tokens, and there 
is no right and wrong other than those concepts an individual takes on of their own will.56  
So morality, understood as universally justifiable valuation, simply does not exist.  For 
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Nietzsche, acting on this realisation places us in a position ‘beyond good and evil’ – 
inasmuch as this position transcends conventional moral valuation this is true, but trivially 
so.  To secede to Nietzsche’s ideal, to become the Übermensch, the character of action 
beyond good and evil must be self-affirming, world-affirming, in the face of nihilism.  
Revealed in this paradox is some realisation of empowerment opened up by the revelation 
of nothingness at the base of reality.  In the extremes of scepticism something remains 
hidden.  The positive interpretation of nihilism is identical to its negative and terrifying 
aspect – absolute freedom.  How to address this tenet is the preoccupation of the existential 
mode. 
How indeed can one derive meaning from nothingness?  This is not a problem to be solved, 
such a solution is impossible if it were addressed directly, instead it must be dissolved.  In 
this respect philosophical concepts gleaned from Zen have found contemporary application 
far outside the field of their inception.  Modern commentators on this problem have drawn 
various conclusions, such as; to live in the moment,57 to act spontaneously,58 non-
grasping,59 to make all life a state of play,60 intuitive intellectualisation,61 or emphasising 
nihilism and interconnectedness.62  These responses tend to resolve either towards oneness 
or complete individuality.  I believe conclusions such as these betray a misunderstanding of 
the complication of ‘nothingness’; that it cannot be one or other (nor both), and yet most 
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studies conclude along the lines of positivity, of affirmation.  Reflection upon absolute 
freedom reveals a desire to act for oneself (to be self-willed), so it is not surprising to find a 
common bias at the outset of any study.  The alternative mode would be self-destructive 
nihilism which has obvious pragmatic limitations but should be considered as a philosophical 
possibility nevertheless, if only to point out the necessity of pragmatic considerations when 
assessing a world-view. 
The immediacy of existential awareness in response to a particular world-view and the 
pragmatic implications this entails should indicate that philosophy, specifically here our 
response to nihilism, has radical consequences.  Nietzsche himself remarks, “The thought of 
suicide is a powerful solace: by means of it one gets through many a bad night63”, succinctly 
expressing the two-fold nature of affirmative nihilism and the existential dilemma it 
presents.  A dilemma since the drive for affirmation is tied up with the individual will, which 
finds itself physically limited and reflects upon itself as a philosophical paradox.  The manner 
of dissolving the problem of nihilism may lie in disentangling the will and drive for 
affirmation in the face of meaninglessness.  In response to nihilism Nishitani presents a 
fundamental difference between the standpoint of will and the standpoint of Buddhist 
śūnyatā64.  The will is always necessarily limited to the individual, whereas śūnyatā nihilates 
even the individual. 
 
Śūnyatā  
In Mahāyāna Buddhism Śūnyatā or ‘Emptiness’ is used to designate the ultimate reality of 
non-(intrinsically existent) things.  ‘Nothingness’, as a concept, is commonly presented as 
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absolute otherness; the ‘no-thing’.65  But this is a poor understanding of nothingness.  
Consider the property of “not non-monkey” which is necessarily an exclusive concept 
applicable only to monkeys.  Nothing as merely non-thing gains its exclusivity from a play of 
logic.  The more significant step is to be found in śūnya, the ‘empty’, as those things in the 
world which are characterised by emptiness, so that śūnyatā designates a common 
characteristic of worldly things and is transcendental rather than transcendent.  While the 
‘nothingness’ at the base of every consideration under a nihilistic world-view presents the 
existential dilemma of being utterly other than the will’s desire for affirmation, emptiness 
implicates the base but refers directly to the thing itself and is not other than that thing.  
 ‘Emptiness’ is not posited as a nihilistic ‘nothingness’, though the history of the idea is 
decorated with accusations to this effect.  Two related distinctions and a metaphysical 
principle characterise a strong Mādhyamika approach, elaborated by Nāgārjuna, which will 
be taken up here.  The first distinction is between conventional and ultimate interpretations 
of reality, which is tied in with the second: the relationship of ‘emptiness’ to ‘dependent 
arising’.  The metaphysical principle, derived from this pedagogical identification, presents a 
‘middle way’ between the extremes of nihilism and its co-entailing opposite, reification.  
Simply put, if both nihilism and reification are shown to be untenable positions, that is to 
say that they fail to explain reality or how it appears, then the solution must be a 
metaphysically valid principle that proposes an alternative that is neither reifying nor 
nihilistic.  To achieve this the concept of emptiness must be carefully elaborated. 
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Glass says that making a choice of type (or definition) of emptiness is a leap of faith66, yet if 
this were true then why ‘emptiness’ at all?  If it could mean anything, then it is unnecessary.  
‘Emptiness’ is based in metaphysical reality, thus the understanding implicit to Buddhist 
soteriology is dependent upon a realisation of this reality.  Whatever ‘emptiness’ is 
understood to mean, it must be metaphysically valid.  Thus far two criteria have been 
identified which must be met: it must answer the existential sceptic’s charge of nihilism; 
while maintaining an avoidance of reifying the characteristic of emptiness.   
The problem with reification will be examined in more detail below, but crucially to tie into 
the Buddhist project and the existentialist’s search for meaning, things are explained to be 
‘empty’ of intrinsic existence because to hold any concept or entity as intrinsically existent 
will cause one’s beliefs to come into conflict with the world apparent as soon as the 
functional limits of the idea of that ‘individual’ thing are exceeded, either spatially, 
temporally or conceptually.  The claim here is that no idea can be extended indefinitely and 
remain functional without coming into conflict with reality.  Things are considered ‘empty’ 
rather than merely ‘limited’ though because even the limited validity of any thing does not 
indicate its intrinsic existence but is rather a reflection of the bounds of the system that 
defined it, just as the recognition of its conflict is a reflection of the limits of that system.  To 
posit an existent thing, ignoring the defining system, is to reify, which leads to the failure of 
that position and so to nihilism.  To posit nihilism is to reify nihilism, which presents the 
paradox of nihilism; that it denies itself through affirmation.  More practically, nihilism is 
always posited beyond its bounds of applicability and so is always in conflict with apparent 
reality.  This is the binary paradox of nihilism and reification from which the doctrine of 
śūnyatā must escape.  
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The two-fold extremes of nihilism and reification (essentialism), which appear to entail one 
another in turn, seem unable to satisfy human desire for a meaningful existence.  The 
inability to find any essential reality invokes a confrontation with ‘nothingness’ that directly 
conflicts with a common-sense view of the world and threatens to undermine all 
understanding.  However, this ‘nothingness’ is a nihilistic result of the pursuit of essence, 
and is hence a negation of what the seekers believe should be.  It denies not only meaning, 
but existence, the interaction of ‘things’ and even ‘things’ themselves, including negating 
the existence of self.  Moving now to a Buddhist conception of this ‘nothingness’ – śūnyatā – 
the negations remain, but since the focus is inverted, the impact is also altered.  This 
understanding seeks to avoid both nihilism and reification through a ‘middle path’.  Hopkins 
expresses the problem well; “When we find out that people do not inherently exist, we 
want to have nothing to do with them, we become indifferent to them.  However, this is just 
due to our addiction to the extremes; actually, emptiness is supposed to be the key to 
compassion.”67  How this functions is the focus of the metaphysics developed in this thesis. 
To examine the connection between emptiness (śūnyatā) and morality from within the 
Buddhist tradition it is useful to understand the concept of emptiness as functioning in two 
distinct ways; metaphysically and epistemologically.  While these two remain distinct for the 
purposes here, it is important to recognise that these are interrelated and ultimately 
inextricable.  When emptiness is understood metaphysically it refers to individual entities 
being empty of essence (śūnya), that things exist only conventionally and that in reality 
there are no intrinsically existent things.  This is explained through ‘dependent origination’ 
which will be explained in more detail below and elaborated into a contemporary 
metaphysical framework in chapter 3.  Epistemologically, emptiness can be understood as a 
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negation of reified concepts which do not in fact hold in reality; indeed many Buddhist 
schools take this as the only use of emptiness (denying a metaphysical aspect).  The purpose 
of this is to distinguish conventional understanding from the realisation of ultimate reality as 
expressed by the Buddha.  These ‘two truths’, and the distinction between them, forms the 
basis of much interschool argument, however the authority of the Buddha is always 
maintained for it cannot be denied that there is a distinction, however it is explained, 
between the experience of a common individual and that of an enlightened being.   
Regarding morality, it is possible to distinguish three aspects of the Buddha’s teaching; the 
Dharma as expressed for lay disciples, the Dharma as expressed for members of the Sangha 
(Buddhist monks and nuns) and finally the morality of an enlightened being.  Each ‘level’ 
builds upon the last and while the Buddhist ontology does not change, what characterises 
each level is its soteriological focus.  This is not to imply that the goals are in conflict (as 
there is a single soteriology), but rather that the epistemic outlook is transformed at each 
level.  The distinction between each level is focus.  There is only one Dharma: for lay 
disciples the focus is on positive and negative actions with regard suffering through karma; 
for the Sangha there is an added emphasis on the complete annihilation of suffering 
through the pursuit of enlightenment for both themselves and encouraging it in others; and 
finally for an enlightened being, one who has become free of suffering, there can be no such 
pursuit, yet their actions are an embodiment of the Dharma.  Recognising the difference 
drawn between these modes will benefit the discussion that follows and will act as 
background for the discussion of transcendence in the next chapter. 
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The Heart Sutra states that “whatever is form, that is emptiness, whatever is emptiness, 
that is form.”68  This apparent paradox has become one of the most important texts in the 
Mahāyāna tradition.  As Lopez notes, no sutra has been more pervasive69, indeed it is said 
that there is nothing explained in Buddhist philosophy that is not already expressed in the 
lines that make up the short text.  The sutra goes on to say that the same holds for all the 
other aggregates in the same way, every aspect that makes up our reality is empty.  This 
immediately contradicts theories, both in the time of the Buddha and today, that posit 
essential existence in any form (consider Plato’s forms, an immutable soul, an existent 
creator God or even physical atomism).  But such theories are put forward in order to satisfy 
that philosophical desire for a primary explanation, some anchor upon which all further 
explanations may be tethered and so justified.  If such a basis is denied, how are we to avoid 
the negative implications of nihilism, or even more immediately how are we to make sense 
of the world? 
For the sake of moving towards a coherent metaphysical understanding, śūnyatā 
(‘emptiness’) is said to be synonymous with pratītya-samutpāda (‘co-dependent arising’).70  
Simply, if every ‘thing’ is dependent upon its causes and conditions for its state of being, and 
this ‘thing’ is also among the causes and conditions of other entities, then no single entity 
contains the cause of its own existence.  Even so, reality still holds and cause and effect can 
still be seen to function through the interactions of empty things.  Nāgārjuna points out that 
if any entity actually had intrinsic existence it would be unable to change (since an intrinsic 
existent is a single state) and so could not interact (since this would alter the relational 
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character of the intrinsic state) and thus would not exist.  The complication here is not only 
that emptiness is feasible but that it is also essential to any rational framework of reality.  If 
any aspect of reality is essentialised, then that aspect will come into conflict with the rest of 
the system, rather than allowing explanations to be built upon it, as was the original desire.  
Rather than being nihilistic, emptiness is the foundation of epistemology, meaning and 
morality for the Mādhyamika Buddhists.  Nāgārjuna succinctly summarises, “For one who 
contradicts emptiness there would be nothing that ought to be done; activity would be 
uninitiated and an agent would be non-acting.”71 
Emptiness as a metaphysical principle has implications that extend beyond the traditional 
field of ‘metaphysics’ and which have direct consequences for the problem of nihilism.  
Since emptiness allows for change, and if things were non-empty there could be no activity, 
then metaphysical emptiness also extends to considerations of personal freedom.  An 
intrinsically existent value could no more interact or be made use of than an intrinsically 
existent object.  On this reading it is the lack of inherent existence, that same void which 
fuels the problem of nihilism, which allows for change and the possibility of one action or 
another and only then is the valuation of action made possible.  If all things in the world 
simply were, intrinsically, then the question of morality would not arise – there would be no 
interaction, no changes and so no possible consideration of right or wrong affects or effects.  
If the universe were not empty, there could be no morality72 and no normative direction.  
This is a complete inversion of the problem from a traditional reductionist perspective.   
The problem of nihilism arose as a result of postulating a solid metaphysical reality beyond 
our perceptions and then attempting, unsuccessfully, to derive a normative value from 
                                                      
71
 Book 24 of the MK, (Trans. Garfield, p.37.)   
72
 See also MK 35. 
45 
 
these (so-defined) existent properties.  Nāgārjuna begins by rejecting intrinsic existence 
since it would deny values we already have.  Interesting as this is, an existential thinker may 
well compare this to denying the ‘death of god’ merely because this would entail a world 
wherein godly values did not exist, thus missing (or never arriving at) the point at which the 
loss of faith presents us with the very problem.  Yet there is a significant difference between 
those traditional values rejected by Nietzsche, held on a basis of transcendent faith, and the 
Buddhist moral valuations which are intertwined with worldly reality and rely upon 
knowledge of that reality for their foundation.  Where the problem of transcendent 
valuation does still arise in Buddhism will be examined in chapter 2. 
Understanding the basic metaphysical function of emptiness in no way solves the problem 
of moral nihilism and is presented here to signal the extent of the implications of emptiness 
to Buddhist philosophical thought.  If a realisation of intrinsic emptiness were sufficient to 
understand moral valuations, then following the deep scepticism discussed in the last 
section through to its nihilistic conclusions should eventuate in a great outpouring of moral 
responsibility, or something of the sort.  In fact the problem of nihilism has historically 
presented the opposite.  “What can be broken should be broken; what will stand the blow is 
fit to live; what breaks into smithereens is rubbish; in any case, strike right and left, it will 
not and cannot do any harm.”73  To focus on the ‘empty’ things themselves, Nāgārjuna was 
attempting to avoid the potential nihilism of relating to ‘emptiness’ as some greater 
underlying reality in itself.  Padhye is critical of Nāgārjuna’s use of śūnya, which he sees as a 
tool to eliminate the impossible openness the Buddha’s direct teaching leaves regarding 
morality and society.74  Śūnyatā is not an aspect of reality but rather the denial that any 
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property is an essential characterisation of an object and that any such property could not 
(on its own, or in combination) provide an adequate description of that object.  What 
Nāgārjuna emphasises with regard to metaphysics is not the methodological limitations,75 
but that there should be restrictions on how śūnyatā is to be used or understood.  The 
middle path between absolute reification and nihilism depends upon such a refined 
understanding of emptiness.   
Kalupahana, in his commentary on the kārikā states; “If Nāgārjuna had merely relied upon 
the abstract concept of “emptiness” (śūnyatā), ignoring “the empty” (śūnya)… the abstract 
concept could easily have been reconciled with the notion of substance.”76  This also 
signifies a conscious shift away from some great underlying nothingness, the nihilistic 
perspective, to a focus upon the interactions of those everyday things apparent to us.  This 
is a turn to a metaphysics of immanence, according to the consequences of 
interdependence, with the most radical implication being a complete lack of substance at 
any level.  Empty things, being dependent for their existence and in turn being depended 
upon for the existence of other empty things, cannot be said to exist substantially or 
independently, that is to reify any particular thing.  In the same way, if the concept 
‘emptiness’ is understood as separate from empty things, as some underlying metaphysical 
existent which somehow functions through things in the world, then it too has been falsely 
reified.  Conversely, to extrapolate from this interdependence that there is nothing at all 
would be utter nihilism and is immediately found to be in conflict with this functioning 
reality we are confronted with. 
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Nāgārjuna emphasises the ‘middle path’ between reification and nihilism since the outcome 
of either extreme fails to describe our reality, and so too, from a soteriological perspective, 
a false view could not lead to liberation.  Debates throughout Buddhist history indicate 
various instances of falling into these extreme views, though, unlike the existential nihilists, 
always with Buddhist goals in mind.  Tachikawa proposes that by the time of Nāgārjuna the 
doctrine of dependent arising was no longer fulfilling its function as ‘non-being’ became 
conceptualised as an affirmation of being.77  Again, the significance of emptiness is to avoid 
both nihilism and reification, to conflate the two does not solve the problem as already in 
their individual modes they are co-entailing.  Dealing with individual entities, if one holds 
that an apparent entity does not exist (nihilo) then its non-existence is reified and this 
conflicts with its influence in the world.  If one maintains that an entity does exist 
intrinsically then it cannot change, cannot interact and its position in interdependent reality 
is nihiliated.  The same is true when positing at the ‘ultimate’ level.  To claim ‘all is 
emptiness’ or that ‘nothingness is at the base of all reality’ is to reify the concept of non-
existence into an existent.  The inverse holds similarly.  If emptiness performs a key function 
in Buddhist soteriology then to reify at any level would negate this function.  If this trend 
has been repeated much later in East Asian developments in Buddhism, then they would 
equally fall to Nāgārjuna’s critique of the extreme views. 
The elimination of extreme views must be extended to the concept ‘emptiness’ itself.  
‘Emptiness’ is not a universal truth independent of any instance of emptiness, rather what 
we are considering here is a mere concept that describes the contingency of those instances 
that make up the world.  Emptiness itself is empty.  The nature ‘emptiness’ describes in the 
world is merely an absence, a pedagogical tool to eliminate false views.  If emptiness is 
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reified and clung to as some metaphysical reality then the pedagogical function of the 
concept is lost and no sense can be made of the Buddhist path.  This is the understanding of 
Nāgārjuna, “if someone believes in śūnyatā you [have declared that] he is lost!”78    If we 
wish to understand our reality, emptiness stands as an indicator to test our assumptions 
when engaging with apparently self-existent things in the world and ‘emptiness’ alone 
answers few questions.  To follow the implications of emptiness one must turn to 
dependent arising.  Speaking strictly of the possibility of metaphysics from interdependence, 
the philosopher who balks at the proposition of empty things interacting (to ask “what then 
interacts?”) is really indicating the limitations of a metaphysical framework of inquiry, the 
language of which holds places only for existent things.  Following Nāgārjuna, it makes no 
sense at all to speak of intrinsically existent things interacting, if we are to proceed it is best 
to accept the limitations of such frameworks. 
It is important to concede that I am not following Nāgārjuna when I propose a metaphysical 
understanding of interdependence.  Anything approaching metaphysical speculation would 
certainly be shunned by Nāgārjuna, as it was by the Buddha, while apparently metaphysical 
concepts such as ‘emptiness’ or ‘interdependence’ were adopted for their pedagogical 
function rather than ontological reality.  Nāgārjuna employs a reductio ad absurdum in 
order to reveal the functional extent of such systems and exactly where they fail through 
their own logic.79  As Tachikawa notes, “by faithfully applying the mechanisms of logic to 
their utmost limits, he brought about the breakdown of the application of language.”80  
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However the use of language conventionally must not be discarded, as it can be considered 
true in some sense due to the results of the use of language.81  Here the delicate interplay 
between conventional and ultimate modes is again revealed. 
It has been claimed that since the language Mādhyamikas use has no referent, rather 
characterising everything as empty, they do not have to defend any particular philosophical 
view82, though this is still subject to scholarly debate83 as it has been for as long as there 
have been Mādhyamikas.  Mādhyamikas are still Buddhists however, and as such they 
believe in the Buddha, in enlightenment and the teachings of the Buddha such as the Four 
Noble Truths.  While the language and structures used by the Buddha may only be 
convenient designations used out of pedagogical necessity on this account, a Mādhyamika is 
still concerned with the Buddhist soteriological project.  As previously discussed, ‘emptiness’ 
plays a strong part in the explanation and experience of this project.  Holding ‘no view’, 
depends upon the lack of referent of convenient designations, which is to say that those 
‘things’ to which we refer do not exist in reality, they really are empty.  This poses two 
immediate considerations; the first being metaphysical, which is examined later in the 
thesis, and the second existential.  For the latter consideration, that is to ask what it would 
be like to experience emptiness, the positioning of ‘self’ is critical. 
According to the Buddhist framework, the self is, like all things, dependent upon causes and 
conditions for its existence.  When these conditions cease to hold an individual ‘dies’ and 
when these conditions are met an individual is ‘born’.  Ignoring for the moment questions 
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about what metaphysical basis reincarnation may claim,84 there is a recognisable principle in 
karma in which the positive is manifest in positive circumstances and the negative in 
negative circumstances.  The nature of cause and effect is not merely physical but also 
moral according to the doctrine of karma.  In this way beings are understood to be born into 
a realm depending upon their past actions, towards the highest heavenly realms for positive 
actions and the lowest realms of hell for negative with human beings situated somewhere in 
between.  More immediately, from moment to moment, the seeds and fruits of karma are 
sewn and won as cause and effect.  This is a natural law and it is important to point out that 
there are no judgements being made. 
An enlightened being, one who realises emptiness, is no longer conditioned by karmic 
influences.  There is no longer any ‘gap’ between their perception of the world and the way 
they live.  As a practitioner attains realisation they become “a spontaneous expression of 
the Bodhisattva’s deep compassion for all living beings.”85  This claim is of fundamental 
interest for the present thesis.  From the existential angle, the difference between acting 
immediately due to causal conditions and acting spontaneously as an expression of absolute 
freedom is an intriguing one.  From the metaphysical angle we may ask after the origin of 
this compassion which arises spontaneously.  In either case the connection between 
emptiness and its experiential result is not immediately clear, nor is the difference between 
‘ignorant’ and ‘enlightened’ modes of understanding, even though these are clearly 
connected to the realisation of emptiness in the world.  Furthermore, while an enlightened 
being is certainly able to make use of empty words and systems as pedagogical tools, hence 
convenient designations, it is not immediately clear how reality would appear to an 
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enlightened being, since it would seem that no expression could ever relate to reality as 
such because while reality is empty of intrinsic existence every instance of explanation is 
necessarily reified.  To make use of language is to fall into this problem, with the only 
‘solution’ being to make any reference to ultimate truth deliberately self-refuting in order to 
at least point out the conventional limitations of language. 
It is a challenge to avoid reified thought, particularly in philosophy, and it is not clear if 
reification can be avoided altogether.  To accept the divide of conventional and ultimate 
truths will certainly cause problems for a metaphysical interpretation, through which both 
truths must somehow be related, thought it should at least numb the sting of nihilism as a 
merely conventional realisation.  Ultimately, on this reading, nihilism cannot hold because 
the sceptical logic which brought it to light cannot apply to ultimate reality.  Even so, since 
these systems still function conventionally, we may assume that nihilism remains a 
conventionally real problem.  This assumption depends upon the modes of conventional 
and ultimate being independent - that this is not so is particularly clear in the case of 
nihilism.  The problem of nihilism refers to the ultimate reality, that there is no meaning 
ultimately; however since the system which presents nihilism is shown to be faulty at the 
ultimate level, as it plays on the impossibility of absolute reification, then the conventional 
reality of nihilism, from the mode of the ultimate, is shown to be false.  In this manner 
nihilism works through both aspects to undermine itself.  That the problem of nihilism is 
only apparent through analysis of its position in both modes indicates something of the 
connection between the ‘two truths’. 
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The Great Doubt 
As the existential realisation of nihilism, and the problems that result, are not isolated to 
Western philosophy, it is insightful to consider the responses of Zen practitioners to the 
realisation of this ‘nothingness’ at the heart of Zen.  Throughout Zen literature there is 
reference made to a ‘sickness’ which arises through extended periods of meditation.  This 
was certainly in part due to the tremendous physical stress placed upon the body, while the 
transformation of the conscious mind towards extreme doubt transforms the practitioner’s 
awareness to one of despair.  Such a psychosomatic malaise overcame Hakuin86 early in his 
practice, for which a master prescribed a visualisation technique whereby he was able to 
correct the physical imbalances he felt.87  The other side of the sickness is the ‘Great Doubt’, 
a relentless nihilation of essentialism into emptiness, leaving nothing but an existential void.  
This may well be a symptom of Zen reduced to philosophy, investigating Buddhist śūnyatā 
subjectively, a kōan without solution.  What is revealed through such reflection is 
nothingness, though, as we shall see, a limited nothingness characterised as nihilism.  The 
experience of impenetrable nihilism is a possible station of the Great Doubt, and will 
underpin this philosophical investigation of Zen. 
For Nishitani Keiji, nihilism is not only an existential dilemma but also akin to the means by 
which one breaks through to enlightenment. He explains: 
Essentially, nihilism and Existence break down the standpoint of the observing self in which 
the self that sees and the self that is seen are separated.  When the existence of the self 
becomes a question mark, an unknown X, and when nihility is experienced behind the 
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existence of the self or at its ground, one can no longer afford to have two separate selves – 
the questioning self and the self that is questioned.88 
The result of nihilism then, according to Nishitani, is to realise one’s true self by reducing the 
field of awareness to the origin of nihilism – non-dualistic nothingness.89   This is a resolution 
that depends upon the disillusion of the ego, to the realisation of no-self (anātman).  
Nishitani is able to draw upon the epistemological foundation Descartes sets out in his 
Meditations, as a scepticism akin to Buddhist deconstruction of phenomena.  Descartes 
conclusion, that of the irreducible thinking subject, is here seen as a mere pause before the 
process of doubting must penetrate still further, of self doubting itself – a progression 
apparently absurd from a Cartesian standpoint.  This further penetration of the ‘self’ is 
possible due to the separation of the subjective self into doubt and doubter – an artificial 
dichotomy – inherent in Cartesianism and still throughout much of contemporary 
philosophy. 
Concerning Zen, to directly experience reality as it is, the nihilistic self must be overcome.  
This possibility is opened up through repeatedly deepening doubt, not to merely draw upon 
an existential logic but to question the essential existence of that doubting ego.  It is to ask: 
“who is it that doubts?”  Nishitani refers to this as the “self-presentation of the Great 
Doubt”.90  This deepening of nihilism reveals the ‘nothingness’ behind the self, which 
“...signals nothing less than the bankruptcy of the Cartesian ego.”91  The process of doubt 
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which brought the thinking subject into focus destroys the validity of the position, according 
to Nishitani.   
This is a radical distinction to the position of subjectivity adopted in contemporary 
philosophy, particularly existentialist modes of thought (including those who would not 
label themselves as such).  Where the existentialist places the subjective at the heart of 
experience and meaning, Nishitani presents a view developed from the emptiness of this 
very position.  Nevertheless, the subjective experience remains as an important staging 
post, for both modes of thought, allowing the concerns of various traditions to come 
together in addressing the common problem of nihilism. 
Nishitani is in agreement with the preliminaries of Nietzsche’s perspective on nihilism.  
Nihility is always present, but it must be experienced before it may be overcome.92  While 
Nietzsche saw nihilism as something to be affirmed, many who followed attempted to 
revaluate the experience of nihilism in order to express that want of positivity that lies 
behind the drive for affirmation.  As mentioned in the first section, the positive side to 
nihilistic realisation is the absolute (and potentially terrifying) freedom this leaves open to 
the individual.  Sartre’s ek-stasis, as ‘nothingness’, acts as a continual springboard of nihility, 
affirming the transcendence of the self against this impossible backdrop.  Nishitani’s 
position exposes the function of the ego in such a philosophical mode, as it reveals a ground 
of ‘nothingness’, which becomes a barrier to freedom.  Here a distinction must be made of 
(mere) ‘nothingness’ (Jp. mu) contrasted with ‘absolute nothingness’ (Jp. zettai mu), which 
is representative of having no ground.  According to Nishitani, it is only absolute 
nothingness that can deliver the kind of freedom Sartre’s existential mode aspires to affirm. 
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Nishitani (and the Kyōto school generally) also substantially breaks away from the atheistic 
existential mode through a strong focus on ‘religion’.  Nishitani claims that the modern 
malaise of subjective atheism must be broken through to the world of religion.  The familiar 
term is relatively transformed in this context however.  As it is the state of separating the 
reality of oneself from everyday life, which has led to nihilism, it is this separation that must 
be overcome,93 and the realisation of the ‘true self’ is a religious experience in this sense.  
Much is made by Kyōto scholars of the connections between Christian thought and Zen in 
this vein, but these discussions will not be covered here.  For the present study it is 
important just to recognise the significance of the term ‘religion’ to Nishitani’s thought and 
to hint at how this affects his interpretation of the existential mode.   
As the experience of nihilism becomes the force through which the ‘true self’ is uncovered, 
it is in turn this realisation that overcomes the problem of nihilism.  Once again the ‘true 
self’ will only function in this capacity if it is not reified, for if intrinsically existent, nihilism is 
immediately invoked. With no separation between the questioning self and the self 
questioned, the only possibility is to abandon systematic reduction and live, as the 
existentialist ideal, immanently, in the moment.  That this is an experienced reality and not 
merely a conceptual conclusion is of key importance for Nishitani’s project.  After breaking 
through to the groundless ground of the ‘true self’, how one relates to the world beyond 
nihilism at first appears as uncertain as the absolute freedom garnered from the 
existentialists.  For nihilism is not then washed from the mind without lingering effect; 
conventional views are still problematically relativised and there remains a lack of any 
‘ultimate’ meaning or morality.  While this may not matter to one immersed in their own 
                                                      
93
 ibid., p.36. 
56 
 
non-dual subjectivity, the question of ‘what it is that motivates’ is raised as soon as they 
move to interact with others in the world. 
Finally there is the claim made by Zen scholars that Zen is a kind of distillation of Buddhist 
philosophy.  Abe remarks, “Zen is not merely one form of Buddhism, but rather, in its 
fundamental nature, is the basic source of all forms of Buddhism.”94  If Abe’s claim were 
correct then all Buddhism would have nihilism at its base, and so the problems of meaning 
and morality encountered by the existentialists are similarly applicable.  So while the 
subjective experience of the self may be revealed in its ‘true’ nature as the breakthrough 
from nihilist doubt, it is not clear what implications, if any, this has for guiding an 
individual’s actions in the world. 
 
Conclusion 
Nihilism is a concern not easily dismissed, particularly when ones’ concern is in determining 
the core of metaphysics, as ours is here.  Our apparent inability to make any meaningful 
statements about the nature of ultimate truth, at the conventional level, presents a 
philosophical impasse.  One must either qualify the issue as ‘ineffable’ and resolve oneself 
to quietude,95 or determine to endlessly fight against this meaninglessness by forging one’s 
own meaning, as Nietzsche proposes, which is instantly self-refuted - only to be forged 
again. 
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The next chapter will pick up this problem in order to determine the nature of the ‘Zen 
moral problem’ and establish the limits of the current study.  The problem is made more 
difficult by the separation of levels of meaning, specifically here between ultimate and 
conventional truths.   
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Chapter 2: Transcendence 
 
The previous chapter set out the problem of nihilism and proposed that this is symptomatic 
of a system overreaching its bounds.  The alternative to either reification or nihilism, which 
are co-entailing, would appear to be a middle way between the two extremes.  Nishitani 
proposes that nihilism is a feature of a reductively rationalised world and so, in order to 
overcome the problem, nihilism must be must be engaged with and followed through, 
rather than avoided.  Here the problem of nihilism as meaninglessness reappears.  If 
Nishitani is correct, then any correct understanding of reality will have ‘nothingness’ at its 
base.  What kind of creature will arise from nothingness?  Will it be the Mahāyāna Buddhist 
Bodhisattva, or Nietzsche’s Übermensch, or a capitalist pleasure-seeker?  Initially the lack of 
intrinsic self in Buddhist metaphysics would seem to eliminate any selfish or self-directed 
agency, yet with the emphasis placed upon the subject in existentialist reactions to nihilism 
the no-self doctrine appears to reaffirm this ‘western’ nihilism.  The assertion that Zen is 
amoral only reinforces this interpretation, especially when considered in conjunction with 
some of the ‘enlightened’ actions of Zen masters recorded historically. 
In this chapter I will propose that ‘the Zen moral problem’ is a result of transcendent 
justification.  In order to explain this, two definitions of transcendence must be identified: 
ontological and epistemological.  While ontological transcendence appears in primary 
conflict with interdependence, epistemological transcendence is necessary for the Buddhist 
soteriological project.  Put simply, the enlightened perspective transcends the conventional 
(or ignorant).  To make sense of this transcendence without succumbing to the Zen moral 
problem is the purpose of this chapter. 
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For Nietzsche, transcendence is a problem due to the necessary separation of the immanent 
reality of this world from values based in it.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
reification of otherworldly values leads to nihilism.  This chapter will argue that making a 
justification based on a transcendent position oversteps the limits of the system in which 
the justification is applied.  This is of significant impact when the overriding truth being 
considered is ‘emptiness’ or ‘nothingness’, in which case a transcendent justification 
attempts to nihilate the validity of any particular mundane event.  This is how the Zen moral 
problem arises. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections: 
The first section, Zen amorality, sets up the Zen moral problem.  The problem is derived 
from historic examples displaying an apparent discontinuity between the characteristics of 
Zen enlightenment and the Buddhist connection of wisdom and compassion to this state of 
being.  I claim that the moral problem arises due to transcendent justification, and that this 
must be avoided if Zen is to be understood as consistent philosophically and soteriologically. 
The second section, Buddhist Soteriology, expounds the aims of the Buddhist project and its 
suppositions in order to examine the critique that Zen is not Buddhism.  The requirement of 
epistemic transcendence is elaborated and enlightenment is considered in relation to the 
‘perfection’ of virtue as a possible alternative to transcendence. 
The third section, Daoist Naturalism, pursues the question of transcendence through early 
Daoist philosophy, which is intimately connected with Zen thought and the development of 
the concept of ‘Buddha-nature’.  The unique implications of transcendence coupled with 
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immanence as ‘thusness’ are examined, as are the consequences of Dao understood as a 
functional prime nature.   
Finally, the project of the thesis proper is established in Metaphysics of the Four Noble 
Truths.  This marks a return to Buddhist soteriology and examines the metaphysical 
implication of the truth of suffering in the light of nothing transcended. 
 
Zen Amorality 
Following the discussion from the previous chapter we now turn to the search for a middle 
way between the co-entailing extremes of nihilism and reification.  Thus far the problem of 
nihilism has been explained but not overcome.  The significance of nihilism again appears 
when we consider the ‘two truths’ elaborated from Buddhist philosophy.  These are, 
according to Nāgārjuna, the ultimate truth of emptiness (śūnyatā - as elaborated previously) 
and the conventional truth of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda - to be examined 
in the next chapter).  Nāgārjuna maintains that these truths are self-referential (each entails 
and is explained by the other) and ontologically identical.96  The problem of nihilism returns 
when ‘ultimate truth’, as emptiness, is taken as overriding conventional truth such that all 
conventionally maintained values are nullified in relation to an absolute nothingness.  When 
examining the perspective from enlightenment conceptually this outcome is difficult to 
avoid, yet if this were actually the case then the wider concerns of compassion and the 
Buddhist project as a whole would fail based on these principles.  A focus on Zen allows the 
implications of these base principles in isolation to be examined. 
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Chao-chou (Jp. Joshu) asked his teacher Nan-ch’uan (Jp. Nansen) about the way: 
The Way does not belong to knowing or not knowing.  To know is to have a concept; to not 
know is to be ignorant.  If you truly realize the Way of no doubt, it is like the sky: wide open 
and vast emptiness.  How can you say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to it?97 
In the above passage ‘the Way’ refers to the privileged enlightened perspective, adopted 
from a Daoist metaphysic98.  ‘To have a concept’ is the problem of reification which is self-
refuting and so cannot hold ultimately, and ‘not knowing’ is similarly tied up as the negation 
of this position.  More must be said on the relationship of enlightenment to conceptual 
thought, however a more pertinent issue is disclosed in the remainder of the passage: ‘how 
can you say yes or no to it?’  In the context of the passage, as a pedagogical tool to remove 
discursive thought, the statement is affirmative; the failure of conventional reason is set-out 
as a characteristic of the ultimate truth.  Ultimately, discriminative conceptualisation cannot 
take place as the ultimate truth is the emptiness of all such conceptions.  In this manner 
morality is explained to be merely conventionally true.  Following Nansen, it would seem 
that when an enlightened being acts in the world, from their position of ‘ultimate truth’, we 
cannot say ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ to it. 
Being outside the limits of moral discourse, the enlightened being is ‘beyond good and evil’ 
in Nietzsche’s sense.  If we are to follow Nietzsche’s diagnosis then an enlightened being 
would be free to forge their own meaning/values/actions, which could be judged by nothing 
more than their effectiveness at meeting those self-proposed ends.  This appears to conflict 
with the Buddhist ideal that to be enlightened is the perfection of virtues, and this 
perfection is in accord with those virtues conventionally understood. 
                                                      
97
 Joshu, The Recorded Sayings of Zen Master Joshu, p.11. 
98
 This is examined in the third section of this chapter. 
62 
 
While conceptually we may be able to dismiss the significance of reified ‘morality’ and 
ethical principles, from the perspective of enlightened awareness, it is more difficult to 
dismiss the pragmatic concerns that these conventions overlay.  Hirata Seiko summarises 
the problem; “Zen’s position that the adept’s world of satori can be reached only through 
transcendence of dualistic notions of good and evil is one that leaves no ground for 
distinguishing the socially beneficial from the socially harmful.”99  If this is also true of what 
is beneficial or harmful to oneself, as it appears to be from the standpoint of ‘nothingness’, 
then the Buddhist soteriological project is nullified.  Furthermore, as a political standpoint it 
would appear that Zen has little to offer, and yet extreme actions have been justified for 
their religiously significant results.  A master can teach a student through violence, a 
Samurai warrior can dwell in a state of ‘no-mind’ and lop off his opponents head in the 
name of loyalty and honour, and a national army can invade another country in the name of 
a Buddhist super-state.  Historically these circumstances have come to pass and the 
justification of some ‘higher’, transcendent, position of enlightened authority has been 
sustained.  The purpose of this section is to show that transcendent justification is the basis 
of the Zen moral problem. 
Nāgārjuna warns that to misunderstand emptiness (sūnyāta) is to fall into the extremes of 
nihilism or reification.  But if enlightenment is simply the understanding of emptiness and 
Zen is the distillation of this understanding, then how can a swordsman dwell in a Zen state 
of ‘no-mind’ and lop off his opponent’s head?  What appears to be missing from this 
understanding of emptiness is a characteristic Buddhist morality.  The same openness that 
allowed Nietzsche’s reaction from nihilism, the ‘will to power’, to be appropriated by the 
Nazis appears to be present in the distilled Zen philosophy too.  Indeed modern 
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commentators have targeted the Kyōto school regarding Japanese Nationalism as just such 
an example.  The focus for this chapter is neither nationalism nor systems of morality 
specifically, but rather the underlying philosophical problem; the apparent openness of Zen 
and how this fits with wider Buddhist philosophy. 
Other than the well recorded adherence of Samurai warriors to Zen and the connection of 
Zen philosophy to the way of the sword100, the recorded history of Zen is filled with actions 
that appear morally problematic.  A dramatic example is of Master Nansen, who, in order to 
teach arguing monks a lesson cuts a cat in two.101  Instead of being shunned as a negative 
action, breaking the precept of not killing, these actions are attributed philosophical validity 
in Zen.  While many argue that this is due to specifically Japanese cultural influences,102 the 
Zen moral problem, being based on a philosophical distillation of Buddhism, has much 
farther-reaching significance.103  The problem is that one can seemingly justify immoral 
actions by reference to the ultimate nature of that action, which is empty of moral 
considerations.  If this were carried through, an enlightened being, in full knowledge of 
reality and free from karmic effects and conventions such as morality, would have no 
inclination towards moral action.  They would appear as Nietzsche’s Übermensch; 
absolutely free to create their own values according to the manifestation of their own will to 
power.  This should not be the case in Zen, according to the goals of Buddhism, however to 
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explain how Nietzsche’s conclusion can be avoided these apparently immoral actions need 
to be explained. 
By far the greatest historical interest in the Zen moral problem has stemmed from the 
question of nationalism, relating to the support of the Japanese military in the early 20th 
Century by much of the Zen establishment104.  These concerns were brought to the 
mainstream by Brian Victoria in the provocative Zen at War and its sequel Zen War Stories.  
While certain biases appear in the works105 the impact on the philosophical study of Zen 
given the wartime actions of well respected, and in many cases purportedly enlightened, 
individuals should not be underestimated.  Victoria concludes Zen at War with the invitation 
to investigate how such actions have been falsely justified as being in accordance with Zen.  
According to Victoria, this is primarily down to “the longstanding subjugation of Buddha-
Dharma to the state”106.  Victoria would prefer to preserve Zen, but admits that we cannot 
do so in ignorance of the historical facts.  We must ask if these characteristics of the Zen 
moral problem are philosophically allowable. 
One possible response is that we are being overly critical of Zen as a tradition.  After all 
various atrocities throughout human history were instigated by individuals belonging to a 
great many religious, cultural, philosophical or various polemic traditions and it is usually 
the case that the instance of those individual’s actions are differentiated from the tradition 
as a whole.  Indeed, their actions are often portrayed as heretical and clearly not 
representative of their tradition of origin.  Hirata Seiko remarks; “The Zen priesthood is 
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made up of individuals, and as in any religion during times of war, there were among them 
many who appear to have abandoned the ideals of their faith to embrace the narrower 
ideals of their country.”107   
This is certainly true, however, according to Victoria, there is a more general distinction that 
was recognised by Japanese scholars at the time; “In general it can be said that Chinese 
Buddhists believe that war should be avoided no matter what the reason.  Japanese 
Buddhists, on the other hand, believe that war conducted for a [good] reason is in accord 
with the great benevolence and compassion of Buddhism.”108  This justification for war 
refers to the transcendent ‘greater good’, the promise of a Buddhist super-state, the value 
of which overrides the violent means undertaken to achieve it.  There are references made 
in Mahāyāna Buddhist scriptures to the overwhelming value of enlightenment and the 
Buddhist teachings, “more than the grains of sand in the Ganges”109, so we may well assume 
that any means would justify an end whereby the correct Buddhist teachings are 
propagated.  Indeed, it would make sense along these lines for people or animals to be 
sacrificed in order to sustain a monk who is working towards the liberation of all sentient 
beings.  But we do not find this in the Buddhist texts.  Instead monks are recorded as going 
out of their way to help others, even sacrificing themselves.110  There is an emphasis on 
compassion, non-violence, on not eating meat where possible, and certainly on the 
avoidance of warfare at all costs.111  
                                                      
107
 Hirata Seiko in Rude Awakenings, p.11. 
108
 Victoria, B., Zen at War, p.87. 
109
 Diamond Sutra, 15; in Price, A. & Wong., M. (Trans.), The Diamond Sutra & The Sutra of Hui-neng, p.35. 
110
 For instance, tales of monks giving their own bodies as food for starving villagers or even a tiger; See 
Kieschnick, J., The eminent monk: Buddhist ideals in medieval Chinese hagiography, p.40. 
111
 “Abandoning the taking of life, the ascetic Gotama dwells refraining from taking life, without stick or sword, 
scrupulous, compassionate, trembling for the welfare of all living beings” - Dīgha-nikāya 1.8 68; quoted in 
66 
 
There is something about enlightenment specifically that gives the Zen problem its 
philosophical impact.  An enlightened being is supposed to be wiser than a conventionally 
disposed (ignorant) individual.  They have a comprehensive understanding of reality.  
Moreover, they are supposed to be compassionate.  The dilemma is presented by 
Christopher Ives as follows: either wartime roshi were not enlightened or enlightenment 
does not entail wisdom and compassion.112  Robert Sharf proposes that Zen enlightenment 
is a culturally (monastic) entity that does not relate to any transcendental truth, thus 
avoiding any such philosophical problems.113  For the Zen tradition either outcome is 
problematic and both have wider reaching philosophical implications for Buddhism 
generally.  Whether this can be avoided depends upon how Zen differs philosophically from 
other forms of Buddhism. 
As a distinct form of Buddhism Ch’an (Zen) marks a shift in the emphasis of practice from its 
Mahāyāna Buddhist foundations.  That is from a focus on the cultivation of virtue, to a direct 
realisation through meditation.  This is not to imply that other forms of Buddhism do not 
use meditation, nor that Zen has no cultivation of virtue, only that the emphasis is placed 
firmly on meditation in Zen.  This focus, while also emphasising experiential awareness, 
means that the connection between wisdom and compassion has a less robust pedagogical 
foundation.  Philosophically this places focus on the ultimate truth; emptiness, which in the 
Zen moral problem appears to override conventional considerations akin to nihilism.  This is 
certainly a misapplication of emptiness, but the emphasis on ultimate truth remains valid.  
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Bodhidharma, the founder of Ch’an, when asked about the meaning of Dharma is reported 
to have said, “Vast emptiness, nothing sacred”.114 
The disarmament of conventional truth in Zen discourse is characteristic of a significant 
philosophical shift undertaken in this tradition, founded on a transmission outside of the 
scriptures.  Signifying this, the sixth patriarch Huineng is credited with tearing up the 
scriptures, and while the historical credibility of such an event is dubious, the story is 
decidedly symbolic.  Expressing the more traditional view, Huineng’s contemporary Shen 
Hsiu wrote;  
Our body is the bodhi tree, 
And our mind a mirror bright. 
Carefully we wipe them hour by hour, 
And let no dust alight. 
To this Huineng replied; 
There is no bodhi tree, 
Nor stand of mirror bright. 
Since all is void, 
Where can the dust alight? 115 
The superiority of Huineng’s response is credited with his being named successor of the 
tradition.  While Shen Hsiu‘s position was still valid116, it was considered inferior to 
Huineng’s demonstrated understanding.  This is an expression of the ultimate truth of 
‘nothingness’. 
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This basis, rather than resulting in utter aloofness, as one may expect given the reading 
towards nihilism as proposed by the Zen moral problem, is characterised in Zen by the exact 
opposite.  The mode of expressing this ultimate truth, is done through the history of Zen, by 
focus on immediate experience.  “Eat when hungry, sleep when tired.”117  Due to this focus 
on the immanence of immediate experience “Zen makes no distinction between “is” and 
“ought””118.  One merely reflects upon the world, free of judgements.  This is not peculiar to 
Zen, as mere reflection is the basis of insight meditation (vipaśyanā) essential to early 
Buddhist practice.119  If this immanent reflection indicates something of the enlightened 
experience, this would certainly avoid the co-entailing extremes of nihilism and reification 
while revealing the problem of morality, “for when their aim is accomplished and the 
problem of reifying thought disappears, the content and form of propositions are entirely 
inconsequential.”120  While this does not explain how apparently immoral actions can be 
justified in this way, it does express the conceptual problem that conventional truths are 
invalid across transcendent bounds. 
The problem of transcendent justification has several facets, the first to be examined is 
derived from the discussion in Chapter 1 on the limits of systems.  In the examples used to 
propose the Zen moral problem there appears a conflict between a moral judgement and 
the alleged ‘amorality’ of the ultimate reality of Zen, from which a Zen master is said to act.  
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Zen is termed ‘amoral’ since morality is recognised conventionally but not ultimately.  To 
assume moral values to hold ultimately would be to reify those values, contradicting 
emptiness, resulting in metaphysical conflict and nihilism.  Thus when an enlightened 
being’s actions are subjected to moral judgement they are said to be acting ‘beyond good 
and evil’.  Labelling Zen ‘amoral’ is the only solution to a question (moral valuation) which 
has no referent ultimately.  Epistemically, the limits of ‘morality’ have been exceeded and 
the conventional implications are invalid at the ultimate level. 
Arguments to this effect are common in philosophical studies of Zen121, however, rather 
than presenting a solution to the Zen moral problem, the above rationale for moral 
transcendence becomes the root of the problem when the rationale is reversed.   A 
transcendent justification is made in which an apparently immoral action is justified as 
‘ultimately amoral’, and thus the action itself is said to be ‘beyond good and evil’.  For an 
enlightened being, from the perspective of the ultimate, this is true, however the 
judgement of immorality is made conventionally, not ultimately.  Indeed ‘immorality’ makes 
no sense ultimately, and the judgement could not arise from that position.  That the 
judgement has been made indicates that the action is subject to conventional analysis, 
which is true of any action regardless of its origin.  Hence both enlightened and 
unenlightened actions are actualised at the mundane level and are only judged 
conventionally.  Ultimately the action is recognised, but no judgement takes place. 
Just as conventional morality cannot be applied to ultimate reality, so too does the 
application of ultimate ‘amorality’ overstep the limits of ultimate analysis and so cannot 
                                                      
121
 One critic of such moves is James Whitehill, who has called this tendency ‘the transcendence trap’ - “The 
trap misleads them and us into portraying the perfected moral life as a non-rational expressiveness, something 
natural, spontaneous, non-linguistic, and uncalculating.”  (Whitehill, J., ‘Buddhist Ethics in Western Context: 
The ‘Virtues’ Approach’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol.1, 1994, p.6.) 
70 
 
override conventional morality.122  This is the consequence of recognising epistemic 
transcendence.  The two truths apply to the same phenomenon, such as a mundane action, 
but respond with distinct interpretations.  One interpretation, or level-specific schema, 
cannot be used to justify implications to a schema set within the other.  To this extent one 
level transcends the other.  Metaphysically, a connection through ontic interdependence 
must be maintained, which will eventually affect the extent to which the two truths are 
seen as exclusive.  For the present chapter it is sufficient to say that there is a problem with 
transcendent justification. 
A major complication with denying transcendent justification is that this method appears to 
be in common practice.  In ethical discourse, for example, the view of a ‘limited’ individual 
may be superseded with reference to a position of greater knowledge, greater rationality or 
some transformative valuation.  For example, appealing to an authoritative position of 
greater knowledge we may say that “she would not have acted in such a base way if she had 
known that its effects are ultimately harmful to herself.”  Such moves can be understood as 
a transcendent justification given my epistemic qualification (that ‘transcendence’ is a 
radical transformation of mental outlook).  Other examples include cross-disciplinary 
interpretation derived from the sciences, such as the reduction of thoughts to brain states; 
or the conflict of ideologies resulting in each subsuming the other into their paradigm; or 
the market value of some unit differing between divergent economic frameworks.  In each 
example there is the potential to override one systematic interpretation through 
justification from the authority of a second, allegedly superior and epistemically 
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transcendent system.  If the problem of transcendent justification is to be maintained these 
instances must also be problematic.  While ultimate reality is a peculiar case, the argument 
problematising transcendent justification (outlined previously) is also applicable to these 
common cases.  The dissimilarity however, is that epistemic transcendence between 
conventional modes can potentially be reconciled through reference to common systematic 
origins, but this recourse is unavailable when considering ultimate truth.  In short, in any 
instance of transcendent justification the limits of the relevant systems must be taken into 
account so that where possible debate can be focussed upon, and built up from, some 
common ground.  In any instance, if these limits and commonalities are not taken into 
account, transcendent justifications will be invalid when considered from within the bounds 
of the competing system. 
Simply put, morality does not hold at the ultimate level so the ultimate level cannot be used 
to justify apparently immoral mundane action.  On this reading, ignoring for now the 
pragmatic differences between the two modes, enlightenment is not intrinsically ‘better 
than’ conventional understanding, it is ‘other than’ it.  At this point there is a danger that 
the epistemological distinction slides back into an ontological distinction, which was 
previously dismissed.  Enlightenment must have some bearing on the conventional world if 
it is to be made sense of in an interdependent metaphysics and if we are to make sense of 
the actions of the Buddha, Arhats or Bodhisattvas throughout Buddhist history. 
If transcendent justification is the cause of the Zen moral problem, and Zen is accurately 
characterised as a distillation of Buddhist philosophy, then it should be possible to elaborate 
a position on ‘enlightenment from the direct realisation of reality as it is’ that is compatible 
with the Buddhist conception of an enlightened being who is both wise and compassionate.  
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I propose that such a subject is best examined metaphysically.  Undertaking this 
consideration requires both a coherent metaphysical construct (undertaken in the next 
chapter) and further elaboration on the soteriological foundations of this connection.  These 
foundations further problematise the denial of transcendent justification, since historically 
such justifications have been maintained in Zen. 
If this problem cannot be resolved then there would appear to be some credibility to the 
distinction between Zen and Buddhism ‘proper’.  Alternatively, if the Zen Buddhist claim 
that Zen distils the fundamentals of Buddhism is maintained, then the Zen moral problem is 
of equal concern to all forms of Buddhism.  To better determine the position to be taken up 
here the principles of the Buddhist soteriological project should be examined. 
 
The Buddhist Soteriological Project 
While we can approach a reading which does away with ontological transcendence, it 
remains important to recognise the role of epistemic transcendence.  This is critical if the 
Buddhist project is to remain viable.  Without such a radical transformation of knowing, the 
karmic effects that bind individuals to samsaric existence could not be overcome.  
Enlightenment would not be possible.   
At the root of what became Buddhist philosophy is a recognition of the significance of 
suffering (duḥkha).  While this focus suggests a pessimistic world-view,123 it is suffering 
which provides the soteriological focus of Buddhist practice.  Unlike the Abrahamic religions, 
from which the Greek term soteriology is adapted, the view of salvation to be taken up here 
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is not ontologically transcendent but necessarily bound up with the mundane world.  That 
said, given that the world is intimately interconnected with experiential awareness, the 
character of epistemological transcendence to be elaborated here entails not only a 
radically different subjective experience for one who attains enlightenment, but also a 
radically different way of acting in the world. 
The realisation of suffering is both an existential awareness and a philosophical elucidation 
that serves as the foundation of Buddhism in the sense of its core drive and also as its 
historical inception.  The historical Buddha’s elucidation of his realisation is presented in the 
‘four noble truths’.  Succinctly; there is suffering, suffering has a cause, there is a way to end 
suffering and the Dharma is the path to this realisation.  It is interesting to note that no 
normative claim is made in this plan.  The invitation is that one need only wish to end 
suffering, in which case the path will satisfy this desire.  The path itself is certainly directive, 
however the decision to follow the path is left open. 
The Heart Sutra characterises the enlightened being as follows, “in the absence of thought 
coverings he has not been made to tremble, he has overcome what can upset, and in the 
end he attains to Nirvana.”124  According to the Mahāyāna Buddhists, it is the realisation of 
emptiness which allows this soteriological change and allows one to see reality as it is, in the 
absence of (ultimately false) conceptual overlays.  It is also this realisation which ultimately 
frees one from karma, rebirth and the conditioned suffering that is a necessary result of 
cyclic existence.  The very experience of being upset indicates some discontinuity between 
either an expectation or a desire and the actual realised unfolding of events.  Existentially, 
this is suffering and can be recognised as symptoms of the negative afflictions of 
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attachment, craving and ignorance.  Analysed philosophically, this is the result of unwittingly 
extending the validity of a system beyond its limits – the application of a static overlay upon 
a dynamic world.  Thus construed, the Buddhist project appears to present an attempt to 
find an unlimited system, or more properly, given the problem of a systematic 
interpretation of the ultimate truth, a way of engaging in the world which does not overstep 
the validity of any particular system.  If the limits of discourse are kept in mind, there need 
be no conflict between the experiential engagement of such a way and a philosophical 
interpretation thereof. 
Indeed the Buddhist path proposes just such a way to enlightenment, rather than 
attempting to explain some inexplicable metaphysical ‘truth’.  Even so, an experientially 
focussed pedagogy should be metaphysically consistent.  The path should not lead one to 
contradict ultimate reality.  For this reason the teachings themselves should not be reified, 
for this would only act as a sticking point for a practitioner and undermine the overall 
purpose.  The practical aspects of the Dharma are set out to allow one to reach a realisation 
that is ultimately empty.  Morally, one is told to be compassionate, one’s epistemological 
focus is directed towards non-clinging and metaphysical understanding is guided by 
emptiness.  In this way reified understanding should be avoided, one will be less likely to be 
caught up in negative influences as a result of karma and one’s perspective should remain 
open to reality as it is, free of the limitations of any system.   
There is an implicit paradox in the soteriological project which is shared by the present 
thesis’ focus on a metaphysics of interdependence; specifically that a schema is elaborated 
which proposes the abolition of all conceptual schemas in order to portray (in the latter 
case, or simply realise in the former) reality as it is.  Hopkins states the problem thus; “In 
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order to leave cyclic existence, we must directly cognize emptiness; in order to do that it is 
necessary to generate an inference of emptiness, which is a type of conceptual 
consciousness.”125  For the current project the only recourse is to adopt the Prāsaṅgika 
consistent referential of the ‘emptiness of emptiness’ and thus avoid any potential reifying 
of ‘emptiness’ as ultimate truth.  Rather, ‘emptiness’ is understood as a conventional 
designation of the contingent characteristic of reality as it is, and thus understood it is useful 
for understanding conventionally realised phenomena.  ‘Emptiness’ here functions as a 
conceptual negation of any implied intrinsic or independent existence, including ‘emptiness’ 
itself. 
The concept of ‘emptiness’ “is primarily a soteriological device for purifying the mind so that 
one may be empty of emotional and intellectual attachment to objects of desire and 
knowledge.”126  Emptiness can be considered independently of any metaphysical analysis in 
order to make use of it soteriologically.  Commonly this is done whenever Buddhism is 
described as simply ‘philosophy’ or ‘psychology’, a particular cosmology need not be 
assumed in order for the Buddhist critique of intrinsic existence to be existentially applied.  
The problem is that at this superficial level, emptiness appears to imply a lack of grounding 
which has previously been interpreted nihilistically.  The soteriological project is not to 
reject conventional phenomena outright, but to reveal their ultimate nature, which includes 
a lack of intrinsic existence.  In this manner emptiness does indicate particular 
characteristics of reality as it is ultimately.  Further investigation of these implications to 
metaphysics should overcome nihilism if it can connect the conventional and ultimate truths 
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without transcendent nihilation.127  The basis of this connection is not found in ‘emptiness’, 
but rather the nature of metaphysical interactions that lie behind impermanent phenomena 
and prompt an enlightened being to declare that “things are empty”. 
With ‘emptiness’ as ultimate truth denoted as a mere directive schema, the foundation of 
metaphysical analysis is found in the related conventional truth of interdependence.  As 
noted earlier, for Nāgārjuna since conventional and ultimate truths are ontologically 
identical, “samsara and nirvana are not distinct.  The understanding of samsara is itself 
posited as nirvana.”128  The nature of the difference of expression is dependent upon the 
epistemic perspective held and not on any metaphysical causal distinction other than this.  
Sonam Thakchoe writes that, “Ultimate truth is described as ultimate; not because it is 
absolute or higher than conventional truth, but simply because of its consistent character – 
it’s mode of appearance and mode of being are the same.”129  The state of ‘Nirvāṇa’ and 
‘Ultimate truth’ designate a metaphysical coherence between a subjective epistemic and 
‘reality as it is’. 
An alternative, though not incompatible, interpretation is developed from an understanding 
of enlightenment as perfection.  On this reading there need be no reference to metaphysics, 
only the cultivation of a particular engagement with the world.  The implication that one 
‘follows a path’ to practice Buddhism indicates a progression, namely from ignorance (and 
duḥkha) to enlightenment (and Nirvāṇa) through adherence to beneficial practices and 
moral precepts.  Keown states that “Nirvana is the perfection of these virtues and not an 
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ontological or soteriological quantum leap.”130  That there is a smooth transition between 
ignorance and enlightenment and not a sudden jump131 is also found in the Zen literature, 
including that of Zen master Dōgen, to whom discussion will turn in later chapters.  This also 
opens the ‘sudden’ versus ’gradual’ debate regarding enlightenment, prominent in the 
history of Zen and in contemporary philosophical studies.132  For the present thesis this 
debate over the qualification of enlightenment is not relevant, since the criterion for our 
metaphysical study does not allow for the possibility of absolute (ontic) difference.  What is 
of interest is the relation of enlightenment to ‘reality as it is’ and the implication of 
enlightenment as perfection.  That is the implication of epistemology and natural virtue 
respectively. 
The connection of wisdom and compassion is a key concern when considering the Zen moral 
problem in relation to wider Buddhist theory, and I have proposed that if such a connection 
cannot be established then the moral problem is not limited to Zen.  Generally conceived, 
“The basic teaching of the Buddha can be expressed by two words: wisdom and 
compassion.”133  As a teaching, as the path towards right-living and enlightenment, the 
cultivation of both wisdom and compassion appears to be philosophically warranted.  
Without wisdom one is prone to make mistakes that will inevitably lead to the failure of any 
undertaking.  Without compassion one would remain entangled in the effects of negative 
karma.  In such a state, apart from being thwarted by undesirable physical and emotional 
consequences, it would also be impossible to sustain the level of equanimous meditative 
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concentration required to experience reality as the Buddhists understand it.  
Metaphysically, the problem remains that if wisdom and compassion need to be proposed 
independently, with corresponding programs, are they ultimately (metaphysically) 
connected or are they only pragmatically related?  If compassion is not necessary for 
wisdom then an enlightened being would not necessarily be compassionate.  If compassion 
does not arise from an understanding of reality as it is, and is rather a habit cultivated only 
through specific paths to enlightenment, then wisdom and compassion are not necessarily 
co-dependent. 
The most immediate connection of these two depends upon Buddhist cosmology, 
specifically the function of karma and the consequence of rebirth.  The seed of rebirth and 
what keeps the wheel of saṃsāra turning is said to be craving.134  In Buddhist cosmology 
there is something privileged about the human realm; only in human form is a being far 
enough removed from a life of unprovoked and unthinking bliss (in higher realms) and also 
free of all-consuming pain (in lower-realms), just enough that enlightenment is attainable.  
The motivation to free ourselves from suffering allows us to see the folly of impermanent 
pleasure, and ideally the Buddhist aims to temper both positive and negative affects.  
Naturally this is very rarely the case since we are compelled to avoid the negative aspects of 
existence and seek out pleasurable ones, and since craving is active in both respects the 
causal loop continues.  In this manner saṃsāra functions as a self-sustaining causal network.  
The radical shift, Nirvāṇa, proposed by the Buddha, is the escape from a seemingly closed 
causal loop.  By eliminating the causes, the effects cease. 
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The affect of pleasure seeking and pain avoidance on the world is obviously widely 
recognised, and is taken as the prime force in naturalised systems.  This is extended across 
all modes of thought, including commerce, politics, science and philosophy generally.  
Consider Darwin’s principle of ‘natural selection’, as fundamental to his theory of evolution 
and speciation.  In terms of ‘selection’, the inheritance of conditions for pleasure, and thus 
to seek out situations which will affect one’s survival and perpetuate their biological species, 
an organism increases in ‘fitness’ and is pragmatically better adapted to survive in the 
world.135  The explanatory power of this simple theory is immense; almost every 
characteristic can be interpreted as having originated through its practical merits, which at 
our conscious level becomes the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain.  The political 
force of popular opinion and commercial fluctuations in the stock market due to supply and 
demand can be similarly construed as being subject to a principle of the drive for personal 
benefit by a ‘rational actor’ (within the free market of laissez-faire capitalism).136  
Pragmatically, if one does not compete in these fields they will be selected against and so 
the struggle of one individual places a force upon all others, which in turn reinforces the 
pressure on that individual.  The feedback from this causal loop prevents any escape that is 
not fatal in relation to the system.  
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Darwin’s work, among others,137 no doubt influenced Nietzsche’s development of his theory 
of ‘Will to Power’, as discussed in the last chapter.  Nietzsche follows the philosophical ideal 
search for some essential truth, some basic principle that governs all interactions, and bases 
it on our common desire for gain.  That principle of struggle that shapes the natural world 
from an evolutionary perspective, and is recognised as the cause of existence as affected by 
karma for the Buddhist, albeit in quite a different manner, is for Nietzsche the only pursuit.  
The Buddhist project presents an alternative.  Rather than failing in the struggle for power 
when one ignores the competing interactions of worldly reality, the Dharma claims that it is 
possible to act for the benefit of others without detriment to oneself.  Moreover, by altering 
one’s perspective it is possible to break out of the struggle for power altogether and 
ultimately get free of saṃsāra.  Nietzsche himself strongly connects ‘freedom’ to ‘power’,138 
though it is clear that any individual within the struggle for power is conditioned by their 
predicament, and so cannot be free.  The ultimate power, the ultimate freedom, is then 
total escape from the struggle, both towards pleasure and away from pain.  This is the 
promise of Buddhism that so starkly contrasts with one’s natural drive and existential 
experience. 
If, monks, there were no gratification in the world, beings would not become enamoured 
with the world.  But because there is gratification in the world, beings become enamoured 
with it. 
If there were no danger in the world, beings would not become disenchanted with the 
world.  But because there is danger in the world, beings become disenchanted with it. 
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If there were no escape from the world, beings could not escape from it.  But there is an 
escape from the world, beings can escape from it.139 
This quotation sums up the motivations, and so too the limitations, that make up most of 
human experience.  The final sentences relay the promise of Buddhism, that there is a way 
that is not determined by the world, that it is possible to be free from karmic causation.  To 
be completely free does not imply that a physical being can be uncaused or will somehow 
be isolated and not have any affect in the world (this would be an ontological separation); 
rather escape entails a change of perspective (an epistemic change), a way of ‘seeing’ the 
world without being compelled to crave or struggle within it. 
 
Daoist Naturalism 
The previous section set up the fundamentals of Buddhist philosophy, in this section these 
principles will be contrasted with the philosophical impact of Daoism on the development of 
Zen – specifically with regard to the position of ‘transcendence’ in Daoist thought.  To this 
extent there are several principles that must be brought to the fore.  First, a distinction with 
regard to nature and escape for the follower of ‘the way’ and the relation of this to the 
theory of ‘Buddha-nature’ must be examined.  Second, the implication of immediacy, 
‘thusness’, for Zen and the consequences of this focus for elaboration of the Zen moral 
problem will be explored.  The problem of transcendent justification is reaffirmed in the 
light of ‘thusness’ as can be found in the expression of Daoist ‘wu-wei’ (non-action). 
While I have characterised Buddhism as founded upon the soteriological path away from 
suffering, there is a focus on ‘the way’, Dao (Jp. do), in Chinese Buddhism and those schools 
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derived from it, including Japanese Zen, which developed a naturalistic account of an innate 
‘Buddha-nature’.  Basing ‘the good’ in ‘the natural’ presents a normative dilemma for 
explanation as to how actions could ever be other than good/natural.140  Furthermore, the 
already problematic distinction between immanent phenomenon (conventional truth) and 
transcendent realisation (ultimate truth) is further entangled, as the expression of Dao is 
already manifest as individual instances.  These are both issues that arise from naturalism 
and are present in Zen.  As the philosophical content of Zen tends to be difficult to extract 
from the recorded tradition it is useful to examine the concept of ‘the way’ with reference 
to Daoist thought.  The similarities and differences with Buddhist thought, where these are 
not explained away as cross-cultural influences, offer an insight into the character of Zen 
which can be brought to bear on the question of the uniqueness of the Zen moral 
problem.141 
First something must be said of the distinction between Buddhist ‘emptiness’ (śūnyatā) and 
Daoist ‘nothingness’ (k’ung), each functioning as the respective ‘ultimate truth’.  The 
ultimate functions similarly in both traditions, and certain interpretations of śūnyatā would 
be in accord with ‘nothingness’, but the elaboration of emptiness discussed thus far has 
particular metaphysical limitations that leads to a conflict with Daoist cosmology.  The 
previous chapter presented the Prāsaṅgika emphasis on the emptiness of emptiness, 
implicating the rejection of any reified understanding of śūnyatā.  Dao is characterised as 
‘no-thing-ness’, an absolute other to existence, despite its manifest action making up myriad 
existent things.  Nothingness is also the primary cause of existent things, existing before 
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worldly phenomena in the cosmological order (see below).  Thus understood, Dao, as 
‘nothing’, is intrinsically existent and cannot be ‘empty’ in the Prāsaṅgika sense.   
Importantly there is a focus on unity in Dao for the Daoist tradition that is at least 
problematic for the current project, given the understanding of emptiness as the absence of 
reification (including the final reification of a total ‘unity’).142  Using this approach to make 
sense of Zen is further complicated by the historical intermingling of the two traditions, 
wherein unity and emptiness are taken up together and the language and arguments of 
each become borrowed and placed into new contexts.143  While such cross-cultural 
complications may seem to be an unprofitable sideline given this thesis’ focus on the 
philosophical, historically this is the collision from which Ch’an (and Zen in turn) arose. 
This synthetic connection has not been ignored in relation to the Zen moral problem.  In 
Swanson’s provocatively titled paper Zen is not Buddhism, 144 following the development of 
the Critical Buddhist movement, the position of the metaphysical concept ‘Buddha-nature’ 
(Buddha-dhātu)145 is questioned as a deviant form of Buddhism, owing more to Daoist 
influences.  The motivation behind such accusations is to show that if Buddha-nature is at 
fault and is derived from misappropriated Daoist philosophy, then the rest of Buddhism may 
be saved from accusations of amorality.  This may be established if Daoism proposes 
essentialised, transcendent valuation, resulting in conventionally expressed nihilism, and 
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traditional Buddhism does not.146  Such a heavily hermeneutic based approach is 
unfortunately overly dependent upon subjective interpretation, particularly in cases such as 
this where there is a convoluted history.  By way of contrast, Hansen’s understanding 
reverses the influential link saying “Daoism inherited Buddhism’s mysticism of the one, 
permanent, ineffable Buddha-nature.”147  Historically the direction of influence is unclear.  
While Chinese Buddhism adopted native terminology and concepts to explain its doctrine, in 
turn Daoism developed its philosophy along Buddhist lines.148  Knowledge of the direction of 
influence would certainly help identify the development of philosophical themes but this is 
secondary to the investigation of distinctly identifiable philosophical modes themselves. 
A major feature of Ch’an not emphasised in earlier Indian Buddhism is a focus on 
immanence, not as a revelation of impermanence, but as revealing the ‘thusness’ of 
mundane experience.  The ‘transcendence’ of enlightenment is then a return to a realisation 
of the natural state of existence, behind deluded overlays.  The naturalism associated with 
Daoism can be understood as a reaction against Confucianism.149  The Daoist’s viewed the 
systematic interpretation and engagement with the world, characteristic of Confucianism, 
as an artificial enterprise of valuation which ruins natural harmony, causing suffering and 
creating cosmic discord.150  On the other hand, Buddhism was originally posited as a 
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rejection of a Brahmanic metaphysical view that posited an intrinsically existent self.151  The 
idea of the ‘natural’ progression of events was, at least superficially, the wheel of samsaric 
existence from which Buddhism proposed a radical break.  Natural karmic consequentialism 
- the way of nature - for the Buddhist, is exactly what must be overcome.  The Daoist 
soteriological goal in relation to ‘the natural’ is fundamentally divergent from the Buddhist, 
and yet the two are reconciled in Ch’an.  Of course the commonality can be established 
through identifying an underlying nature to which Buddhism aspires, hence ‘Buddha-
nature’.  Furthermore, in both accounts, I maintain that enlightenment is the antithesis of 
habit.  This point will be developed later, for now the details of Daoism must be expanded. 
In contrast to the Confucian ideal of order through rules, good governance and the 
meticulous naming of things (the categorising that enables us to achieve this), the Daoists 
present an apparently anarchic alternative.  For the Daoist harmony is achieved, not 
through adherence to human laws, but by recognition of the natural way of the world.  
Human kingdoms and systems of understanding rise and fall and are subject to change.  
Thus understood, to adhere to a particular name is to attach oneself to the fate of this 
system when it ceases to be relevant.  ‘The way’ (Dao) on the other hand is ‘permanent’, 
and always underlies any particular interpretation of the world.  Because it is not dependent 
upon particular systems, it is unnameable, and so it is not subject to dismissal when 
situations change.  The best form of governance for the Daoist is to, effectively, do nothing 
(this is known as wu-wei or non-action152).  In this way a kingdom ruled by Dao governs 
itself, for the people are following the same influence as their leader. 
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Despite their different characterisations, the chord of ‘the Way’ runs through both 
traditions, providing a point of entry to consider the common Chinese proverb that 
Confucianism and Daoism are ‘two paths to one truth’.153  Daoism is concerned with 
personal development towards an ideal; Confucianism is focused on the structure of society 
and, one could say, more practical or immediate results.  Indeed, a ruler could use a set of 
rules in order to govern by the Dao, like a good judge in our law courts could function justly 
within a framework of laws by working in the spaces between them.  Independent of 
ideologies, human beings find themselves involuntarily placed in the phenomenal world, 
between heaven and earth, and subject to the greater rules of causation.  Both Daoism and 
Confucianism hold that even at the level of heaven the functioning of Dao is still evident, as 
the way of the universe, but their interpretations differ.154  The Dao De Jing states: 
Man models himself on earth, 
Earth on heaven, 
Heaven on the way, 
And the way on that which is naturally so.155 
By way of contrast, the Analects state that “Human beings can broaden the Way – It is not 
the Way that broadens human beings.”156  The hierarchy of influence is reversed.  The 
Confucian builds up to a system of practical functionality, the Daoist breaks down to the 
function of nature.  For the Daoist personal cultivation cuts through cultural formalities, 
while for the Confucian it refines them, nevertheless both extend their philosophical 
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concerns to the public and private realms with the goal of harmonisation.157  The Daoist 
emphasis is important to note here as it is (arguably) taken up by the Ch’an schools (see 
discussion below) which directly leads to the moral problem – where enlightenment is 
considered the ‘natural state’. 
The principle that represents the great Dao, as the ‘Way’, in individual situations is li.  
Related to this is the principle of virtue, the characteristic of being able to follow li; De.  De, 
in Daoism, as in the title of Laozi’s work the Dao De Jing, ‘book of the Way and Virtue’, is 
taken up as one of the two interconnected themes therein.  Talk of De then is a naturalised, 
anthropocentric functioning of Dao; in other words how a human being should act in the 
world.  While talk of Dao tends towards the metaphysical, the two concepts are 
fundamentally connected.  Earlier translations of the Dao De Jing, interpreted the title as 
‘The Book of the Way and its Power’158, managing to capture something of the relationship 
between Dao and De, but the significance of understanding De as ‘virtue’ in combination 
with being recognised as the ‘power’ of Dao should not be overlooked. 
In characterising the Dao at least two aspects can be identified.  First there is the way 
actualised, that is manifest in each individual event or situation, li.  As examples, there is a 
‘way’ of woodcutting or a ‘way’ of playing a musical instrument.  Obviously what the ‘way’ 
entails in each instance is going to depend upon all the elements that make up that 
situation.  For instance, what tools are at your disposal while cutting wood, the 
characteristics of the wood, your own physical disposition and, most interestingly, what 
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your objective happens to be.  We shall return to this last point in a moment.  Confucius also 
credits De with a universal validity; “If you govern with the power of your virtue, you will be 
like the North Star. It just stays in its place while all the other stars position themselves 
around it.”159  Virtue here is playing the governing role through deliberate manifestation, 
which the Daoist would only want to credit to the spontaneous expression of Dao.  Where 
‘virtue’ is understood as an accord with Dao, the two traditions see no conflict. 
The second, and related, aspect of Dao is the transcendent Way; the unchanging ‘mother’ of 
the universe.160  In Daoist cosmology the Dao precedes the One (which precedes the two, 
etc, and finally the multitude of things) in the order of creation.  This should not be 
understood simply as an explanation of the origin of the world, for creation here is a 
constant undertaking; the Dao is active in the world.  The Great Dao can be understood as 
that which allows things to be, though should not be confused with ‘Being’ as such.161  Dao 
is expressed as both being from emptiness and being the mother of emptiness (via non-
being).  It is also the source of all things as well as the state of enlightenment reached by the 
sage.162  Like the Buddhist emphasis on ‘no-self’, focus on the base of ‘nothingness’, far from 
being nihilistic, is also the basis of compassion .163  “[The sage] makes sure never to act from 
a motivation of desires or love.  Love here is defined as an ego-centered impulse; it is the 
                                                      
159
 Confucius, Analects, 2:1. 
160
 “[Dao] is the mother of all things” – Dao De Jing, 1. 
161
 “Even though the Tao of transcendence is everywhere generating... it is certainly not identical with the 
object generated.” – Saso, M., ‘Buddhist and Taoist Ideas of Transcendence’, in Saso and Chappell (Eds.), 
Buddhist and Taoist Studies I, p.5. 
162
 Kohn, L., Taoist Mystical Philosophy, p.87. 
163
 Daoism can certainly be seen to be ‘amoral’ and anarchistic, by the same reasoning as Zen is found to be so, 
however the Daoist Sage is ‘governed’ by the working of Dao itself – not of artificial virtue, but natural 
harmony.  Consider chapter 20 of Zhuangzi, “May the Tao and Te be your only refuge.” (Quoted in Kaltenmark, 
M., Lao Tzu and Taoism, p.104.)  Also, Dao De Jing, 49, “The sage has no mind of his own.  He takes as his own 
the mind of the people.” 
89 
 
opposite of compassion.  It is concerned only with egoistic self-preservation, while 
compassion means to support others in their efforts towards the Dao.”164 
This brings us back to the question of an individual objective in relation to Dao.  Any system 
of understanding which has a naturalised morality, direction or universal way, must 
somehow account for the discrepancy which allows for individuals (primarily humans) to 
function against it.  Of course the problem could be denied by saying there is never any 
discrepancy, but then discussion will turn to arguments on free-will and determinism which 
is best avoided for the time being.  On the Daoist account it is certainly possible to go 
against the Dao, even though we are ultimately a function of it.  The Ultimate Way is not 
deterministic, at least not at our subjective level, rather it is the way that all things naturally 
fall into, and for us discerning humans it tends to be the path of least resistance provided 
we are not embedded in some artificial structure.  Hence the Daoist emphasis on wu-wei 
(non-action); since through ceasing to act for oneself, one functions through the Dao and so 
‘leaves nothing undone’.165  In this way one would not find conflict, at least not within 
nature. 
In any situation, at every moment, one can follow the Dao.  There is certainly a wrong way 
of doing things on this account, and for those who go against Dao their ensuing struggle is 
taken as immediate evidence of this.166  However, there appear to be many instances that 
this naturalistic account must find exception with.  Pursuit of selfish gains or human-inflicted 
order, for instance, may have immediate benefits and to follow such paths, while easy, is 
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certainly not in accordance with Dao.  Ultimately, the Daoist must maintain, there is a 
difference between acting in accordance with Dao and following a mere limited way, for in 
many instances the immediately easy path is not virtuous.   
If our previous discussion on the limits of systems is considered in this context, an answer 
may be posed that saves the Daoist pragmatic emphasis and allows differentiation of 
virtuous action.  Just as the limits of a conceptual system cannot be overstepped if its 
conclusions are to remain valid, so too can pragmatic modes be understood as limited.  
Spatially; one can only walk between walls and not through them, wood can only be 
chopped provided some wood remains, and the content of a cup can only be added to until 
it is full.  Temporally; hunger does not persist once the belly is full, taxation is only effective 
provided workers can sustain themselves, and no selfish end outlasts the death of the 
individual.  To be in accord with Dao one’s actions cannot be focussed on such limited 
outcomes, for Dao is permanently valid.  While it is necessary to adapt to the particularities 
of the situation at hand (all mundane action is necessarily contingent) to realise Dao is to be 
unrestrained by limited modes.  Only that which is manifest locally yet valid eternally could 
be considered The Way.  All that is needed to reveal abstract pursuits as folly is time. 
So how does one become attuned to the Dao if in each situation the correct ‘way’ is 
different and the most beneficial path may not be immediately evident?  Zhuangzi’s 
interpretation of the Daoist path is not immediately helpful.  Unlike the Buddhist path, 
where emphasis is placed on wisdom (that to understand reality is the foundation of correct 
action) the Daoist emphasis is characterised as the pursuit of ignorance.  As well as 
variations in translation, the emphasis here is placed against the Confucian ideal, since to 
characterise the world intellectually would further separate us from nature.  The Confucian 
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path, by contrast, celebrates the naming of things, abstracting from the world as an attempt 
to place timeless characteristics upon the changing world.  From the Daoist perspective, 
considered from pragmatic limits, this is a system that will ultimately be forced to collapse.  
The ‘ignorance’ which the Daoist sages of old preached should likely be understood along 
the lines of wu-wei.  Just as the individual who practices wu-wei still acts, the sage may be 
understood to continue to think, to use language and even write great tomes on ‘the way 
that cannot be expressed in words’167 – the difference is that these modes of expression are 
not used in opposition to Dao. 
 Then there is the problem of interpreting Dao itself.  “Dao is obscured when men 
understand only one pair of opposites, or concentrate only on a partial aspect of being.  
Then clear expression also becomes muddled by mere wordplay, affirming this one aspect 
and denying all the rest.”168  Thus, when engaging with Dao philosophically one is forced to 
first admit its ineffability before, ironically, continuing to systematically dissect this 
indivisible unity.  Yet even here there is something to be picked up.  Hansen insightfully 
remarks that “If language cannot express dao it must be due to something about dao and 
something about language.”169  Indeed, something about the combination of these two 
results in the apparent ineffability, a similar predicament already noted with regard to 
Buddhist ultimate truth.  Limited expression cannot capture the unlimited, though it is 
possible to indicate towards it, and in this manner reach enlightenment. 
Evidently there is a commonality with this interpretation of Daoism and Buddhist emptiness.  
Enlightenment is freedom from suffering through an elimination of the causes of suffering.  
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For the Daoist this is akin to ‘knowing Dao’.  If one knows the true way then they will not fall 
into paths which conflict with the universal Dao.  In this way the sage is like the virtuoso or 
master artist who acts spontaneously, without thinking, because the relevant mode of 
action has been internalised.  The principle difference though is that the Daoist sage has not 
learnt one specific way of acting, in one specific field, but is said to have become attuned to 
the nature which underlies all fields.170  In Buddhism the nature of existence as emptiness is 
quite a different truth, for although all things are empty there is no transcendent thing 
‘emptiness’ which empties things of intrinsic existence.  The Dao however is understood as 
that which functions behind things in the world.  The Dao thus appears as a metaphysically 
reified concept, albeit reified as the ‘non-thing’. 
It should also be pointed out that emptiness is not an unfamiliar concept to the Daoist.  The 
Dao De Jing speaks of the space that is the hub of a wheel or the emptiness of a jar being 
the useful aspect of each object.171  A thing is utilised through the ‘nothing’ it creates, by 
virtue of the characteristic of its existence.  Also pragmatically, for a Daoist accordance with 
Dao is achieved through non-action, through non-discernment rather than active striving.  
As an aesthetic principle, this emphasis on the negative is adapted to painting in Zen, and 
sees emphasis placed on the space between the ink rather than the brushstrokes 
themselves.172  Just as in Zhuangzi’s characterisation of Butcher Ting,173 who’s mastery of 
finding the empty spaces between the bones and sinews, keeps his blade perpetually sharp, 
the individual who recognises Dao sees the space into which one can move without effort.   
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The relationship between Dao (the universal) and li (the way in a specific circumstance) can 
be interpreted in at least two ways.  The first is to claim that the way in each specific 
instance is nothing more than the manifestation of the universal Way.  This is to say that 
there is a direction which exists on the level of universal unity, and each instance is merely a 
fulfilment of that directedness.  In other words each instance is functioning as part of the 
whole.  There is nothing in the instance itself which necessitates a certain course of action; 
it is dependent upon the universal Dao.  The second interpretation is to reverse the 
relationship and say that the universal Dao is produced by the combination of all individual 
‘ways’.  This is certainly not an accepted interpretation, as the order of influence is quite 
clear – for the Daoist it is the Dao that manifests the myriad things and their interactions, 
the myriad things do not create the Dao.  However if the first interpretation is accepted, 
that the universal Dao is simply played out through the myriad interactions, then a problem 
emerges: how is it possible that we can (and do) make sense of events in specific 
circumstances without knowledge of the Dao?  Angus Graham suggests that, “Grasping the 
Way is a matter of ‘knowing how’, not of ‘knowing that’.”174  It appears that despite the 
apparent ‘transcendence’ of Dao from the manifest world, the expression of Dao is 
existentially realised as indistinct from the functioning of things in the world and implies a 
form of pragmatism specifically related to our own existential position. 
It would seem that Dao itself needs to be both unchanging and dependent upon the 
universe for its existence.  Yet these states seem logically incompatible.  On the other hand, 
if the immanent and transcendent aspects of Dao are separated the Daoist project would be 
undermined.  Wu-wei could not function, as li would have no relation to Dao.  The correct 
                                                      
174
 Graham, A.C., ‘Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of “Is” and “Ought”, in Mair, V.H. (Ed.), Experimental 
essays on Chuang-tzu, p.8. 
94 
 
way of action in one situation would have no relationship to the correct way of action in 
another situation, and so the possibility of enlightenment would also be denied.  For the 
Daoist project to succeed the immanence and transcendence of Dao must be understood 
concurrently.175   If it is possible to make sense of this, then a solution to the problem of 
transcendent justification may be revealed. 
 
Metaphysics of the Four Noble Truths 
The Buddha presented the four noble truths as an outline and explanation of the Buddhist 
soteriological goal.  The four truths express the purpose of Buddhism, its motivation and 
methodology, and its clear claim is that if one follows the noble eightfold path the 
experience of suffering can be overcome.  As a path, the initial state of suffering and the 
final state of non-suffering obviously differ, as there has been a change from start to finish.  
Specifically the cause of suffering has been eliminated through practice in accordance with 
the realisation that suffering does not exist intrinsically.  The conventional experience of 
suffering has been replaced with the ultimate truth of non-suffering.176   
Conventionally suffering beings are ignorant of the ultimate truth of suffering, and so they 
continue to suffer.  Ignoring the necessity of practice, from the investigation of the content 
of wisdom, to achieve enlightenment, according to the interpretation of the noble truths as 
a mere pedagogical tool, one must realise the emptiness of suffering.  In this way non-
suffering replaces suffering.  Here a soteriological complication arises.  In order for 
compassion to function, an enlightened being must be able to recognise the conventional 
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suffering of others, while simultaneously recognising the ultimate reality of non-suffering.  If 
ultimate truth overrides the conventional epistemically (to say that there is absolutely no 
suffering), then compassion would not function.  An enlightened being could not recognise 
or be motivated by the suffering of others, since ultimately it is not suffering - and this leads 
to a nihilistic response.  If on the other hand the conventional overrides the ultimate (to say 
that there absolutely is suffering), then enlightenment would not be possible.  Ultimate 
truth would be nothing more than sophistry, only immanent phenomenon are worthy of 
consideration. 
This existential distinction, between suffering and non-suffering, is transformed into a 
soteriological problem and thus becomes a metaphysical complication.  The difference 
between the two states is one of ‘ignorance’ and ‘enlightenment’ respectively – but how 
can we make sense of these states metaphysically?177  If the soteriological project is to be 
validated, it must be possible to make sense of ‘suffering’ and ‘non-suffering’ both being 
‘truths’ and referring to the same reality.  The truth of suffering is essential for compassion 
and the truth of the cessation of suffering is essential for wisdom. 
In claiming there is a conflict between these two truths I am obviously forcing an artificial 
distinction which is not present in the original Buddhist proposition.  ‘Suffering’ and ‘non-
suffering’ refer to different ‘levels’ of reality, they are different positions on a path.  The 
conflict I am drawing out requests a metaphysical consistency behind the epistemological 
transformation.  Perhaps if the nature of the epistemological difference can be established 
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then the project of establishing metaphysical continuity between the two perspectives 
could then be undertaken. 
The first distinction to be considered is the psychological difference.  The difference 
between the two understandings of suffering is dependent upon the state of mind of the 
individual in question.  Specifically, their progress on the path is equivalent to their 
respective understanding, such that: the novice experiences suffering and comes to 
recognise its existence, the experienced practitioner comes to realise the emptiness of 
suffering and hence discovers its cessation.  Finally, and more mysteriously, according to the 
Mahāyāna account of the Bodhisattva, the enlightened being simultaneously realises the 
emptiness of suffering (and so does not suffer) while also recognising the suffering of others 
(and so is compassionate).178  The actions of the enlightened being would then not be 
motivated purely by the short-term alleviation of suffering in others, to make them 
temporarily more comfortable, but ultimately to lead them to personal emancipation from 
suffering. 
The second distinction to be considered is the logical difference.  ‘Suffering’ can be 
understood as being used in two different senses with two competing definitions.  Many 
versions of this explanation could be constructed, all being based on the logical ground that 
one thing cannot both exist and not exist simultaneously, and thus the ‘suffering’ which 
exists and the ‘suffering’ which is empty each represent separate entities (in the loosest 
sense).  For example, ‘suffering’ refers to something undesired (this is already problematic 
as desire is the cause of suffering) while its ‘emptiness’ refers to the cause of that which is 
undesired.  Without an empirical reference this explanation does not present a conflict as in 
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the previous explanation, however this same lack leaves the explanation without active 
application.  Devoid of pragmatic function this form of explanation misses the core of 
Buddhism. 
The third distinction may be considered an existential difference.  The reality of suffering is 
directly experienced while the ‘emptiness’ of suffering is an analytic truth realised through 
reductive reasoning which is unable to find any ‘essential existence’ applicable to the 
experience of suffering.  This is a specific variation of the logical difference (and one that is 
important to Nāgārjuna) since ‘suffering’ in this case has two distinct reference points – one 
phenomenal, the other rational.  Alone, this explanation creates a conflict between 
experience and understanding which must then be overcome. 
Finally we should consider what the distinction as an epistemological difference entails.  
Since the realisation of emptiness (in Mahāyāna) is the realisation of Nirvāna, then a 
fundamental epistemic change has taken place between the original experience of suffering 
and this new mode of being.  There has been no change in ontological state.  This explains 
how an ordinary being and an enlightened individual can, on the one hand, move in the 
same place and time while experiencing and existing in this world in completely different 
ways.  Saṃsāra and Nirvāna thus overlap but are epistemically different existences of the 
same world.  Beings in the state of saṃsāra suffer while those in Nirvāna realise emptiness, 
and do not.  Being dependent upon a change in the foundations of knowledge, this 
explanation can be used in conjunction with any of the other forms of explanation.  Altering 
a mode of understanding has dramatic consequences for one’s worldly interactions and also 
effects the construction of any metaphysical system. 
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Now, for the sake of the current thesis, this must be tied in with the problem that 
‘metaphysics’ is just such an epistemological system of explanation.  Consider how one may 
decide between various competing metaphysical explanations.  Surely one will select, or 
simply adhere to, a principle if it affects them in what they feel is a positive way or that they 
witness such affects as positive in others who have previously adhered to this principle.  The 
principle itself acts as a type of keystone, an explanation that becomes the core premise, 
holding up a metaphysical framework.  Also, while the principle ‘supports’ further 
metaphysical or worldly explanations, it is itself without foundation and must be accepted 
purely on faith, or, more progressively, upon the explanatory power of the system of 
metaphysics it provides a basis for.  There are two major objections to this explanation.  
First, each keystone principle may entail a different supporting/supported system but it is 
possible that each could be understood as functional.  One may be led to relativism along 
these lines since each principle appears metaphysically valid.  Second, while the principle 
itself can be adopted without contradicting reality, since it is metaphysical and hence in 
some sense transcendent of worldly phenomena, the systems it supports and which support 
it subtly infuse reality to the point whereby the principle is accepted as ‘real’, while what is 
apparent is dismissed as unreal or illusory.  A world in which many of these systems, or even 
many interpretations of the same system, are present produces individuals sharing the 
same world yet experiencing this world in conflicting ways. In this manner, individuals 
themselves are led into conflict. 
To avoid this outcome, yet still engage metaphysically, our only recourse is to move either 
entirely into the abstract or use metaphysics only as a description of the principles of 
immanent interactions.  While an abstract system, like mathematics, may be self-consistent 
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it must be applied in order to be functional, in which case the application of the system 
becomes the sight of potential conflict.  As a functional engagement, in order to explain a 
soteriology, metaphysics cannot be transcendent. 
If metaphysics must be understood immanently, then conventional and ultimate truths 
must be understood concurrently.179  That a change in epistemology presents a change in 
pragmatic engagement is readily apparent.  That such a change can affect the subjective 
experience of suffering does not necessitate an ontological change, and thus a non-suffering 
enlightened being shares a world with suffering ignorant beings.  One subjective epistemic 
experience cannot override another, even where one truth is metaphysically consistent, 
while the other is not.  "Those who realize Void [people of prajna] know that ultimate 
ignorance (avidyd) and ultimate wisdom (vidya) do not exist as two.”180 
 
Conclusion 
The unique historical background of Zen presents a philosophical question; how can the 
truth of suffering (mundane experience) and the truth of no-suffering (enlightened 
experience) be metaphysically connected?  One solution may well be a re-interpretation of 
the concept of enlightenment itself.  It may be possible that rather than transcendent 
‘extinction’, “We can achieve... a nirvana not found in escape from the world but in an 
enlightened and awakened engagement with it.”181 
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 This complication is significant for both Nāgārjuna and Dōgen, both key thinkers in this thesis, as “They are 
committed to the claim that the objects of awakening and ignorance are both distinct and identical.” (Garfield, 
J. and Priest, G., ‘Mountains are Just Mountains’ in D’Amato et al (eds.), Pointing at the Moon, p.81.) 
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 Nirvana Sutra, quoted in Tokiwa G., ‘Chan (Zen) View of Suffering’, Buddhist-Christian Studies, Vol. 5 (1985), 
p.113. 
181
 Garfield, J., The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, p.341. 
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Transcendent justification falls down when an absolute separation is not maintained and 
focus is turned to the immanence of events.  Consider the valuation of soteriology 
ultimately.  If all sentient beings must be saved at any cost then we must posit another, 
‘higher’, reality to warrant this.  Otherwise, one may wonder what kind of world they are 
being saved for.  If we make no distinction between the ultimate and conventional realities 
then ‘at any cost’ is ridiculous.  Salvation is not found beyond the means used to attain it.  
To sacrifice some virtuous aspect of reality for the sake of allowing a being to see reality as it 
is would be akin to saving a being at the expense of condemning them.  Transcendent 
justification must then fail because every instance, in its ‘thusness’, must be considered an 
end in itself.  There is nothing ‘beyond’ by which to justify an event as insignificant, only 
epistemic interpretations of what is immediately apparent. 
Transcendent justification fails.  Instead we must understand the two truths concurrently.  
Here the term ‘concurrent’ is used to make sense of the mind of an ‘enlightened being’, 
following Nāgārjuna, both truths must be recognised as valid in the same moment, in the 
same entity, together in a coherent mental process.  How this is possible presents a 
metaphysical problem.  If a soteriological project can function towards an ultimate 
understanding, entailing both wisdom and compassion, in a world wherein reified 
systematisations are necessarily limited, then we must be able to make sense of the 
relatively mundane and transcendent truths together, without one overriding the other.  To 
reach such compatibility, the implications of interdependence must be followed through. 
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Chapter 3: Interdependent Entities 
 
The previous chapter concluded by claiming that the two truths must be understood 
concurrently if both wisdom and compassion are to function.  If uncovering the nature of 
this connection is to be tackled as a metaphysical problem then the extremes of reification 
and nihilism must be avoided.  It would seem however, given the limits of systems explored 
in Chapter 1, that any proposed metaphysical system would not be able to express the kind 
of universality expected of metaphysics, since no system is unlimited.  The keystone of this 
project is ‘the standpoint of śūnyatā’, metaphysically rendered through the concept of 
‘interdependence’.   
This chapter will begin the extrapolation of a metaphysics of interdependence proper 
through the examination of entities.  Chapter 4 will continue the project by examining the 
implications of ‘reverse causation’ and levelled frameworks, focussing on the phenomenon 
of mind.  The fundamentals of this metaphysics will then be completed in chapter 5, 
Interpenetration. 
It is clear that enlightened and unenlightened individuals share one reality, since they are 
historically recorded as interacting, indicating that they are metaphysically connected.  That 
they experience this reality differently indicates an epistemological separation between the 
two.  Given the problems of ‘transcendent justification’ examined in the preceding chapter, 
even this epistemological separation cannot be absolute.  To assume separation absolutely 
would not allow the transition from ignorance to enlightenment, while to absolutely deny 
separation would not allow for any distinction between the two.  Both are identified in 
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relation to their shared reality, as states of ignorance and wisdom respectively.  The nature 
of this reality, the Zennists claim, is ‘absolute nothingness’. 
Following the Zen model, what does it mean to have ‘nothingness’ at the base of reality?  
There are two interpretations that arose from the study of Dao in the previous chapter.  
Either this ‘nothingness’ is absolutely other (the ‘no-thing’) or it is a characteristic of our 
attempt to engage with the world, which is to say that ‘nothingness’ just is immanent 
reality.  The former interpretation appears to be incompatible with non-reification, if it is 
understood metaphysically.  The latter may also be problematic if, as a characteristic, 
‘nothingness’ is again reified as a systematised understanding of reality.  The metaphysics to 
be elaborated in this chapter is a system, and so is still necessarily limited, but aims to be 
self-referentially so.  This system is to be absolutely contingent.  In fact this characteristic is 
the fundamental nature of the system itself: that is, that every-thing is absolutely 
contingent; interdependent.  Where the necessary referents of a system are not present, 
the system does not exist in limbo as some potential of the world and it certainly does not 
stand ‘behind’ the world causing it to be as it is. 
This antifoundationalist system of metaphysics is proposed as an alternative to a purely 
reductive method.  While reduction is a useful conceptual tool, if it is followed through to its 
limits it is found to conflict with interdependence, and, I suggest, denies the possibility of 
enlightenment.  In a reductive model all phenomena are reduced to a fundamental base, 
which is necessarily irreducible and essentially existent, though this is often left 
unexamined.  Furthermore there is an inherent assumption of a hierarchy of epistemic 
‘levels’ of reality.  In contrast, interdependence presents an alternative metaphysical 
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framework which is within the bounds of its own assessment while retaining functional 
application. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections: 
The first section, Nāgārjuna’s Dependent Origination, elaborates upon the concept of 
śūnyatā as explained by Nāgārjuna , here focussing on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.182  As 
reification and implications of ‘intrinsic existence’ lead to nihilism, and the collapse of a 
metaphysical understanding, the only metaphysical principles that can be drawn must avoid 
these extremes.  Following Nāgārjuna, emptiness is presented as the only plausible 
explanation of reality as we experience it. 
The second section, Metaphysical Framework, sets out the function and implications of 
‘interdependence’ as a metaphysical principle.  Chiefly the identification of emptiness and 
dependent arising is established as an epistemological qualifier; a pedagogical device for 
examining claims made about the world.  Here, a metaphysical examination is undertaken in 
order to determine the structure and validity of a universe ‘empty’ of intrinsic existence(s).  
Regarding the Buddhist soteriological project, this ‘empty reality’ is explained as the basis of 
the possibility of enlightenment.  Furthermore, these principles are examined in relation to 
the metaphysical foundations of contemporary science and the implications of this 
examination are followed through. 
The final section, Bootstrap Universe, briefly outlines the implications of a metaphysical 
system of absolute contingency and responds to possible criticisms of this account.  It is 
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important to note that at this point the metaphysical system described still cannot explain 
the Zen position.  This project will be completed in chapter 5. 
 
Nāgārjuna’s Dependent Origination 
Nāgārjuna is recognised as the 14th patriarch in the Zen tradition and the texts attributed to 
him are given canonical status.  Given the significant philosophical distinctions found in Zen 
and the development of the moral problem, much has been made of the deviation of Zen 
from Buddhism proper.  If the development of śūnyatā taken up within the Zen tradition can 
be shown to be in accord with Nāgārjuna then, once again, either the accusations of 
immorality should not apply to Zen, or else these problems are even more widely applicable 
to Mahāyāna Buddhism (or if we accept Nāgārjuna’s position, all Buddhism, and in fact any 
method of approaching reality, is thus implicated).  From the previous chapters the problem 
arises from a nihilistic reading of śūnyatā and the reification of systems of interpretation 
leading to the failure of transcendent justification.  As Nāgārjuna is credited with having 
established śūnyatā as a foundation of Buddhist philosophy, his understanding of the 
implications this holds for the functioning of reality, and one’s manner of interpreting it, 
should be properly examined.  
The idea of dependent arising was present in early Buddhism but only identified with 
emptiness as a philosophical doctrine under Nāgārjuna.183  Historically, the conception of 
emptiness was in part a reaction against essentialist schools and the metaphysical 
assumptions their views entailed.  The characteristic opponent of the Mādhyamikas 
maintained that there was some essentially existent entity that was independently existent, 
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permanent and uncaused.184  The responses to such claims apply both to physical atomists 
and cognitive realists; so that, according to this view, to posit ‘self-existence’ at any level 
denies interdependence.  This contravenes emptiness and thus cannot explain the world 
apparent.  This is the claim which will now be examined. 
Firstly, to build upon the discussion of emptiness in chapter 1, we will now analyse how 
śūnyatā (‘emptiness’) is explained to be synonomous with pratītya-samutpāda (‘co-
dependent arising’) and the relevance of this to the Buddhist project.  Nāgārjuna directly 
connects these three in the following passage;  
Whatever is dependently co-arisen 
That is explained to be emptiness.  
That, being a dependent designation  
Is itself the middle way.185 
All phenomena are empty of essence because they are dependently arisen.  They do not 
contain within themselves the cause of their own existence.  This indicates that an 
examination of any phenomenon necessitates an examination of those phenomena on 
which it depends.  Furthermore the recognition of emptiness as interdependent (and 
interdependence as empty) becomes the ‘middle way’ between extremes of essentialist 
reification and nihilism.  In order to pursue the middle way, the examination of śūnyatā in 
chapter 1 will now serve as a guideline for interpreting interdependence.   
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 Early Buddhist opposition was in the form of the Sarvāstivāda school; maintaining that dharmas existed 
independently and were both impermenant and uncaused.  (See Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, Chapter 9; 
also Williams and Tribe, Buddhist Thought, pp112-115).  For the wider early Indian context see the description 
of Nyāya atomism in Siderits, M., Buddhism as Philosophy, p.88. 
185 Nāgārjuna, (MK) 24.18.; Garfield (Trans.) The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way.  
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The connection made above gives opportunity to again recall the famous passage from the 
Heart Sutra: “whatever is form, that is emptiness, whatever is emptiness, that is form.”186  
The passage has been variously translated187 but a common recognition of the appearance 
of form as empty is maintained, and, as the sutra continues, this further applies to all 
aggregates.  While I will pursue an antifoundationalist reading it should be recognised that 
this not common to all Mahāyāna schools, in fact Zen is usually connected to the ‘mind-only’ 
school of Yogācāra, which metaphysically presents mind as a foundation.  The ‘mind-only’ 
reading is justified as recognition of the emptiness of external phenomena and can be found 
in such common Zen passages as “directly pointing to the human mind.”188  I will argue in 
the next chapter that such readings are metaphysically incomplete as revealed through 
illustrations taken from Huineng and Dōgen, among others, recalling that mind too is empty. 
It would appear, at least for soteriological purposes, that any systematised understanding of 
reality must have some principles at its base and the selection of these principles tend to be 
reified by that system, hence the admission that all systems are necessarily limited and 
merely conventionally true.  The problem of addressing a metaphysical explanation of 
reality appears to be backed up by the Buddha’s refusal to provide answers to metaphysical 
questions, such as whether the universe is infinite or finite.189  However this is not 
necessarily a refutation of metaphysics as such, but a reasonable response to a non-
question which is ultimately misleading.190  If the Buddha affirmed or denied either position, 
then the essential assumption in the propositions, of an essentially existent universe, would 
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 Heart Sutra in Conze, p.163. 
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be affirmed.191  Neither position makes sense, both are defined by alternate reified systems 
which are presented as directly conflicting with emptiness.   
Now, if we are to address and hopefully overcome the nihilistic implications of Zen 
‘nothingness’ in order to explain the position of an enlightened being, we must ask if it is 
possible to develop a metaphysics, in the principle sense, which is based upon ‘emptiness’.  
Inasmuch as Nāgārjuna is labelled ‘metaphysician’192 it is the connection of emptiness to 
interdependence that makes this possible.  While śūnyatā can be considered an 
epistemological principle which is used to examine metaphysics, it is expressed 
metaphysically through interdependent phenomena.  Rather than being nihilistic, and 
simply proposing that nothing exists, an ‘empty metaphysics’ must be capable of explaining 
our perceived reality as a ‘metaphysics of interdependence’.  Interdependence as a 
metaphysical principle is a description of the connection phenomena must have in order to 
appear; act and be acted upon in the world, but, in accordance with emptiness, 
interdependence does not itself exist beyond the phenomena described.  In this manner 
interdependence is presented as a metaphysical principle that is not reified – it is an 
element of understanding reality, merely part of a metaphysical system and not of reality 
itself.  In other words, interdependence, like emptiness, is not a real thing in the world, but 
an abstract principle used to comprehend the world.  Following Nāgārjuna, this is the only 
understanding that can account for our reality without inherent contradiction in the system 
of explanation. 
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 A similar situation with an alternate and problematic response can be found in the kōan “Does a dog have 
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As interdependence is a guide for correctly understanding phenomena, the significance of 
this metaphysical understanding to the Buddhist stereological project must be stressed.  
Enlightenment as the perfection of wisdom, or ‘seeing reality as it is’, is paramount to Zen 
practice, and according to the elaborations on Dharma made by Nāgārjuna, this amounts to 
recognising the interdependence of all phenomena.  As noted in the previous chapter, the 
four noble truths relate two aspects of suffering according to the two truths, which, if they 
are to be understood concurrently at the metaphysical level, must be reconciled.  Nāgārjuna 
states, “Whoever sees dependent arising/ also sees suffering”.193  The apparent conflict 
between the truth of suffering and the cessation of suffering is due to the reification of the 
concept inherent in the proposition of the problem.  The desire to hold onto impermanent 
phenomena as though they existed inherently is the cause of suffering.  As previously 
explained, reification is immediately incompatible with emptiness.  Nāgārjuna, in 
elaborating interdependence, explains the (dys)functional origin of this incompatibility: 
To say “it exists” is to reify. 
To say “it does not exist” is to adopt the view of nihilism. 
Therefore a wise person 
Does not subscribe to “it exists” or “it does not exist.”194 
A concise example of interdependence is given by the Buddha in the Śālistambasūtra,195 
whereby the Buddha explains the causal origins of a sprout.  Coarsely imagined, a seed can 
be identified as the cause of a sprout and the resulting plant.  In order to sprout, a seed 
must experience the right conditions.  It requires soil with appropriate nutrients, water, 
sunlight and temperature all within a comfortable range, and so on.  This is explained as the 
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dependence upon sufficient causes and conditions.196  To limit one’s understanding of 
causation to the seed alone fails to comprehend the interdependent nature of the 
functioning of the sprout, as revealed when the simple cause does not produce its expected 
effect.  The inability of such a limited reified system to explain its own failure indicates that 
the system of explanation is incomplete.  The principle of interdependence indicates that 
any essentialised understanding of causation will always remain incomplete, as in reality 
there are no simple ‘causes and effects’ that can ignore conditions. 
Despite the obvious significance of conditions to the validity of positing causes and effects, 
conditions are commonly dropped from such discussion in favour of the brevity of 
generalised causation.  A generalised expression of causation simply assumes the correct 
conditions in order for the described connection to actually carry out (i.e. the ‘conditions’ 
are assumed to be an aspect of the cause).  Nevertheless, simply describing causes and 
effects as if they were complete gives the impression that causation could function in 
isolation of a wider environment and that when a described causal connection is not 
manifested, this is due to the presence of intervening factors; which is to say the incorrect 
conditions.  In this manner the idealisation of casual connections obscures the wider 
interdependence of these interactions.  By reducing the commonly presented position, the 
conventional, to its necessary components, the accuracy of the convention can be assessed.  
Emptiness maintains that such methods will never reveal a substantial essence by which to 
validate the reification of any conventional phenomena, such that any phenomenon can 
only be made sense of as interdependent. 
Nāgārjuna’s method involved the use of reduction in order to prove the impossibility of 
essentialised positions – a reductio ad absurdum.  This leads to two further consequences.  
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Firstly, this method can be used to disprove the substantial solution of any such reduction.  
Secondly, and this is my elaboration from Nāgārjuna’s work, the validity of the method of 
reduction itself is brought into question.  It is for this purpose that śūnyatā is taken as a 
guiding principle when setting up the groundwork for this metaphysics. The outcome of this 
line of enquiry will be a coherent metaphysical framework that avoids reification.197  
However, this is only possible if śūnyatā is not understood as an ontological existent.  This 
statement is derived from the discussion in chapter 1.  While empty things exist 
conventionally, ‘emptiness’ itself cannot.  Any positing of existence risks reifying that entity 
and thus falling into the nihilism that results from essentialism.  As Nāgārjuna posits śūnyatā 
as the middle way between reification and nihilism, we must avoid placing the concept in 
either category.   
Nāgārjuna explains that “emptiness is the elimination of all views”,198 although there is still 
contemporary scholarly debate over the philosophical status of the viewpoint of the 
Mādhyamikas.199  It appears that one would only be able to hold a position, however this is 
defined, if the position itself can avoid reification.  Whether this is possible is at the root of 
the debate.200  For the present thesis, it is enough to focus on Nāgārjuna’s method of 
examination, not to arrive at a characteristic  ‘view’ but in order to reveal what he 
understood to be the limitations of epistemological engagement with the world. 
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Nāgārjuna’s  use of the tetralemma (catuskoti), to dismiss all possible logical positions, is a 
readily identifiable feature of his work.  This method is repeated throughout the MK.  
Nāgārjuna begins the ‘examination of conditions’ in the MK with the following passage: 
Neither from itself nor from another 
Nor from both, 
Nor without a cause 
Does anything, anywhere, ever arise.201 
The purpose of the above examination is to overlay the apparent arising of phenomenon, 
which we regularly witness, to the impossibility of locating a logical basis of this arising.  The 
negation process denies essentially existent arising and, at the meta level, revokes the 
possibility of essential existence applied to the system which brought this understanding 
about through the negation of the propositions of ‘itself’, ‘another’ and ‘without cause’ as 
essentially existent.  This method is applied to the concepts of causes and effects, to the 
possibility of change, to motion, to aggregates of entities, of the (in)distinction between 
agent and action and to the elements of the Buddhist path including the four noble 
truths.202  As already stated, the purpose of Nāgārjuna’s project is not to deny the 
conventional meaning of such tools as cause and effect, but to throw light on their ultimate 
nature, which is emptiness.   
As emptiness is a reaction against a permanent, essential existence, the universe entailed by 
interdependence must be entirely devoid of essentially existent entities.  While one may be 
persuaded to accept the emptiness of a single entity or phenomenon following a convincing 
case argument, such as those presented by Nāgārjuna, to follow this through to a universe 
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112 
 
without any instance of essential existence will be distasteful to those who see essentialism 
as the basis of existence.  In order to go on to explain the coherency of such a universe, we 
must first examine the function of emptiness according to Nāgārjuna, which he presents in 
opposition to the artificial impracticability of essentialism. 
To physically, conceptually or metaphysically posit some entity as permanent does not allow 
for its interaction with other worldly things, since on this account it cannot change203 and 
interaction is understood as a relational change.  Furthermore the identity of any effect is 
tied up with its cause204, and as this connection requires that neither cause nor effect be 
essentially identified if causation is to take place.  An essentially existent cause could not 
relate to, and thus give rise to, its effect and, in the case of transitional causation, could 
certainly not give way to an effect since it cannot cease to be what it is essentially.  In order 
for activity to take place, in order for anything to change, that which makes up an activity 
must be capable of change.  Only empty, dependently arisen phenomena are thus capable 
of explaining the dynamic world we perceive. 
One may respond to this ultimatum that the conception of ‘essence’ used in Nāgārjuna’s 
critique is antiquated and relevant only to those ancient Indian essentialists with little 
bearing on contemporary use of the term, developed from the ancient Greek tradition.  We 
may, for instance, have no problem understanding ‘essence’ as a dynamic and engaged 
ground of existent things, rather than as a permanent and isolated ground.  In this sense 
‘essence’ need only logically relate to that without which that entity would not exist (in its 
presented state).  As ‘essence’, like ‘emptiness’, is merely a convenient designation, 
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modifying its definition presents no problem so long as the implications of the proposed 
qualities are followed through.  I maintain that if ‘essence’ is modified in this way then the 
additional implications of interdependence must also be attributed.  The ‘essence’ of an 
interdependent entity is nothing more than the connection it holds to all those 
phenomenon on which it depends.  Metaphysically this would implicate the entire universe, 
since no thing exists in isolation (that is independently).  Analytically, the counterfactual 
definition of essence applies trivially to the definition of a ‘form’ (in the traditional Greek 
sense), which too must be subject to the principle of interdependence and is thus found to 
be empty.  A ‘form’ in this sense is dependent upon those phenomenon it describes and 
ones perception of an instance of form is just as dependent upon the conception of that 
form.205  The concepts are not as important as the principles they define. 
Without recognition of interdependence no sense could be made of the world and this 
includes understanding the origins and function of conventional systems.  Nāgārjuna states; 
If dependent arising is denied 
Emptiness itself is rejected.   
This would contradict 
 All of the worldly conventions.206 
Putting aside those physical considerations, if the universe were non-empty, there could be 
no such thing as moral causes or effects,207 no normative direction, and no self.208  The 
consequences of a proposal of essential meaning are familiar to existential thought,209 
though here are required to be further connected rather than utterly disconnected from the 
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self.  The self exists non-essentially, dependently, or else not at all.  This presents an 
inversion of the problem from a reductive standpoint.  Reductively we postulate a solid 
metaphysical reality beyond our perceptions and then attempt to derive a normative value 
from these existent properties.  Nāgārjuna begins by rejecting non-emptiness since it would 
deny values we already have.  The purpose here is not to take conventions as the starting 
point and, through circularity, explain their necessary validity.  On the contrary, conventions 
are considered ultimately empty.  However, since we aim to explain the appearance of 
conventional reality then we cannot reject such conceptions outright.  That there is no ‘self’ 
to be found ultimately does not replace the conventional recognition of some continuity 
through a physical body that is recognised as such.  To simply deny a conventional self fails 
to explain our experience of the world.  In order to explain the convention of self, it has to 
be shown to arise dependently and that it is nothing more than this. 
The self is composed of the five aggregates and each aggregate is made up only of the 
instances of that aggregate, thus presenting a reductive model of self.  Nāgārjuna examines 
the nature of consciousness in dependent relation to the instances of consciousness.   
If it can endure 
Without such things as seeing, 
Then, without a doubt they also 
Can exist without it.210   
However, when examined, we can never identify a ‘seer’ without an instance of ‘seeing’ 
being necessarily implemented.  Nāgārjuna then examines the opposite position; 
If the seer itself is the hearer itself, 
And the feeler, then 
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For it to exist prior to each of these 
Would make no sense.211 
Consciousness is nothing beyond the instances of consciousness, and there is nothing that 
exists before (or after) each instance.   This is true of all dependently arisen entities, and 
thus all experienced phenomena.   
Tsong Khapa, in his commentary, draws upon Āryadeva’s explanation found in the 
Catuḥśataka; 
Whatever is dependently arisen 
Cannot be independent. 
None of this is independent. 
So all of it is selfless.212 
Recall that interdependence isn’t merely a metaphysical principle, but is for Nāgārjuna 
“itself the middle way”.213  Interdependence is entrenched in the Buddhist soteriological 
project.  Nāgārjuna remarks that “[The view of] existence does not achieve liberation from 
becoming, nor does [the view of] non-existence. The Great Person is freed through the 
complete understanding of [the interdependence of] existence and non-existence.”214  As 
we have seen, emptiness entails both a conventional recognition of existence and an 
ultimate recognition of non-existence.  I reiterate: the two truths must be understood 
concurrently.  Nāgārjuna states: 
Those who do not understand 
The distinction between these two truths 
Do not understand 
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The Buddha’s profound teaching.215 
To understand the two truths ‘concurrently’ here requires that we recognise each truth 
through its own aspect, uniquely, and also realise that in isolation either one is incomplete.  
In order to validate the Buddhist soteriological project through ‘interdependence’ the 
distinction between ultimate and conventional modes of being and the nature of the reality 
to which they refer will be examined metaphysically. 
 
Metaphysical Framework 
There is an assumption from the ‘objective’ standpoint of absolute connection, which is 
reduced to an ontological ground.  There is also an assumption from the ‘subjective’ 
standpoint of absolute separation, which is reduced to the subject.  Both standpoints are 
conventional systematisations, limited by the logic inherent in the structure.  
Comprehending the problem of suffering in the Buddhist project requires both standpoints 
to be understood together.  Suffering is only experienced as such subjectively, and as 
enlightened beings do not experience suffering as such, we may further categorise the 
experience of suffering as a naive standpoint.  Correct understanding, we are told, is the 
realisation that suffering does not essentially exist, however this realisation is not equivalent 
to ‘objectivity’ in the abovementioned sense.  Both the experience of suffering and the 
experience of non-suffering are existentially realised.  Nevertheless, the ‘objective’ 
standpoint proposes a common ground to diversely realised subjective states.  The project 
of metaphysics is to find just such a common ground, but this cannot be limited to the 
‘objective’. 
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This metaphysical framework is proposed in order to address the fact that enlightened 
beings share a world with the unenlightened.  The previous chapter concluded with a denial 
of transcendent justification, indicating that those acting through ultimate truth must 
engage at the conventional level.  Furthermore, in order for compassion to function, the 
conventional cannot simply be overridden by the ultimate truth, lest the truth of non-
suffering nihilate the truth of suffering.  The subjective realisation of a conventional being is 
valid in the same reality as the ultimate realisation of an enlightened being, and the latter 
must recognise this if the Buddhist project (implying compassion) is to be metaphysically 
explained.  Nāgārjuna, in connecting emptiness and dependent arising, prompts this 
metaphysical project as a means of understanding the two truths concurrently.  I claim that 
following through the implications of interdependence leads us to accept an 
antifoundationalist metaphysics. 
Emphasis of the functional validity of conventional truth should deter us from a nihilistic 
reading of Nāgārjuna and give some indication as to the purpose of proposing 
‘interdependence’ as a metaphysical concept.  That empty entities exist means they exist 
dependently and are nothing other than that dependence.  This alone gives credence to a 
reductive metaphysics whereby entities are reduced to more fundamental entities which 
are in turn embedded in some kind of wholistic universal ‘real’. 216  This is a common reading 
of both Zen and Daoist metaphysics and will not be pursued here.  On the contrary, I claim 
that such a reading is in direct conflict with śūnyatā and so too with interdependence.  Any 
reduction that claims an essential existence, even at the most fundamental level, is non-
empty and so cannot exist interdependently. 
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Conventionally speaking, it does not seem absurd to suggest that there are things in the 
world- a chair, a rock, one’s own hand, and so forth.  In addition one may maintain that 
immaterial entities also exist – a soul, a number, an idea of a chair, and so on.  For now let 
us consider the possibility that entities do actually exist (hopefully not a controversial 
position).  We deal with physical entities in the world, we work with entities in our logical 
calculations and we see the fruits of our interactions with entities.  It would seem ridiculous 
to doubt their existence, and yet our almost unconscious positing of entities is not without 
complications.  Whenever we attempt to define an object of our intuition, we are forced to 
rely upon its relationship to other objects or to leave its fundamentals undefined.  The 
necessity of interdependence to epistemology is evident.  Alternately, if we attempt to place 
the reified entities proposed within systematic frameworks upon the world we discover the 
limits of these definitions rather quickly.217  When this occurs it can be identified either as a 
problem of our conceptions of the world or of the nature of the world external.  But if there 
can be a distinction made between conception and physical extension then we must favour 
one over the other if the two are found to conflict.  The basis of this favouring will be 
grounded in either the primacy of the ‘subjective’ (mental perception) or for the potential 
universality of the ‘objective’ (metaphysical existence).   
Another problem with our intuited entities is their limitations in space or time.  Ultimately 
we cannot say that a changing physical entity remains the same over time (like a ship which 
gradually has all of its constituent pieces replaced in repairs), nor that a specific area is 
separately identifiable from its surroundings (like a shades of green from shades of yellow 
on a progressive colour cline).  This is not true of the representative objects we conceive, 
they tend to stay true to their definitions and so come into conflict with their dynamic 
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counterparts.218  Thus, usually when being a pedantic philosopher, we can come to realise 
the limits of reified entities.  Although our objects are useful, they have no definite inherent 
identity beyond our own necessarily static, and thus, limited conceptions of them.  
However, recognising the necessity of change in identity, and the impossibility of identifying 
an object in isolation, we accept these limitations and continue to utilise a conception of 
‘entities’ to work in the world.  A great deal of analytic philosophy has set its sights on these 
problems, attempting to save our systemised understanding of the world or, in more radical 
moves, taking the opposing position and revoking it entirely with little to propose in return.  
As we have seen, Nāgārjuna’s interdependence proposes an alternative, a possible ‘middle 
way’. 
First a metaphysical issue must be resolved, since it appears that we require an idea of 
individual entities to make sense of ‘interdependence’.  Such an assumption would 
ultimately undermine the project.  The argument runs that only if objects and/or individuals 
are recognised as such (that is, individual) can they be understood to be somehow related 
to one another, if there were no individuals there could be no relations.  However, it is a 
very different thing to say that an entity is dependent upon others for its existence than 
simply stating that no entities exist.  The latter position provokes two likely interpretations; 
the first, which I will immediately dismiss, is that there is nothing.  Apart from being in 
conflict with our perceptions to the contrary it also denies the possibility of consideration 
within its conception (since this would also not exist).  Call this position extreme nihilism.  
The second possibility is more akin to the universal flux idea; that there are no individual 
entities, only a single constantly changing whole.  There may initially appear to be no 
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conflict with the idea of interdependency yet there is a major complication.  Universal flux, 
without entities, is counterintuitive.  All our conventional interactions involve ‘things’ and to 
hold that they simply do not exist does not help us understand our conventional reality.  
Epistemologically this dismisses the existence of the entities we depend upon.  Of course to 
preserve the universal flux idea we could say that the entities we interpret are functional, in 
that they have a use and they do in fact represent something ‘real’ in that sense, but at the 
same time what they represent is not an individual ‘thing’, but merely a distinct part of a 
larger whole.  This only leaves the question of the nature of this ‘whole’, which is to seek the 
nature of existence, at which point all tools have been exhausted.  Rather than being a 
solution to the nature of existence, the ultimate function of interdependence has merely 
been misplaced.  Any such understanding must still be compatible with emptiness, since to 
reify the whole would present the most severe form of nihilism.  Before jumping to the 
nature of the universe, the relationship of everyday phenomena must be better understood. 
Empty phenomena are understood as such due to their dependence upon causes and 
conditions.  Nāgārjuna argues that these phenomena are neither identical to nor distinct 
from their causes and conditions and we have seen various methods of interpreting this.  As 
an explanatory method, emptiness implies that we cannot make sense of an entity without 
reference to its causes and conditions (to claim the entity as meaningful itself is actually 
shorthand for those causes and conditions).  But as we have seen, causes and conditions do 
not simply precede an entity or event (as in ‘cause’ and ‘effect’), they are co-synchronous 
with the event.  Thus we cannot explain a phenomenon without reference to its 
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environment.  In the same manner, the explanation of an environment will remain 
incomplete without a description of all phenomena that make it up.219 
‘Environment’ is here introduced as a technical term which indicates the surrounding 
influences, amounting to the collected causes and conditions, upon which a selected 
phenomenon or entity depends.  The limits of an environment are conventionally defined by 
the system used to address the focal entity.  This could be seen to be following a ‘principle 
of sufficient reason’, as championed by Leibniz,220 leaving ‘sufficiency’ defined by the limits 
of the examining system.  It is important to note that due to the direct implications of 
interdependence, non-independence specifically, the environment of any focal entity needs 
ultimately be extended to the entire universe. 
One final point regarding environment is that, as previously stated, an environment is only 
complete when all effective phenomena are taken into consideration and this includes the 
focal entity.  The significance of this inclusion is immediately apparent when an 
environment and its focus are related in a feedback loop.221  When feedback is identified 
one cannot predict the future state of an environment without taking into account the 
effect of interaction with the focal entity (or entities), which in turn require an 
understanding of the effect of the environment upon it.  From the principle of 
interdependence we can conclude that if this ever occurs, in any environment, then it is a 
contributing factor to every environment ultimately (that is extended to include all entities).  
Furthermore, it is a condition of every entity as empty and dependent that such feedback is 
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a necessary aspect of interdependence at the metaphysical level.  This will be followed up in 
the next chapter concerning the nature of mind.   
Now attention must be turned once again to the limits of systems of interpretation in order 
to dismiss the possibility of a reductive metaphysical framework in opposition to absolute 
interdependence.  If a reductive framework is accepted then an environment can be defined 
by the phenomenon that make it up and complications of feedback and prediction need not 
apply.  At the outset I eliminated the possibility of reduction to an essential base as it 
contradicts emptiness and would fail Nāgārjuna’s metaphysics.222  The process of reductive 
evaluation cannot be discarded however, after all Nāgārjuna used this method in order to 
establish interdependence, so the limits of reduction as a method must be evaluated. 
A theme of this thesis, in establishing interdependence, is to reveal the limitations of 
evaluative systems due to the reification of proposed entities.  Examined generally, the 
reductive method results in certain self-relational logical paradoxes, which demonstrate the 
limits of the system itself.223  In addition to those conflicts highlighted by Nāgārjuna, 
consider the Sorites paradox224 which entails a conclusion that, while syllogistically valid, is 
undeniably false.  The paradox is formed when adding or removing a small quantity from a 
subject, the heap, at a constant rate until the initial subject no longer exists.  The original 
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example is taking away grains of sand from a pile one by one.  Removing a single grain does 
not revoke its ‘pile-ness’, nor does removing a further grain from that resultant pile, 
however the end result of this progression is an empty space that we are forced to admit is 
a ‘pile’. This problem cannot be solved using the logic that created it, except by asserting a 
sharp ‘cut-off’ point between states (i.e. 1000 grains is a ‘pile’ and anything less is ‘some’ 
until there are no grains left).  The reason the paradox remains valid is because it plays on 
an inherent limitation in our logic, specifically the reification and segmented identity of 
objects and properties.  This is a limitation necessary for the functioning of any categorical 
system (including standard mathematics) but it is not a feature of reality as such.  Sorites is 
but one of a family of such paradoxes, all hanging on this system limitation.225   
Pointing out the enduring validity of paradoxes is not intended to be a rebuttal of logic.  
Stating that the reification of objects does not exist in reality is not to say that simple logic is 
erroneous or useless, but that the process by which we interpret the world into an abstract 
logical framework is necessarily limited.  If we make a prediction based on a logical 
sequence and we find that our prediction does not come to be, we do not assume that logic 
is flawed, nor that the world must be broken, rather we have missed something in our 
calculations.  The world does appear to consistently fulfil our logical expectations.  We can 
understand that certain effects spring from certain causes and that, for example, certain 
forces will affect the trajectory of a body in motion.  These are conventional truths.  Yet 
even here, the demarcations of  ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ are merely relative qualifiers and, 
further, we can identify no such thing as a ‘force’ outside of the problem it is calculated for.   
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We can understand the healthy human body as a functioning network of mechanical, 
electrical and chemical pathways but we could also interpret obstructions in a flow of 
energy around the body as a cause for sickness.  The latter explanation may seem 
oversimplified (if not completely incorrect) to most ‘western medicine’, yet such a concept, 
Chi, is still used in traditional Chinese medicine.  If we evaluate the two interpretations of 
the body based on their various practical applications the ‘simpler’ version may be able to 
account for disruptions and cures that the historically western version cannot (and vice-
versa).  This medical example glosses over issues of scientific rigour and criticisms of 
traditional modes, and such controversy will always obscure a philosophical point.  In this 
example it is certainly difficult for one working within the paradigm of one mode of 
understanding to consider the alternate possibility; that, in the first instance, ‘energies’ may 
explain anything more than a combination of what could be understood as an interaction of 
the various bodily systems or, alternatively, that these interactions can do away with said 
energy.  This difficulty, I hope, is less prominent in the following example, considering 
interpretations of light.  Depending upon the problems we are facing we may choose 
between looking at the contrast or tone of patches of colour or we may understand these 
colours as the separation of various wavelengths of white light.  It doesn’t matter how 
accurately we understand the interactions of frequencies of light, we would still need to 
work with the level of the experience of colours in order to design a painting or construct 
camouflage.  Our reified understanding would have to be converted to a broader level to 
tackle these problems. 
There is a tendency in popular literature to set up such examples to show the contrast 
between ‘western’ reified interpretations of the world to contrast with the predominantly 
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‘eastern’ modes, which work at a more holistic level.226  This overly simplified view 
overlooks the fact that both modes represent reifications.  Whether we call it colour or a 
certain light frequency, whether it is an obstruction of energy or a set of neurons firing out 
of sync, we are still labelling and breaking up reality into workable pieces.  Conventionally 
realised, these are pieces which interact with each other in a coherent manner and are thus 
practical and valid interpretations.  Only at the edges of these systems do we recognise the 
limits of these interpretations, and only then does emptiness become a serious 
consideration. 
As a method of studying and classifying phenomena, contemporary science has proven 
overwhelmingly successful, allowing us to identify connections and tendencies correlated to 
theories presenting predictable future results.  However the accepted boundaries of the 
scientific method, and extreme examples such as the logical positivist’s abolition of 
metaphysics,227 tends to obscure, or prevent critique of, the metaphysical presumptions 
inherent in these theories.  As a description of reality certain conceptual factors, which 
sustain the overall structure and situate experimental results, persist beyond the reach of 
empirical investigation.  These foundations remain philosophical, yet the extrapolation of 
results into grander contexts presents epistemological consequences, altering the 
interpretation of experimental data, and so too the interpretation of the world based upon 
this.   
Paul Davies expresses the popular opinion that “The belief that the underlying order of the 
world can be expressed in mathematical form lies at the very heart of science, and is rarely 
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questioned.”228  While Davies goes on to side with a mathematical foundation, it would 
appear that, while a commonly held belief, such a foundation is not essential to the 
continued function of science.  It is true that the development of mathematics as the 
‘language’ of scientific descriptions of the universe, hand in hand with the development of 
empirical experimentation, radically transformed the modern world-view, however this 
should not be considered as the end-point of our theoretical development.229  Elaborate 
projects such as Harty Field’s Science Without Numbers, which undertook a nominalist 
explanation of mathematics, have brought into question this dependence upon the 
ontological existence of mathematical entities. 
The position of mathematics in contemporary (often undisclosed) metaphysics is a 
fascinating topic, however to return to our focus on the implications of interdependence as 
a metaphysical principle, the nature of mathematics becomes a secondary concern.  If a 
mathematical entity (or system) exists, it can only do so interdependently.  That 
mathematics functions as a vocabulary for describing the physical universe, even if it is 
recognised as indispensible,230 does not necessitate that mathematics itself is somehow 
ontologically fundamental.  Rather, it is primarily identified as a relation of a mind to the 
universe – that is to say that the existence of a mathematical system depends upon the 
expression of that system by an individual or culture within the universe it describes.  
Physicist Lee Smolin agrees, “Fundamental properties in physics, such as space and time, 
have something in common with biological properties: they are all about relationships, not 
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absolutes.”231  The nature of reality itself, on this reading, is not determined by the overlay 
of mathematics. 
The tendency towards reductionism that dominates scientific method may allow parallels to 
be drawn with Buddhist emptiness, since at any level a phenomenon is recognised as no 
more than its constituent, lower-level, parts.  However, somewhere down the chain of 
reduction, where it is assumed that there is a fundamental unit of existence which is 
considered irreducible - a foundation; be it atom, quanta, superstring or mathematical 
formula – such a foundation is incompatible with Nāgārjuna’s emptiness.  The foundation 
too must be critically examined and further broken down.  The critique of emptiness must 
be levelled against the apparent essentialism inherent in a reduction to some fundamental 
level,232 where that level is understood as essentially and necessarily existent. 
It should be noted that the above dismissal of any essential foundation could be criticised as 
leaving open the question of what it is to exist, or why there is ‘something rather than 
nothing’, but so does the positing of an essential foundation.  Attributing some essential 
existence is not a solution and only defers this question.  If, for instance, we determine that 
our best theories indicate that there is some fundamental mathematical basis for reality, 
our enquiry then turns to the nature and origin of this basis.  I would argue that this basis 
must also be dependent.  While we are not yet ready to examine the problem of existence, I 
would like to highlight it and indicate that the metaphysics developed in this thesis hopes to 
do away with such deferrals. 
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Another basic position directly affected by the principle of interdependence is the ideal in 
physics of a particle in isolation.  The essential properties of a particle are posited as the 
natural state free of external influences.  This is the mean state from which all interactions 
are measured as deviances.  This is accepted only as an ideal since it is impossible to observe 
anything in perfect isolation.233  We hold that an entity will interact differently when it is in 
some kind of contact with other entities than if it were in isolation.  But according to the 
principle of interdependence any entity is defined by its contact with other entities; its 
causes and conditions.  Without these interactions an empty entity has no properties, so 
according to interdependence a particle in isolation is not only unobservable, it cannot exist.  
The properties of any entity are determined in dependence upon its environment, and in 
each different instance of relation the effect on the entity similarly differs.  So the state of 
an entity (in effect, what it is) is determined by the entities it is in contact with. 
Notice that denying the possibility of existence in isolation does not affect the validity of a 
scientific system which accepts isolation as an ideal since, being unobservable, it cannot be 
physically posited.  Where the implications of interdependence become significant is in the 
further postulation of metaphysics.   As the properties of an entity are a result of its 
environment, and since this applies to every entity, and further, that no entity exists (in this 
world) in isolation, then the state of any entity is dependent upon the state of every other.  
This does mean, in one sense, that to change any minute detail of the world will affect 
everything.  However everything is not affected directly.  There are groups of closely related 
causal networks, feedback loops and phenomena such as event horizons which, while their 
sources of influence are grouped or ‘chunked’ in the world, are still all ultimately 
interdependent (otherwise they could not exist).  In this manner temporal and spatial 
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separation become recognisably manifest as the delay/distance between one action and 
another, as, for example, cause and effect.234  Physically, this separation creates intense 
localised interactions, decreasing in strength with distance as the effect disperses, 
culminating in the development of focal environments.  Epistemically, one is thus able to 
recognise difference and identify ‘individual’ entities; objects which hold their shape and 
patterns which recur.  In everyday interactions it is important to recognise that it is this 
apparent separation that is often of most use to us.  Philosophically, if one is to discover 
reality as such, one must see through what is apparent. 
The complication of connection and separation is expressed by Nāgārjuna as follows; 
One different thing depends upon another for its difference. 
Without a different thing, another would not be different. 
It is not tenable for that which depends on something else 
To be different from it.235 
A categorically identified difference is not an inherent difference.  Metaphysically, nothing is 
independent.  No entity can exist in isolation.  Though we can conceive of such an entity, we 
can never perceive it (by its very definition) nor any of its affects.  Such an object is 
necessarily of a different world.236  The coherent extension of a single world is assumed in 
order to define the limits of enquiry.  Someone’s first reaction to such a limit may be to say 
that this isn’t a metaphysical rule, but an epistemological one.  They would be right, it is an 
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epistemological rule, however metaphysics is necessarily bound up with epistemology.  
What we can know, and hence what we can theorise about, is physically limited.  A simple 
example is that one may not have knowledge of the contents of a sealed box, since they 
cannot (directly) perceive any contents, but these contents are still a part of the same 
physical world as the (non-)observer.  In more complex examples the ‘laws of nature’ can 
also be understood as metaphysically limited and here the ‘world’ definition breaks down. 
There is some confusion here and the result can be seen in the physical limits of ‘light 
cones’, as expressed for example, in the idea of an ‘event horizon’ in astrophysics.  The 
‘event horizon’, or boundary of the region surrounding a black hole, is defined by the point 
at which light cannot escape its gravitational pull.  We theorise that time ‘stops’ and space 
becomes infinitely elongated.  Epistemologically, beyond this point we cannot perceive 
anything since nothing can escape the horizon to interact with us.  The limits of our thought 
and the limits of our perceptions (and interactions) are related.  (Of course you can think of 
something you cannot perceive but the opposite is not true.) 
The black hole is an awkward example for my purposes here as it is based upon a temporal 
instant and spatially essential view of the universe (the very thing I aim to do away with).  
More importantly, regarding the premise that nothing can be independent, consider what it 
would mean for something to be wholly independent.  This independent thing could not 
interact with the world in any way (whether or not we are aware of it is unimportant, as our 
epistemological awareness already requires some basic metaphysical interaction – and even 
whether or not it affects us directly is unimportant as the principle of interdependence 
implies that we must at some point interact with something which has been influenced by 
this thing.  If we are completely isolated from a ‘thing’ then it is not a part of our world.)  
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Something that is not a part of our world, does not interact with us or anything with which 
we interact with, that is to say does not affect our world in any way, is not something we 
need be concerned about – in a purely pragmatic sense.  In a logical sense it is impossible 
for us to know such a thing anyway. 
To continue this discussion I will make the assertion that the function of seeing ‘reality as it 
is’ is itself interdependent and thus dependent upon the metaphysical position of the being 
that ‘sees’.237  Regarding the nature of the experience itself, I believe there is an additional 
quality that enlightenment must possess (and the argument for this position dominates the 
next chapter) - enlightened realisation cannot be reductive.  By this I mean that the wisdom 
an enlightened individual has cannot be contained purely in one ‘level’ of thought for the 
reality that is to be understood is made up of multiple ‘levels’.  That is to say that reality 
isn’t simply a universal flux of sub-atomic energy – reality is also thoughts, sensations, 
organisms, cultures, and so on.  It would seem that this has just made enlightened wisdom 
so much more complex, since it has to include multiple levels of understanding which are 
often either partially or wholly contradictory, but let us consider the alternative.  If we are 
to understand reality on a single level then all other levels of understanding must be 
reducible to (or extrapolated from) this single level.  As mentioned previously, this is 
generally assumed to be the case in science; that if we knew the most basic level of reality 
(the most basic form of reality, its state at a specific instant in time, and had a computer 
powerful enough to crunch the numbers that would correspond with the ‘laws’ of the 
universe) then we would understand and could explain everything.  There are many 
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directions in which we could take this discussion238 but here our interest lies with the 
possibility of ‘enlightenment’.   
Firstly, I propose that it is impossible for a human mind to comprehend such calculations as 
would be necessary to understand the universe on this model.  Nevertheless we can 
meaningfully and intelligently interpret the world.  Our mistake is to project the implications 
of a model, which is an interpreted piece of reality, beyond its scope.239  We try to hold onto 
the distinctions we create at one level and thus come into conflict with the groundwork of a 
different level of interpretation.  Whatever enlightenment is it should not suffer this 
confusion.  If it is possible to understand reality directly then this understanding would not 
be based on any epistemological level, it would be an understanding of the reality that 
underlies all levels simultaneously.  The realisation itself must be free of interpretation. 
A final criticism of the basic premises in constructing this metaphysical framework is the 
obvious contradiction, mentioned in chapter 1, that the principles of ‘interdependence’, 
‘emptiness’, ‘environment’, and so on, appear to have been reified.  Here I must reiterate, 
this framework is inherently empty and so cannot be considered as metaphysics in the 
conventional sense as it denies fundamental ontological reality.  These principles, such as 
interdependence, are themselves interdependent.  They only acquire meaning in 
dependence upon appropriate conditions (without there being two or more ‘entities’ 
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interdependence cannot arise, for example), without which they would only theoretically 
retain their counterfactual validity.240  The validity of such a metaphysical principle further 
depends upon the nature of the mind from which it is conceived, which presupposes the 
conditions necessary for that mind’s existence.  The actual embeddedness of epistemology 
in metaphysics and vice versa should be a major concern for both fields of thought.  This, in 
relation to interdependence, is the focus of the next chapter. 
 
Bootstrap Universe 
Taking interdependence as a fundamental metaphysical principle leads us to adopt specific 
positions in disputed areas within the philosophy of science.  If the basic premises of 
interdependence are readily accepted as part of commonly accepted scientific method then 
some credence is given to the further adoption of the implications of interdependence.  
Alternatively, an outright rejection of interdependence must answer to Nāgārjuna’s 
tetralemmas – without recourse to an alternative it would appear that a reified discourse 
will be unable to explain the nature of causation, identity, or indeed salvation, since no 
intrinsically existent element can be found at any level.  Yet to propose an 
antifoundationalist metaphysics would still appear to remove all explanatory power from 
the system; for if there is no fundamental basis to reduce reality to, how can it be made 
sense of?  Here I will argue that interdependence is compatible with a ‘bootstrap universe’ 
model – a universe which is entirely self-referential and self-defining, with no essentially 
existent parts or wholes at any level. 
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To begin the bootstrapping a radical claim is required.  There are no laws of the universe, 
nor are there any constants.241  This follows from a denial of essential existence and the 
universal application of impermanence.  An explanation of why the universe is can be found 
in how the universe is.  Since each and every entity can be understood by its environment, 
what it is made up of and influenced by, rather than saying that there are laws a thing will 
follow ‘in isolation’ (which is impossible), we could say that the interactions of an entity are 
restricted and directed by its place in the universe.  Rather than being deterministic these 
influences are just that, influential.   
A law, after all, describes, in the most general terms, the regular occurrence of events given 
set parameters.242  In order to be deterministic, to be capable of describing the state of the 
world as it appears, a law also requires the starting conditions of the physical system.243  To 
problematise the universal application of the law model, Steven Hawking has proposed that 
the starting conditions of the universe are potentially unknowable as the frameworks used 
to understand the early universe, including time, reach their limits just after the initial 
event, so the event itself is beyond our potential epistemic scope.244  If the purpose of the 
law-method is to dispel metaphysical speculation, an essential limit to investigations could 
contra-wise force the adoption of classical metaphysical explanation – the ‘unmoved 
mover’.  While the validity of such a (classical) metaphysical conclusion will not be 
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addressed in this thesis, I propose that a metaphysics of interdependence eliminates the 
need to turn to such positing in order to explain the world as it appears to us. 
As this thesis is philosophical we are not here concerned with the specifics of theories of 
physics, or debates thereof, it is rather the metaphysical assumptions and implications 
which are of concern.  So when I propose a ‘bootstrap universe’, this should be understood 
as distinct from developments of various field theories in physics.245  At most we can 
describe the principles these theories must abide by.  The usefulness of a system does not 
entail the metaphysical existence of the entities it describes.  However, positing a 
metaphysical element will dramatically affect the interpretation of any system and its 
results.  In addition, if the principles proposed refer to the nature of physical interactions, 
then the theoretical framework should present opportunities of testing the validity of the 
system.  In other words, the metaphysics of interdependence will prove fruitful if it is able to 
describe phenomena that a purely reductive method is not capable of. 
A key characteristic of this metaphysics of interdependence, as we have seen, is the 
maintenance of all entities as empty.  In effect this presents a metaphysics without a 
fundamental ontology, or rather, since phenomena are conventionally identified, a 
fundamentally empty ontology.  David Chalmers is not a fan of this idea.  “One might be 
attracted to the view of the world as pure causal flux, with no further properties for the 
causation to relate, but this would lead to a strangely insubstantial view of the physical 
world.”246  He continues, criticising Shoemaker’s position, “It would contain only causal and 
nomic relations between empty placeholders with no properties of their own.  Intuitively, it 
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is more reasonable to suppose that the basic entities that all this causation relates have 
some internal nature of their own, some intrinsic properties, so that the world has some 
substance to it.”  Furthermore he claims that “such a world is arguably logically impossible, 
as there is nothing in such a world for causation to relate.”247  Certainly, a world of pure 
causal flux is not a common idea,248 but the argument for its ‘logical impossibility’ is difficult 
to maintain.  Considering the limitations of systems from chapter 1, to dismiss the possibility 
of an anti-essential interpretation on the grounds of a logic that assumes essential 
substance is question begging as it cannot address the difference at stake. 
In order to better express the significance of a non-essentialist approach, here we should 
highlight the possibility of the unity of thought or ‘enlightenment’.  In Buddhism 
enlightenment is an undeniably important possibility.  If the world can only be understood 
through some basic principle - say some underlying, simple metaphysical reality - that we 
arrive at through reduction, then unless we completely understand this ‘simple’ level of 
reality, in its full complexity so that it can explain all other levels, any attempt at 
understanding the world must be incomplete.  This is equally true if the explanation of the 
universe is placed in ‘the mind of God’ or some such transcendent explanation.  Whichever 
way reduction directs us we will be impossibly removed from the source of that wisdom for 
which all science, philosophy and spiritual endeavour seeks.  However, and as an apparently 
self-undermining aspect of this project, I want to show that enlightenment without any 
need for a metaphysical ground (in the classical sense) is possible.  Denying reduction 
without denying understanding opens up the possibility of enlightenment, allowing for the 
possibility of discovery without positing some fundamental formula of existence. 
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Recall the discussion of ‘ideal states’, wherein we assume within a small margin of error, the 
characteristics of an entity in isolation.  We say that the entity changes or acts in a certain 
way due to the additional influences to this basic state, the effect of its environment.  So we 
equate this state in isolation with our best interpretation of the ontological reality of that 
entity.  But at the same time we realise that nothing exists in isolation.  Everything is 
interconnected.  If there is an entity which never affects the universe and is never affected 
by the universe, then this entity, for the extent of our reality, does not exist.  This is not 
merely an epistemological truth about what we can know, it is a metaphysical reality.  If 
something does not interact,249 then it is not a part of our reality as a whole and thus cannot 
come into our considerations when I ask the question “can we directly realise reality?”  Only 
those interactions that form the universe and function within it are important for 
understanding the form and function of the universe.  So nothing exists in isolation. 
Following on from this point we can make the stronger claim that an entity, in both how it is 
composed and how it interacts, is dependent upon the influences of its environment.  An 
entity will be fundamentally different depending upon its situation.  From this we leap to 
the proposal that an entity is completely dependent upon its environment, and that this 
environment is made up of nothing but similarly interdependent entities.  This allows the 
further proposition that there are no laws of the universe, nor are there constants, only 
contingent tendencies.  In other words, if the universe were different, the way the parts of 
the universe tend to interact would similarly be altered.  Understanding a ‘law’ is only useful 
so long as its border limitations are not breached, and there are situations within our 
universe where the application of accepted ‘laws’ reach their limits and need to be 
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modified.250  Simply put, if the extent of a ‘law’ is limited, then it too can be considered 
dependent.  Interdependence can be used as a base metaphysical principle that stands to 
set up an interpretation of ‘laws’ and does not require them (or any transcendental 
influence) in order to make sense of the universe.  Rather, to understand the universe is to 
understand those tendencies which lead us to identify ‘laws’, which is identical to 
understanding the rules or ‘laws’ into which these tendencies are abstracted. 
If this holds up it can alter our understanding of the universe in two ways.  Firstly, rather 
than searching for the basic cause of the universe we could understand the universe as 
being the cause of itself – there’s nothing external making it what it is.  An explanation of 
how the universe works and why it is like it is should be evident in the universe 
immediate.251  The second major implication of the removal of constants is that we would 
not necessarily be subject to the laws of the universe.  This is not to say that one would be 
free to act however they choose (ignoring gravity for example), only that one’s existence 
could not be identified as completely predetermined.  Understanding that laws are 
dependent upon the state of the universe should rather let us realise that there are things 
we cannot do, and why we cannot do them at this point in time and space.  Physical laws 
remain effectively ‘concrete’, as far as laws go within the world to which we bear witness 
and the implications for us regarding where the laws break down are likely not within easy 
intellectual grasp.  As a more pliable example consider a social norm.  Suppose that you 
lived in a carnivorous society and that for some reason you wanted to make the society in 
which you live completely vegetarian.  Initially it would be a constant struggle against those 
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around you, against the institutions that already exist working on the old mandate (of eating 
meat) and there may even be an internal struggle.  Eventually, after prolonged effort, it may 
become easier as people change their perspective to accept a different possibility and your 
world slowly alters and helps you along (new institutions form, and so on).  Now we would 
never call the tendency to eat meat in the original situation a ‘law’, but it would certainly 
require some force of effort to move against a social norm, and if we stopped making that 
effort we would not follow our desires, but would naturally follow the norm.252  As a more 
physical example, imagine being caught in a rip in the ocean or being swept along by the 
current of a river.  Common wisdom advises not to swim against it, but rather (if we assume 
you don’t like where it is taking you) to swim across it.  The pull of the current, or of society, 
is always going to affect and become a part of your trajectory, but the norm will only effect 
and not determine where you will end up. 
There have been attempts to develop a type of ‘universal Darwinism’ to explain the 
‘evolution’ of laws and general dispositions of physical systems.253  Generally, the theories 
utilise the epistemological reversal, as noted above, to maintain that laws are a description 
of tendencies and tendencies are not determined by laws.  These theories hold that 
systematic stability, like those tendencies we observe, are the inevitable result of the 
interactions within the substrate of the material universe over time.  These laws are not 
necessary but contingent.   
Through the framework of interdependence we have seen that the state of an entity is 
dependent upon its environmental causes and conditions.  The effect of a ‘law’ on an entity 
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is simply the tendencies of interactions placed within its environment.  As interdependence 
revokes the status of materiality, the entities themselves are recognised to be nothing more 
than a similar abstraction, an identification of stability within the network of interactions 
which is ultimately impermanent.  A metaphysics of interdependence not only entails the 
absolute emptiness of entities, it also presents the possibility of understanding the 
development of the laws of the universe interdependently with the phenomena we readily 
observe.  A phenomenon can be pragmatically interpreted as the result of laws and can also 
be understood, metaphysically, to be the joint cause of those laws. 
Rather than seeing the universe as self-creating, Paul Davies prefers to see the universe as 
“internally consistent and self-contained”254 yet he believes this does not address the 
fundamental questions of existence and specifically does not remove the need for some 
external initiating factor.  Davies believes the laws are there to be discovered, like solving a 
cross-word puzzle, “The links do not evolve, they are simply there, in the underlying 
laws.”255  Davies concludes The Mind of God stating, “I have tried to make a case that the 
existence of an orderly, coherent universe containing stable, organised, complex structures 
requires laws and conditions of a very special kind.  All the evidence suggests that this is not 
just any old universe, but one which is remarkably well adjusted.”256   
This belief is widely expressed in contemporary metaphysics, with theories citing the 
strength of gravity being just right for the formation of planets and stars, of the peculiar 
characteristics of water and so forth, often tied to the anthropic principle – that an 
explanation of the universe must account for the development of the consciousness which 
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is capable of asking this question.  That an explanation of reality must account for all that is 
apparent to us seems obvious, and it is a point I emphasise throughout this thesis.  That 
there is some telos which makes the set-up of the universe such that the arising of a 
conscious human being is necessary, cannot be assumed.  That stability tends to result from 
chaotic systems, that complex systems develop and provide structural advantages achieving 
consistency and stability, does not entail that whatever stability happens to result is the 
necessary result.  Nor does this entail that any stability necessarily results.  To say that one 
must exist and be capable of asking the question in order to ask the question is a tautology 
and does not add anything to the investigation.  The dismissal of ‘universal Darwinism’ 
appears here to take the same form as the dismissal of Darwinian evolution by creationists, 
an outright denial of which Davies would find absurd.  As before I must stress, apparently 
evolutionary tendencies are not independent laws, but are themselves the abstraction of 
such observations into an explanatory framework and are thus part of the interdependent 
universe. 
 
Conclusion 
If interdependence is taken as a basic principle the metaphysical universe it entails has 
interesting characteristics.  No wholes, no parts, no levels, no laws, just absolute 
contingency which appears entirely dynamic and specifically indeterminate.  The bootstrap 
model is proposed as an alternative to complete reductionism and its essentialised 
foundation.  These are philosophical points which are already present in contemporary 
scientific theories, though their extent is obscured by reliance upon substantialist logical 
foundations. 
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The next chapter will examine the implication of two directions of understanding (top-down 
and bottom-up) in order to expand this possibility, every instance of the universe (anything 
we care to call a thing) is not merely a result of some original equation, but is an expression 
of the current world we live in.  Indeed, chapter 5, examining Dōgen, suggests that you can 
look at any instance of the universe and see how it fits into the wider universe, and in fact 
see the entire universe expressed in that very instant. 
The combination of these aspects develops a framework of interdependence which provides 
a metaphysical explanation of the possibility of enlightenment.  Implicated in this 
framework is the inevitable entanglement of ‘other minds’ with the enlightened realisation 
of reality as it is, of which ‘others’ and oneself are parts.  This is the basis of compassion 
through the connection of suffering and non-suffering which will be elaborated in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Interdependent Minds 
 
Following on from the previous chapter, which examined the interdependence of entities, 
this chapter further elaborates upon the metaphysics of interdependence through an 
examination of mind.  This is achieved through analysis of the levelled structure of 
epistemology, proposing ‘downward’ causation as an equally valid source of interpretation 
to its ‘upward’ (and standardly reductive) counterpart.  Integrated into the framework of 
interdependence, this presents two significant results.  First, there is the existential 
realisation of groundlessness inherent in the framework which must be distinguished from 
nihilism.  Second, the possibility of enlightenment is revealed through the antifoundational 
connection of epistemology and metaphysics. 
Making sense of the apparent separation of subjective minds is key to metaphysically 
reconciling the conventional experience of suffering with the enlightened realisation of non-
suffering and thus dispelling the nihilistic reading of emptiness.   
 
This chapter is divided into three sections: 
The first section, The Nature of Mind, utilises modern theories of emergence and 
supervenience257 to develop an understanding of mental affects in the world, compatible 
with interdependence.  The apparent separation of subjective experiences is metaphysically 
connected and this is related to the Buddhist conceptions of mind. 
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The second section, Groundlessness, examines contemporary theories of emergence in 
order to again bring into question reductionist tendencies, this time on the grounds of the 
possibility of knowledge.  If the epistemological investigation reveals that no ‘level’ of 
explanation has priority, according to the scientific standard, then any (empty) level can be 
explained with reference to any other.  The attack on reification/ substance also extends to 
holism, such that the wholly contingent, antifoundational universe , as proposed in the 
previous chapter, is presented as the alternative.  Furthermore, antifoundationalism is 
connected to the Zen model as the mode of coming to ‘see reality as it is.  In the words of 
Hisamatsu, to “stand exactly where there is no place to stand”.258 
The third section, Inverted Metaphysics, briefly proposes a metaphysical basis for the 
possibility of enlightenment through the inversion of classical metaphysics.  This represents 
a culmination of the metaphysics of interdependence developed in this and the previous 
chapter and is the groundwork for interpreting Dōgen in the next chapter.  This in turn will 
allow for the dissolution of the Zen problem, allowing for a direct realisation of reality as it 
is. 
 
The Nature of Mind 
At the root of reality there appears to be a connection that contradicts our apparent 
separation from one another.  If everything is interdependent, given my interpretation of 
the limits of reality, we are all connected.  This is easy enough to comprehend, for it is not 
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our physical connection that is at issue.259  What provokes an idea of separation is our 
apparent mental isolation.  The simple rendering of this issue of ‘private minds’ is that one 
can only think one’s own thoughts, not somebody else’s.  However, as stated earlier in 
relation to meta-morality, we are strongly influenced by the world, not just physically but 
mentally also, and we in turn make a strong impact upon the world.  Our mental and 
physical aspects of being are not as distinct as our classical categorisations may lead us to 
believe.  Our minds are distinct from one another, this is true, but the distinction is similar 
to the way this chair is distinct from the ground on which it stands.  Although mind is just 
what you might call a ‘higher level’ distinction since what apparently separates our minds is 
more complex than what separates the chair and ground, but it is a difference in degree and 
not kind.  The more complex the level, the more drastic the perceived isolation becomes.  
Apparent separation is an emergent phenomenon. 
The concept of emergence is useful when attempting to reductively connect various ‘levels’ 
of interpretation, whereby properties may appear to exist at a ‘higher’ or more complex 
level when they do not appear at a ‘lower’ level, even though, reductively, the higher level is 
identified as wholly made up of this lower level.  This is simply conceived in the ‘wholist’ 
principle “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”.  When these lower phenomenon 
interact together something new ‘emerges’ that we did not recognise in the potentiality of 
these lower phenomena.  In these cases we have plainly attributed two interpretations to 
one aspect of reality and are now forced to explain how they may be connected.  Speaking 
in terms of emergence is still segmenting the world into reified parts, and so descriptions 
from various systems of interpretation are found to conflict.   
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Emergent properties, most importantly for us, are qualitatively different from our 
interpretation of what makes them up, but they are not separate from them.  The 
distinction between these higher and lower levels is purely a result of our interpretation, 
they both refer to the same aspect of reality.  In such distinctions the use of counterfactuals 
to determine priority amounts to a ‘chicken and egg’ tautology; to say for example that 
without a particular chemical makeup a particular organism won’t function.  Both aspects 
refer to the same occurrence and neither can take precedence.  For just as the state of the 
organism emerges from the chemical makeup, the chemical makeup is defined by its 
environment (being the interactions of its neighbouring constituents), in other words the 
chemical makeup is dependent upon the functional state of the organism itself.  Along 
similar lines, the debate between the relationship of mind and brain can be addressed, and 
the consequences for epistemology explored.  When analysing Buddhist positions, it should 
be noted that the problem of ‘mind’ takes a distinctive turn.  
Śantideva elaborates upon the familiar theme of the nature of the two truths: 
The conventional and the ultimate 
Are explained to be the two truths 
The ultimate is not grasped as an object of thought; 
Thought is explained to be merely conventional.260 
The two truths and the mistake of reifying the ultimate, from the perspective of the 
Mādhyamikas, should already be clear.  The metaphysical puzzle that must now be drawn 
out is how it is possible to have a distinction between the two truths.  Specifically, what it is 
about reified objects of thought that allows them to conflict with the reality that they are 
proposed to represent.  This puzzle, along with the problem of the embeddedness of 
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metaphysics and epistemology, will only be fully resolved in the next chapter where this 
separation is connected to its purported solution - enlightenment.  The present concern is to 
establish the nature of mind within a metaphysics of interdependence in order to explain 
the phenomenon of separation. 
The experience of separation is accepted as a characteristic of subjective awareness. While 
two individuals can, to some extent, admit of a shared external world, it happens that I am 
aware of my mind but not yours.  In exploring a metaphysical explanation of this separation 
we must here sidestep much of the history of philosophy in order to limit the present 
discussion.  Since a thorough examination of this issue would require the inclusion of every 
metaphysical theory ever devised,261 it is fortunate that most of these systems of 
metaphysics are incompatible with interdependence.  Also, given the parameters of the 
Buddhist project, the problem itself is quite specific. 
The question of the possible dualism of mind and body is not here a concern.  There can be 
no absolute separation of mind and matter, since, as we have seen, for both to persist 
together they must be interdependent.  This is further enforced by the Buddhist theory of 
no-self, that the self is composed of aggregates being both ‘mental’ and ‘physical’.  
Nevertheless there is an apparent (perceived) separation.  The puzzle is this: given the 
metaphysical connection of mind and body, why are minds experienced separately?  
Connecting mind and body resembles the baseline of contemporary reductive physicalism, 
though I have proposed problems with this method and interdependence is put forth as an 
alternative to reductionism.  This is further complicated by the different uses of ‘mind’ in 
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Buddhist thought, critically for this project the rift between Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra, on 
which Zen stands. 
These two distinct Mahāyāna positions, the Yogācāran and Mādhyamaka, present a conflict 
for the systematic interpretation of Zen.  The former holds that mind only fundamentally 
exists, whereas the latter (through non-affirming negation) maintains that there is no 
fundamental existent.  Paul Williams sums up the difference through use of the dream 
simile, “In Yogācāra the dream simile is used to show how experiences can occur without 
there being anything external to the cognizing mind.  In Mādhyamaka all things are said to 
be ‘like a dream’, including the mind itself.”262  The Yogācāran focus on mind is attacked as 
essentialism by Mādhyamika philosophers.263  Where meditation focuses on the mind, it will 
be argued, we can still maintain the ultimate emptiness of the mind.264  The application of 
this idea to Zen, through an empty ‘Buddha-nature’, will be examined in the next chapter. 
Inasmuch as mind is considered an independent phenomenon, it will be rejected through 
the metaphysics of interdependence.  Candrakīrti, commenting on the Lankavatarasutra, 
wrote; “At [the stage called] ‘The Directly Facing’, the bodhisattva who is turned toward [the 
truth of highest meaning] realizes that ‘the triple world is mind alone.’  [This teaching] is 
intended to refute [philosophical views of the conventional] agent as an eternal self by 
demonstrating that the agent is mind alone.”265  The emphasis presented is in opposition to 
the positing of an essentially existent person.  Furthermore; “...mind alone is produced from 
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delusion (moha) and volitional action”.  Thus mind is presented as a phenomenon 
dependent upon causes and condition in accordance with the cosmology of karma. 
As a precursor to the examination of Buddha-nature, the other enduring distinction is 
between mind as a universal principle and mind as a merely materially manifest 
phenomenon.  A manifest mind refers to subjective awareness as specific to each sentient 
individual, whereas mind as a universal principle indicates a primal nature lying behind all 
such instances.  We have already determined that such a principle, if it existed, could not 
exist independently, yet this does not in itself deny the possibility of such as a principle.266  
The distinction depends upon a difference between a principle and a (mere) manifestation 
of that principle, and here the identification of such principles becomes limited.  Just as we 
have seen that emptiness (śūnyatā) cannot be posited independently of instances of 
emptiness (śūnya), but can be exploited as a metaphysical principle, similarly we cannot 
propose some ‘meta-mind’ behind all instances of mind.  We should consider what use 
‘meta-mind’ (or any meta- concept for that matter) would be.  Since, reductively, a primary 
principle is the foundation of all manifest phenomena, in this case ‘all is mind alone’, then 
the principle must be of a different kind to manifest mind, which would only acquire its 
specific characteristics dependent upon the environment in each instance.  The 
metaphysical nature of a primal principle may just as well be called pure matter or energy as 
pure mind since it is devoid of all the specific manifest characteristics of any of these 
categories.  Reductively, the foundation of all phenomena in ‘mind alone’ is meaningless.  
But we have already criticised the reductive method. 
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The emphasis on ‘mind’ is common to all Buddhist thought, historically originating with the 
meditative method undertaken by Gautama Buddha and correspondingly emphasised in the 
later meditation schools including Zen.  The significance of meditation to this philosophical 
investigation is the focus of the next section.  For now it is enough to connect ‘mind’ to the 
Buddhist soteriological project through the possibility of enlightenment.  On this reading we 
must assume that somehow the manifest mind is capable of directly experiencing its 
underlying, ‘ultimate’ nature, which is unobscured reality itself.  With this in mind we now 
turn to contemporary accounts of the nature of mind which can aid in detailing the 
metaphysical framework of interdependence. 
As a starting position, from interdependence, we can determine that an aware subject is 
restricted epistemologically by the conditions of its metaphysical state.  This is to say that 
the manifest characteristics of mind, and hence what this mind is capable of 
perceiving/conceiving, is dependent upon the nature of its environment.  This environment 
is, in significant part, the mind’s embodiment.   This is not to hold the position that mind is 
simply (reducible to) the physical processes which make up the body, since the mind, being 
interdependent with its environment, must also fashion the nature of the body, as mind is a 
part of the body’s environmental factors.  This marks a deviation from the physicalist 
position, and indicates the technical distinction of the term environment, here used to 
include factors commonly taken to be subsumed under a more fundamental category (in 
this case mind under matter).  However we must also eliminate the idealist position, that 
the body (and indeed the physical world by extension) is nothing more than (deducible 
from) the mental processes of the mind.   
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The inseparability of metaphysics and epistemology could be interpreted in various ways, 
however elaborations along these lines often hinder the project of epistemology, rather 
than clarifying it.  First, the hard determinist view, 267 which basically holds that, 
epistemically, we cannot know the nature of a perspective without knowing the origin of 
that perspective (usually in physicalist terms), which implies that every aspect of its causal 
makeup must first be understood. Second, what we may term the hard hermeneutic 
view,268 which holds that every perspective is only understandable in terms of its complete 
historical / cultural environment.  Of course adherents to such views maintain a distinction 
between ‘total understanding’ and what we might call ‘practical’ or workable understanding 
, the latter being much less restrictive and, hence, actually attainable.  Note that if this 
distinction is maintained then direct and unobtrusive or ‘absolute’ knowledge is made 
practically impossible.  This may appear to challenge the possibility of enlightenment 
however the real target here is the question of ‘objectivity’. 
The validity of an epistemological standpoint is dependent upon its accuracy in reference to 
reality as such, described as ‘metaphysics’.  However, if we assume that ‘metaphysics’, as 
the description of reality as such, is dependent upon epistemology for its creation then the 
prior consideration of validity becomes self-referential and vacuous.  This would entail that 
the limits of a subject’s knowledge results in the construction of a metaphysical framework 
which reflects these limits.  This would explain the appearance of competing ‘objective’ 
metaphysical frameworks – a shared reality interpreted as different worlds - as the product 
of distinct social paradigmatic assumptions.  The grounds of these frameworks are forced to 
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change in reaction to ‘tests’ in the form of alternate world-views or the arising of 
unexplainable phenomenon.  To accommodate such occurrences two avenues are open; 
either the metaphysical framework is altered to take it into account or the subjective 
perspective, which is in part responsible for the arising of this phenomenon, is reassessed.  
Neither option approaches something akin to ‘objectivity’. 
The problem is created through a self-referential loop.  A metaphysical system is created by 
a subject, or multiple subjects through consensus, and so is dependent upon the 
epistemological limitations of their subjectivity.  Furthermore, a subject is dependent upon 
its metaphysical position (makeup) and this will define its epistemological limitations, and 
hence what it can know or theorise about metaphysics will also be limited.269  These are two 
oppositely posed positions but they are not incompatible, in fact they are the continuation 
of the same self-referential loop.  The major conflict appears to be based on the postulation 
of an independent metaphysics in the latter, which is lacking in the former.  In fact this 
connection is present in both views via the ‘subject’, so the latter view actually contains two 
references to this reality, since there is no distinction to be made between the subject and 
its metaphysical position.  The statement ‘metaphysics is created by the subject’ is obviously 
used in a different sense to ‘a subject is defined by its metaphysical position’.  The former 
refers to a theoretical framework (entity of the mind) while the latter refers to the 
foundation of the subject (base to the mind).  In both cases the functioning of mind is 
regarded as an aspect of reality, and one which we may assume is more directly accessible 
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than either the postulated or foundational metaphysics.  The limitations on the subject and 
the consequent framework it constructs are not identical, but are related.  The common 
ground of this relation is then the subject itself. 
The subjective experience of mental entities, their interaction and their apparent affect on 
the material world via our respective bodies is recognised as categorically distinct from our 
interpretation of the physical world as it exists in its (apparent) objectivity beyond our 
personal perceptions of it.  We are faced with an epistemological restriction based on our 
position as an embodied being.  We are culturally biased towards ‘objectivity’ and 
perspectively restricted to ‘subjectivity’.  Hence we have a division between objectivist 
metaphysics and subjectivist phenomenology.  Our pragmatic methods and theories which 
allow us to examine and interpret the world, science and philosophy, are forced to 
acknowledge the apparent conflict between these motivations and so factor in our relative 
subjective viewpoints in order to present a disembodied, objective interpretation of ‘the 
real’.  What we come to call ‘the real’ is recognised to be the most useful, or even the most 
entertaining from the myriad of possible explanations we are capable of constructing.  But 
these criteria do not imply reality.  It would seem that reality as it is must remain 
unreachable by such methods.  If this were so, the division between the physicalists and 
mental idealists would forever render an impossible divide between the principles of mind 
and matter. 
Contemporary thought is dominated by the physicalist account, which rejects dualism, 
claiming that all mental events can be reduced to, and thus explained by, physical events.  
Yet the unique character of subjective mind is not explained away, leading some to propose 
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mind as an emergent phenomenon in an effort to maintain subjectivity without dualism.270  
This developed in two opposing modes: epiphenomenalism – maintaining that mental 
entities have no causal influence; and strong emergence - that mental events are uniquely 
manifest and exert a ‘downward’ causal influence.  Currently there is an increasing interest 
in the concept of ‘emergence’ amongst philosophers of science, though, divorcing 
themselves from ontological dualism, they tend to emphasise supervenience upon the 
physical. 271  The development of this view supports the position that all ‘emergent’ 
phenomenon are describable in physical terms and so have no unique influence.  Influences 
described as either local or environmental are both understood as aspects of the same 
physical function.  As Davies observes, “we do not need to discuss two sorts of forces”.272 
The metaphysics of interdependence requires that mind and matter share the same reality, 
indicating that their distinction can be dissolved.  The reductive physicalist paradigm would 
grant the nature of this shared reality to matter.  I believe this conclusion creates more 
problems than it solves.  To begin with mind, or consciousness, appears to be an almost 
accidental effect when conventionally we recognise mind as a major driving force in the 
world.  Related to this, morality would be dismissed as an abstractive illusion,273 and 
personal goals, feelings and experiences are rendered objectively void.  Regarding our 
common epistemological project, predominantly scientifically based, the findings at macro-
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cosmic levels of description (for example: economics, biology, climatology, even chemistry) 
are demoted in ontological status to ‘merely useful’ in the absence of bridging laws to some 
more fundamental level.  Hence, this is a major issue for the philosophy of science.  Finally, 
given our position as ‘human being in the world’, the physical reductionist account of reality 
does not aid us in any direct experiential understanding of reality, and hence cannot guide 
the actions of a creature living in the shadows of a mentally manifested world.  The 
reductionist account points to something ‘out there’ while being unable to define its 
borders by exploring ‘in here’.  The nature of the subject cannot be ignored when the world 
we posit is a subjectively realised one. 
This is not to say that the reductionist account is not useful, it certainly is, however upon 
examining the working reductionist system it is apparent that there are many aspects of a 
multi-level description of reality already taking place in the reductionist account and, I claim, 
this is evidence that we need such interpolations to be able to understand any of the 
reductionist outcomes.  As the problem here is an epistemological one, the ability to 
describe phenomena intelligently is of key concern. 
Let us again consider a physicalist account of the motion of a particle.  The interaction of an 
atomic particle with another is determined by, firstly, the field structure of the atom which 
is a result of the properties of the sub-atomic particles and, secondly, the relative 
movement of these particles. The movement of each particle is determined by the 
interaction with those immediately in contact with it - its ‘environment’.  This must be 
further expanded to include effects produced at a distance, such as radiation, thus 
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admitting a wider source of effect - expanding ‘environment’.274  As the continually 
expanding explanation becomes more complex, its ease of comprehension and predictive 
power become more limited.  Consider the effect if water molecules, whose low-level 
motion has been described, happen to be inside a bottle which is in the process of falling 
down a flight of stairs.  The localised description of particles is still valid, but is now ‘trivial’ 
and must be expanded to include the mass effect of the entire volume of water, moving as 
part of a higher level system, if the movement of a single particle is to be sufficiently 
explained.  Of course we can add more explanations, based at the elementary level, which 
rapidly increases the complexity of the problem at this scale - though by changing the scale 
of explanation the problem becomes ‘simpler’.   
‘Simpler’ here corresponds to our particular epistemological limits, since it is generally true 
that explanations at coarser (‘higher’) levels become more generalised explanations of what 
has happened or predictions of what will happen in a given situation.  The accuracy of 
prediction decreases with the amount of time elapsed and with increasing numbers of 
influences.  This is true at any level.  Reductionism increases the complexity of problems 
and, as the threshold of comprehension (relative to our position, embodied in the world) is 
passed, predictions become probabilistic.275  The extension of explanation from our position 
becomes generalised, probabilistic and more complex through extension to higher levels of 
interpretation and through reduction to lower levels.  If our epistemological limits are a 
factor in the usefulness of a predictive theory then the further we venture, in our 
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explanations from our existential ground, the more dependent on probabilities our results 
will become.  So whether our theory aims to describe the interaction of galaxies or quantum 
level ‘super-strings’, the relation to phenomena at our level will become increasingly vague.  
Given the symmetry of epistemological uncertainty, on what grounds should we favour 
reduction in one direction over the other? 
The basic assumption and driving force behind reductionism is to explain complex 
phenomenon by reference to the properties and interactions of the simper parts which 
actually make them up.  The influence of higher level, ‘environmental’ effects, should also 
be reducible to these lower level interactions and does not have any unique ‘emergent’ 
influence.  Hence higher level phenomena are said to supervene on lower level phenomena. 
276  There can be no change in the higher level without a corresponding change at the lower 
level. 
Supervenience is taken, in accordance with reductionism, to imply that an explanation at 
one level is a sufficient explanation of reality in its totality.  Usually the level of explanation 
chosen is physical, the most ‘fundamental’ level of understanding available (for example 
physics), such that other explanations (for example chemistry, biology or mental events) are 
said to be merely a result of the interactions at this fundamental level.  A change in the 
fundamental level necessitates a corresponding alteration in the manifest, supervenient, 
level. 
So, are mental entities merely epiphenomenal?  To entertain that idea we must first throw 
out our commonsense view of the world, and this is not necessarily a bad thing (though we 
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will come to revise this particular position).  For the moment we must think of ourselves not 
as autonomous agents but as automated, determined, events of matter.  If this is followed 
through we should find that the mass interaction of elementary ‘bits’277 which make up the 
phenomenon of a mental event may just as effectively be described as the direct influence 
upon an elementary ‘bit’ by its environment.  The environment, you will recall, is just the 
interaction of this focus ‘bit’ with its surrounding ‘bits’.  In other words; a ‘bit’ can be 
described by its position as part of a mental event.   
The validity of interdependence should be equally apparent from either direction of 
interpretation, regardless of the starting position, if the implications are followed far 
enough.   So called ‘emergent’ factors are not a problem for this framework as they are 
already accounted for.  The complexity of an environment results in the possibility of more 
varied and context specific influences.  Furthermore, since the metaphysics of 
interdependence has no reductive hierarchy the identification of emergence is purely 
relative to the explanatory model used.  Thus emergence, in this model, is merely a further 
consequence of the limitations of systems. 
That emergence is utilised as an effective modelling or explanatory method is known as 
‘weak emergence’.278  ‘Strong emergence’, on the other hand, would require the 
identification of actual physical causation of an environment upon constituent parts that is 
not recognisable at the local level of those parts.  In the previous chapter we explored the 
problems associated with defining entities and environments in isolation and as such the 
levelled approach has been brought into question.  Supporting the ‘weak’ interpretation, 
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Gell-Mann recognises the importance of a top-down approach in addition to bottom-up, 
since our ability to explain the world increases as we examine phenomena from multiple 
angles.279   Douglas Hofstadter also notes the significance of the anthropocentric sphere of 
any such an enquiry, “In any case, we humans evolved to perceive and describe ourselves in 
high-level mentalistic terms... and not in low-level physicalistic terms”.280  I have previously 
explained the apparent epistemic limits for the possibility of enlightenment, which are 
strongly connected to one’s conceptual and embodied limitations and the area specific 
limits of systems of enquiry. 
Talk of emergence is particularly prominent in contemporary debates about the nature of 
mind.  Despite the epistemic usefulness of emergence, scientific reductive theory tends to 
concede that such factors are ultimately supervenient upon their substrates.  Gell-Mann 
writes, “it must be a rare contemporary scientist who believes that there exist special 
‘mental forces’ that are not biological, and ultimately physiochemical, in nature.  Again, 
virtually all of us are, in this sense, reductionists.”281  In order to address the issue of 
supervenience we must examine the implications of interdependence on the positing of 
levels of metaphysical explanation. 
If the state of an entity is dependent upon the state of those around it, in other words if in 
order to explain a single phenomena we must make reference to its environment, then we 
are making use of  phenomena on the same level of explanation as the focal entity.  This 
group of phenomena will then interact in such a way as to demonstrate their particular 
environmental characteristic.  In other words, a ‘higher-level’ phenomenon is manifest.  
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Thus our current theory can already be seen to contain an unstated reliance on the 
interaction of ‘higher-level’ entities in order to explain the ‘state’ of a single ‘lower-level’ 
entity.   
Now we turn to the distinction between mind and brain, which is the most common and 
idealistic application of ‘emergence’ in the abandonment of dualism.282  A key motivating 
factor in these applications is the effect of determinism denying individual free-will by 
identifying mind with the (allegedly) mechanistic physical brain.  Applying emergence in this 
case opens the possibility that instead of a single direction of causation through the levels 
from the bottom up, there is additionally a second level of influence from the top down.  
This downward causation opens the possibility that the mind actually influences the brain, 
and thus the physical world, without being impossibly independent from it.283  However, to 
avoid supervenience and provide evidence of ‘strong emergence’, the processes and 
interactions of mental forces would need to be shown to be irreducible to the physical 
brain.  Only then could emergence, possibly, counter determinism. 
The assumption is that if every mental state had an equivalent brain state reductionism 
would surely hold and determinism may well follow, or even if not determinism, certainly 
free will would be a conceptual problem.  The possibility of a second direction of influence 
still requires an explanation of the origin of this causal efficacy, if we follow the reductive 
model.  If the reductive hierarchy is discarded then the positing of determinism or freedom 
is not as simple.  There is an important factor which prevents us from simply flipping the 
priority of levels, so that since every brain state has an equivalent mental state we could 
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reduce the physical to the mental.  Priority is given to the level with the widest explanatory 
power, and mind still remains apparently isolated to a single subject.  Absolute isolation 
should not follow from interdependence. 
If the state of a ‘higher-level’ entity is built up by its ‘lower-level’ constituents then, from the 
earlier discussion, the way the ‘lower-level’ entities interact is a matter of influence from 
the ‘higher-level’ down.   From this, it can be said that without an understanding of 
downward causation, that is causation from the higher to the lower level, the reductive 
model is incomplete.  The significance of this aspect of the reductive framework has not 
been sufficiently explored, for if it had, ‘reduction’ would be considered a methodological 
choice and not an inherent feature of the metaphysical system.  The apparent separation of 
mental realms, reductively restrained by their immediate physical makeup (embodiment), is 
a consequence of the system of interpretation, which posits the mental as ‘emergent’.  The 
addition of ‘downward causation’ to the reductive model falls within the metaphysics of 
interdependence.  Identifying causation, either from the ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’, is a 
description of the same interdependent interaction.  The selection of levels of description is 
a pragmatically necessary but limited overlay which cannot capture reality as it is. 
Buddhist philosophy connects mind and action as interdependent,  one does not exist 
without the other,284 since all action in this sense is volitional action.  The nature of mind is 
empty, as it is dependently arisen, it does not essentially exist apart from its contributing 
factors.  The particularities of a manifest mind arise from prior karmic dispositions and 
continuing effects of ignorance.285  Thus Candrakīrti’s description of the illusion of mind, it 
exists when the necessary conditions are there to create the perception, but ultimately 
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there is no independent consistency which radically isolates one mind from another.  The 
Buddhists are alert to the misleading application of a system of understanding to a 
metaphysical explanation, hence Gautama Buddha’s refusal to speculate on metaphysical 
issues. 
Returning to our core concern, if metaphysically mind is manifest from a common reality 
how can ignorance arise?  This concern mirrors that of the young Dōgen, who sought to 
reconcile the foundation of a universal Buddha-nature with the ignorance of conventional 
beings.286  In order to be a valid metaphysical framework we must be able to reconcile the 
ignorance, and associated suffering, apparent in the world with the principle of 
interdependence and, following the possibility of enlightenment, the entailment of both 
wisdom and compassion. 
Ignorance is to be unaware of the actual state of some aspect of reality, often due to the 
overlay of a misguided interpretation of that reality.  Individuals mentally limit a great deal 
of what their senses take in based on their preconceived concepts and beliefs.  Additionally, 
part of the function of cognition is to expand upon what little direct sensations of the world 
come to it.  Sentient subjects intuit the makeup of their world far beyond the details of their 
direct perceptions.  Consider one’s ability to recognise patterns, to acknowledge the 
influences of ‘unseen bodies’ to explain phenomena, the positing of idealised elementary 
particles, and so on.  This is the origin of both the power of ‘mind’ and also its major folly: 
illusion. 
To determine the function of illusion consider the implications of evolutionary theory on the 
development of the imagination.  The development of a mind to think in the abstract can be 
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seen to have developed as a problem solving tool.  Being able to imagine the outcome of a 
potentially fatal enterprise, and then avoid that outcome, is an obvious advantage for 
survival and would flourish through natural selection.  The other side of this ability is the 
development of a rift between what is experienced in thought and what is actually present 
before the observer.  This not only applies to assumptions leading to delusion regarding 
external phenomena, such as seeing a mirage or the classic ‘blind men and the elephant’ 
example, but also enforces the development of the idea of ‘self’ in the mind,287 separate to 
the reality of self.  This ‘gap’ becomes the foundation of existential ignorance. 
The other metaphysically significant aspect when explaining ignorance directly relates to the 
limits of embodiment.  In conventional experience there are physical states which an 
individual is not conscious of.  Indeed there are many examples of bodily processes that 
take place, of which we are completely unaware.  At the same time, as a non-dualist, we 
would not like to say that there can be conscious mental states which have no physical 
correspondence.  This is purely due to the levels of manifestation at which the relative 
investigations of interactions take place.  Hence the trend of explaining the ‘cause’ of 
consciousness to be the interaction of material parts which ‘make it up’.  By this 
understanding it would appear that consciousness requires the complex interactions of 
matter, but matter does not require consciousness to function.  On the contrary, according 
to interdependence, the complex functioning of matter is consciousness. 
To elaborate on this point I will first draw attention to David Chalmers spin on dualism.  
Chalmers maintains that consciousness is irreducible, positing phenomenological 
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subjectivity and physicalist functionalism as two distinct and independent realities.288  
According to this view, consciousness is dependent upon but not a necessary result of a 
specifically complex type of functional organisation.  His twin worlds thought experiment 
proposes a physically identical world to ours which exists without any arising of 
consciousness, a zombie world. 
Searle attacks what he claims is panpsychism in Chalmers which he calls absurd.289  
Furthermore, consciousness becomes explanatorily irrelevant according to Searle since the 
same events would take place with a purely physical makeup devoid of consciousness.  This 
is a fine addition to the previous discussion on the validity of ‘weak’ emergence, but appears 
to miss Chalmers’ point, which is the peculiar nature of conscious experience.  Chalmers 
recognises that the zombie world is not our world, the laws of our universe do give rise to 
consciousness.  Our zombie doppelgangers carry on in their world in an identical fashion to 
our conscious selves in this world, so the causal efficacy of consciousness does appear to be 
denied.  The difference between the two worlds is the experience that is consciousness 
which absolutely cannot be identified outside of the experience itself.  According to 
Chalmers we cannot have a method of verifying if a complex digital system has developed 
consciousness, nor can we determine whether the person in the next room is a zombie 
(even though we will make assumptions extended from our own experience and shared 
world). 
The unique subjective position of consciousness is important to understanding philosophical 
developments in Zen, yet this should not be considered independently of the metaphysical 
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implications of interdependence elaborated thus far.  Any form of dualism is problematic.  
Hofstadter exclaims that “consciousness is not a power moonroof”,290 implying an added 
extra on top of the physicality of a complex entity.  Consciousness is a dependent arising; it 
arises automatically when the causes and conditions are appropriate.  Two identical worlds, 
on this reading, must present identical conscious states.  Given two directions of causal 
influence, the effect of the arising of consciousness in the world is the radical alteration of 
the physical environment of which the mind is a part.  A change in physical matter can lead 
to a change in mind, a change in mind can lead to a change in physical matter.  Mind is 
causally efficacious, and interacts with matter interdependently. 
This metaphysical description of the nature of mind allows for an explanation as to how an 
enlightened being can recognise conventional suffering.  Nishida Kitarō recalls, “Over time I 
came to realise that it is not that experience exists because there is an individual, but that 
an individual exists because there is experience.”291  The metaphysical influences on the 
‘self’ provide the conditions of experience; and the ‘self’, as interdependent and causally 
efficacious, has the ability to alter its conditions.  The experiences of an enlightened being 
are significantly different to those of an unenlightened individual and are subjectively 
separated from them.  However, one of the characteristics of enlightenment is wisdom, 
which entails an understanding of the interdependent interactions which make up reality, 
and this must include the causes upon, and effects of, the minds of other beings.  Suffering 
does not ultimately exist, but it is experienced conventionally and the effects of suffering 
upon the world are mentally and physically manifest.  Interdependence stipulates that the 
suffering of a single being is universally relevant.  
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For this grand conclusion of interdependence to hold we must make sense of the 
complimentary reading of the interdependence of mind: that the mind is empty of intrinsic 
existence.  Ultimately, to maintain the emptiness of all phenomena, including mind, 
presents us with an utterly empty universe - a groundless metaphysics.  The proposition of 
such a framework once again risks a fall into nihilism as the epistemic outlook of an 
individual is potentially seen as devoid of content.  Here the significance of this position to 
the Zen tradition should be examined, with the fundamental nature of reality expressed as 
‘absolute nothingness’. 
 
Groundlessness 
In 1951, distressed at the inability of his Zazen practice to find some ground by which to 
escape nihilism, Abe Masao suddenly confronted his teacher.  “Abe rose from his meditation 
pillow and lunged toward Hisamatsu screaming, ‘Is this the true self?’  He was restrained 
briefly and then left the room.  Later, Abe said in despair, ‘I cannot find any place where I 
can stand,’ and Hisamatsu answered him straight away: ‘Stand right at that place where 
there is no place to stand.’ This is what Abe Sensei called ‘the standpoint of emptiness.’”292  
This standpoint is presented as an existential position, directly affirming the groundlessness 
that leads to the apparent nihilism at the heart of being.  This also became a key concept for 
Nishitani.  By learning to stand ‘where there is no place to stand’, nihilism ceases to be a 
problem and the practice of Zen is opened up.  If the Zen project is to function, ‘the 
standpoint of śūnyatā’ must be the foundation of both wisdom and compassion.  This 
groundlessness relates to both something about reality and our engagement with it. 
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Following Nāgārjuna, we have pursued a ‘middle way’ between reification and nihilism, 
examining the metaphysical implications of interdependence in order to make sense of 
levels of separation and connection.  This alone is just another conventional and limited 
system of interpretation, even as it attempts to provide justification for the possibility of 
enlightenment, if it is not reintegrated into everyday experience.  An empty metaphysics 
does little to allay the emotional response to the nothingness at its heart.  It is for this 
reason that avoidance of the reification of any static position, including ‘nothingness’, has 
been emphasised.  Thus we are told “The wise should not abide even in the middle.”293 
How does one make sense of standing ‘where there is no place to stand’?  Nāgārjuna 
recommends that one should meditate on the meaning of “the conditioned which is 
profound and without a support.”294  It is this understanding of the nature of reality which 
the metaphysical framework of interdependence and the bootstrap model of the universe 
have been set up to describe.  To make use of the framework one finds themselves posed in 
the position of emptiness, since there is no foundation for phenomenon in this model, they 
are completely and interdependently manifest.  Clearly, since all intrinsic existence has been 
denied, we can conclude that “nothing at all originates and nothing at all ceases”.295  This 
presents an interesting metaphysical position since now it is clear that “the dependently 
originated does not originate.”296  The challenge becomes to interpret this non-nihilistically, 
which would not be possible under a reductive essentialist model.   
If such an understanding is to be useful it must be able to explain metaphysical functionality 
in light of the four noble truths.  Specifically, there is an epistemological duality, and hence a 
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phenomenal one, between suffering and the cessation of suffering.  These are united along 
the path through recognition of the root cause of suffering, to complete the four noble 
truths.  I have identified this connection as a metaphysical one.  To both connect suffering 
and the cessation of suffering as well as differentiate the two modes which give rise to these 
distinct realities means to differentiate between the conventional and ultimate realms, or 
saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa respectively. 
To make the transition from conventional to ultimate understanding, in addition to 
requiring karmic good standing and behaving correctly, one must focus the mind through 
meditation.  To understand the world metaphysical speculation is unhelpful, instead one is 
encouraged to direct one’s focus inward to that aspect where reality is most directly 
accessible.  While Buddhist sutras refer to the ‘other shore’ of enlightenment, it is one’s 
own mind; that is that immediately present, yet conceptually distant, point, where 
enlightened understanding can occur.  This is what Nishitani calls the “absolute near 
side”.297  This is where ‘reality as it is’, tathātā (thusness), may be realised by an individual.  
To explain how this can occur requires further investigation. 
We can identify two aspects to wisdom; introspection and expansion. 298  With respect to 
the external world, expansion entails the perception of changes in the world which are then 
adopted into some kind of conceptual framework.  Scientifically, the accuracy of these 
objects is measured by their continued applicability or explanatory validity, which replaces 
any search for metaphysical truth; since what is considered ‘true’ is just what is currently 
explanatorily useful.  To further complicate matters there is the mystic claim of the 
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ineffability of ultimate reality.  This view maintains that language, due to its limited logic and 
referential indirectness, is incapable of grasping the nature of ultimate reality.  If 
metaphysics is taken to be merely a tool, rather than a direct description of ultimate truth, 
then metaphysics is similarly limited and so devalued.  Hence, since all systems are limited, 
including metaphysical systems, we are forced to distinguish then between metaphysics and 
the functioning of reality itself that metaphysics is supposed to be the (incomplete) 
representation of. 
The recognition of the epistemological divide between metaphysics and the reality it is 
supposed to represent takes various forms, depending upon the definition of metaphysics 
that has been adopted.  An empiricist, for example, will posit the separation of direct 
perception from the metaphysical explanation.299  Various subjectivists may cite relativism 
as the impossibility of completing a comprehensively cross-subjective metaphysical 
framework.300  An idealist metaphysics of pure Platonic forms should face the same 
ineffability issues as its naturalised cousins, whereby ‘ultimate reality’, either ‘above’ or 
‘below’, is absolutely separate and cannot be translated into a complete metaphysical 
system.  To sum up, the problem of metaphysics versus reality is defined by the chosen 
interpretation of metaphysics, which paradoxically must be distinct to reality.  If we take the 
realist interpretation of metaphysics then we must either claim that this metaphysical 
framework is reality itself or that it resembles reality itself.  In an absolutist sense the former 
is ridiculous, since when a system of interpretation is changed the universe is directly 
changed, and the latter is vague and falls to the same problems as the idealist position. 
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Introspection too is a form of cognitive expansion, however in each case, differing 
depending on our chosen mode of metaphysics.  The act of introspection draws on the basis 
of the metaphysic rather than moving towards the outer limit and beyond to examine 
‘reality’ itself.  Thus the empiricist focuses on direct perception, the subjectivist on the origin 
of the subject, while those I have bundled as holding the ‘ineffability’ hypothesis are forced 
to focus on the embodied self, which entails moving to an investigation of epistemology 
rather than speculative metaphysics.  There are actually two possibilities here, however the 
second possibility is dropped immediately due to impracticality; one must either focus on 
the immediate subject or focus on the unobtainable absolute.  Provided one is not a dualist 
(or pluralist) then to focus on one aspect rather than another makes only practical 
difference since all are ultimately interconnected. 
The connection of epistemology and metaphysics is crucial to this thesis as it specifically 
implicates why morality, or mind more generally, should be taken seriously from a 
metaphysical perspective.  The metaphysical position presented thus far is that mind and 
body are two interpretations of the same segment of reality, without depending upon 
essentialised physicality.  The hope of this position is to avoid the problems of dualism and 
reductionism.  Rather than take epistemology as a justification or definition of what it is to 
be a metaphysical entity, I will instead claim, given interdependence, that: all metaphysical 
statements are metaphysically empty.  This does not mean that an empty metaphysics is 
meaningless.  While there are many explanations which can be adopted as functioning 
metaphysics, they are only valid within a limited range.  An empty metaphysics of 
interdependence is (self-)referentially dependent upon the reality it describes, and as such it 
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cannot be seen to posit additional entities or relationships and hence it is a limited system 
with unlimited scope. 
If levels of interpretation are found to be equally valid then we may consider the aspect of a 
human being looking out upon the world to be as important as the world building the 
human being.  Both explain the outcome of events in the world.  Mind matters because 
matter ‘minds’; matter manifests mind which in turn directs matter.  The significance of the 
level of ‘mind’ is that at this level matter is ‘aware’.  Consciousness is capable of recognising 
its position, its makeup, its situation and so informed it can direct its awareness.  In various 
fields, for various purposes we can speak of ‘higher-level’ directive phenomena such as 
pragmatic considerations, rules and regulations, and morality in its various forms.  Each 
instance of pragmatic application is grounded in its specific circumstances and selected 
virtues.   
The process of becoming aware of one’s position alters the selection of values and the 
assessment of one’s situation.  Ultimately, following the metaphysics of interdependence, 
all values come to be seen as ‘empty’ and all situations as absolutely contingent.301  What is 
important for considerations of morality here, though at this level ‘compassion’ may be a 
more accurate term, is not the lack of self existence alone, but it is the truth of no-self in 
combination with the illusion of self in others.  These contradictory aspects together are the 
true makeup of reality and are the driving force behind the metaphysical basis of morality in 
interdependence. 
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Unlike the reductive model which indicates the levels of difference between the 
fundamental substrate and the emergence of the phenomenon, the interdependent 
framework allows for the comprehension of a phenomenon conceptually in situ by 
reference to both its internal state and the affect of its environment.  This thesis proposes 
that an empty metaphysics is philosophically more accurate than an essentialist model and 
has greater explanatory power through the admission of multiple directions of causal 
influence.  This is a ‘groundless’, self-defining system of metaphysics.  Parallels can be seen 
in recent developments in the philosophy of science, which has seen the emergence of 
Systems Theory across a variety of fields, proposing a shift in focus from a purely reductive 
model.302  These new theories admit the significance of ‘top-down’ feedback systems in 
addition to ‘bottom-up’ causal explanations. 
Consider the following statement from an article in Science,  
The reductionist approach has successfully identified most of the components and many of 
the interactions but, unfortunately, offers no convincing concepts or methods to understand 
how system properties emerge... the pluralism of causes and effects in biological networks is 
better addressed by observing, through quantitative measures, multiple components 
simultaneously and by rigorous data integration with mathematical models 303   
The philosophical development is the admission that there could be a variety of 
macroscopic patterns having an impact on the world, some of which would be able to 
control the particles they were made of, rather than exclusively the other way around.   This 
is what Nancy Cartwright has called a "dappled world".304  In addition to describing a 
complex web of interactions and significantly modifying the potential to model phenomena, 
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the philosophical scope is also altered such that metaphysical problems such as ‘free will 
versus determinism’ are radically transformed. 
It is encouraging to note the progress made through developments in Systems Theory and 
research which should lead one to question the validity of a simplistic reductive 
interpretation of all macrocosmic phenomena, particularly in relation to the impoverished 
interpretative power of restrictive ‘levels’ of reality.305  The identification of multi-stability, 
for example, gives credence to the necessary inclusion of what I have termed environmental 
makeup for explanation.  I believe research along these lines will prove increasingly fruitful 
with regard to explaining, predicting and designing complex systems with applications from 
social cybernetics to interfaced robotics and artificial intelligence.  The implications of such 
developments upon theories relating to the philosophy of mind are profound and have yet 
to be extensively explored. 
Returning to metaphysical considerations, the groundless universe may cause one to ask 
after the ontological status of the universe itself.  I have said the universe is empty, but it 
seems absurd to say there is absolutely nothing as this would contradict our experience of 
the world, which appears to be very much existent.  Even if our experience of the world is 
illusory, it is still something.  Nishitani believed that “Ontology needs to pass through nihility 
and shift to an entirely new field, different from what it has known hitherto.”306  To further 
complicate matters, concerning the present thesis, popular culture abounds with 
statements from Zen masters to the effect that “All is One”.  If this is the Zen stance then 
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surely I should claim a universal unity.  Here I want to point out the distinction between 
‘one’ as an individual among the multitude and ‘one’ as the unity of this multitude.  This 
same debate and confusion was addressed in discussions of ‘emptiness’ and ‘the empty’, so 
following on from this the first important point to make is to dismiss the possibility of ‘one’ 
as unity.  There is no ‘whole’ to the universe, as strange as this sounds, there can be no 
absolute oneness, rather all is absolute subjectivity.  The apparent unity is a conceptual 
speculation which does not describe any-thing.307  This discussion is extended to all things, 
since a ‘whole’ is only relatively different to a ‘part’, dependent upon which conceptual level 
the whole is posited.  At any level a ‘whole’ is assumed, but this whole is always dependent 
and hence empty.   
To say that the whole does not exist certainly poses a critical problem for our understanding 
of the world, not to mention my framework through which interconnectedness implies 
unity.  However there is no unit that is universalisable.  Everything only exists by virtue of its 
dependence on its causes and conditions, and ‘absolute nothingness’, which is identified 
with the ultimate unity in Zen, does not and cannot exist.  Nothingness is non-dependent 
and uncaused.  To make sense of the Zen position one must recognise that absolute 
nothingness is existence, without revoking those negative characteristics.  Nothingness is 
not negative, nor positive, in effect it is nihilistic but only inasmuch as we attempt to project 
ourselves onto it.  Really it is nothing and the Zen emphasis on nothingness is to reveal that 
reality is ultimately nothing, which is to say interdependent.  From this standpoint of 
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emptiness, where there is no place to stand, one is forced to engage with worldly 
phenomena in the absence of metaphysical essences.  Nishitani writes,  
Emptiness in the sense of śūnyatā is emptiness only when it empties itself even of the 
standpoint that represents it as some ‘thing’ that is emptiness.  It is, in its original Form, self-
emptying.  In this meaning, true emptiness is not to be posited as something outside of and 
other than ‘being’.  Rather, it is to be realized as something united to and self-identical with 
being.308 
Ultimate reality can be interpreted as transcendental but the interpretation does not then 
characterise ultimate reality.  This is particularly apparent if we address ourselves to the 
Prasaṅgika Mādhyamika recognition of saṃsāra and Nirvāna together.  Metaphysically, 
ultimate reality is not transcendent but immanent.  While simultaneously, ultimate reality is 
epistemologically removed so that practice (transformation) is required for realisation.  
While later developments of Mahāyāna, along the lines of ‘Buddha-nature’, speak of 
‘original enlightenment’; this is to reverse the direction of practice, from building up to 
uncovering, while leaving the conventional/ ultimate relationship unchanged.  All of this is 
only possible if the characteristic of ultimate reality, or the characteristic of the realisation 
of reality as it is, is empty.  Hence, there is no characteristic to be uncovered or built up to.  
The epistemological realisation of ultimate reality is absolutely contingent, thus it relates to 
whatever is, and in this way can be conventionally characterised as ‘emptiness’ or 
‘nothingness’. 
Finally, if in the end metaphysics is found to be empty, and existence is identified with 
nothingness, what is the purpose of building up a metaphysical framework?  The first 
answer is simply that participating in the process of following the metaphysical analysis of 
interdependence through to its limits allows one to make sense of the final position.  The 
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continuation of this point, since ‘nothingness’ is nothing, is that the final position is not a 
metaphysical endpoint at all, rather it implies the constant recognition of the processes of 
interdependence, and elucidating this is the purpose of such a metaphysical enterprise.  
Additionally there is the ‘soterio-epistemological’ justification.  Even though enlightened 
understanding is attributed to the ‘elimination of all views’, the metaphysics of 
interdependence provides a philosophical bridge to allow the rejection of systematic 
overlays.   
Not only are we disposed to break the world down reductively, due to current social norms, 
but also have, at a more basic level, the habitual nature of ‘clinging’.  The reason our 
theories of the world conflict, or that ‘levels’ are irreconcilable, is due to their essential 
bases.  It is not that they actually say something about the world such that ontological levels 
actually conflict since they cannot be seen to conflict without us positing them.  The origin 
of this conflict is that we believe the essential bases to be the world.  Static entities are 
characteristic of our fleeting minds, not of the world.  Hence all identifications of 
permanence, being necessarily maintained by a momentary mind, are impermanent.  
Emptiness is an epistemological correction tool, a method of identifying falsely reified 
beliefs, prompting their abandonment in favour of an interdependent understanding, and 
thus ending the conflict of essentially posited grounds.  Rather than a limited mode, finding 
that your explanation or world-view doesn’t hold in this instance, groundless metaphysics 
allows one to experience the world without restraints. 
I have attempted to illustrate the pragmatic consequences of avoiding the ignorance 
resulting from the metaphysical acceptance of limited reified systematisations in order to 
suggest engagement with a wholly contingent understanding of interdependence.  
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Nāgārjuna states, “Those who hold that dependent entities are like the moon's reflection in 
water, neither true nor false, are not attracted to a view.”309  The soteriological purpose of 
this groundlessness is summed up in the Heart Sutra’s description of the Boddhisattva; “in 
the absence of thought coverings he has not been made to tremble, he has overcome what 
can upset, and in the end he attains to Nirvana.”310 
 
Inverted Metaphysics 
The possibility of enlightenment has been flagged throughout the thesis and now the 
metaphysical framework has reached a point capable of entertaining such a possibility.  
Here I propose that the problem of the possibility of supreme wisdom (that is, omniscience) 
may be overcome through a conceptual inversion311 of conventional modes of 
understanding.  This inversion is proposed as an alternative to the conventional 
identification and inclusion of indefinitely extended dependent interactions that define a 
focal entity – a complicated web which would appear to hinder direct realisation.  By 
connecting manifest existence and nothingness, through the framework of 
interdependence, any moment of experience can come to be recognised as the expression 
of ultimate reality.  Elaborating this point will allow for a detailed reading of the work of 
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Dōgen, who is the focus of the next chapter.  Regarding this mode of direct realisation, 
Dōgen tells us that “the ten thousand things advance and confirm the self”.312 
If we accept that everything is empty, that is to say that no thing exists in and of itself - that 
everything is interdependent, then it is possible to make an interesting interpretational 
change.  If things in the world are empty of essence, for they exist purely through 
interaction with other things (their environment, which is also empty), then it may be 
possible for us to do away with the concept of ‘thing’ altogether.  If we take the entities out 
of our metaphysical worldview we are left with a universe of interactions.  Our proposed 
ontology has not changed.  We are still referring to the same phenomenon, event, or pocket 
of flux.  However, by removing its individual identity we are left with no illusions of an 
exhaustive causal situation whereby one object affects its neighbour and that is all. Any 
interaction is affected by and affects its environment.  Understanding the significance of this 
point is crucial to becoming a moral being.   
You will recall that this understanding does not require some radical holism, which proposes 
that we cannot understand anything without understanding the entire system.  Models do 
work.  We can understand pieces of our world and apply that understanding in the working 
universe.  Indeed, it is pragmatically useful to do so.  My emphasis here is on morality and 
ignorance.  We make no mistake in making use of models as conventionally functional.  As 
we have seen, a mistake is made when we take these models, in their isolated frameworks, 
to reflect the interactions in reality as a limited thing, which is the composite result of 
positing essentially existent entities or systems.  When an interaction takes place its effects 
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are not isolated to the particular system of interpretation we identified it through.  Our 
epistemic limits are not necessarily causal limits.  
Having said this, in contrast to a web of interactions, talk of ‘empty’ things actually has the 
additional benefit of allowing dialogue to continue between those who believe in ‘things’ 
and those who believe in a ‘flux’ of interdependence, and I believe this to be very important.  
To strongly break with traditional understanding gives the impression of radical distinction 
when in fact the two are compatible.  The benefits of talking of a world without ‘things’ is 
that this alternate understanding may open an avenue for the possibility of enlightenment 
that, even if emptiness is understood, an idea of a world of interacting ‘things’ tends to 
obscure.  David Shaner remarks that,  
Zazen awareness is not unobtainable or undefinable because it transcends spatial and 
temporal distinctions and entails some other-worldly mystic experience.  Rather, zazen 
awareness is undefinable because it undercuts the thetic positing of a privileged standard by 
which temporal and spatial change is measured.313 
 
If all there are are interactions, then what we perceive when we look at an object can be 
inversely identified as not being the object at all.  For the object is merely a phenomenon 
dependent upon the interaction with its constituent causes and conditions, its environment, 
which is in turn an interaction from its neighbouring interactions and so on.  Following the 
ultimate extent of interdependence, what we are experiencing when we observe an object, 
is really the absence of this object.  We experience the entire universe culminating on this 
point, which is empty in itself, giving the object form and function, past and future.  It is 
created by reality of interdependence and in turn it functions to create reality.  The 
implication of this inverted model is that if we were to experience this object, to understand 
                                                      
313
 Shaner, D., The Bodymind Experience in Japanese Buddhism, p.177 
180 
 
its unique characteristics as a function of interdependence, then the nature of the universe 
is revealed at that point.  Like the jewels in Indra’s net, we could experience the universe 
reflected in a single atom.   
Some of the characteristics of enlightenment are said to be creativity, spontaneity, 
happiness, moral virtue, freedom from spiritual afflictions (karma), as well as being mentally 
and emotionally free from cause and effect.  This may sound a bit fanciful, but it should be 
noted that all of these characteristics may be simply attributed to overcoming that gap 
between oneself and reality.  It is in the misunderstanding of our place in the universe, 
which is a result of this gap, that existentially traps us, leading to reification and nihilistic 
despair.  With the appearance of nihility “all things appear isolated from one another by an 
abyss.  Each thing has its being as a one-and-only, a solitariness absolutely shut up within 
itself.”314  We keep perpetuating emotional states, even though we don’t like them, we 
follow social norms we may not agree with, we take the words of scientists and 
philosophers we may not understand, and we believe that we are isolated in the world 
when we are truly all interconnected. 
However, there are moments in our lives, some may be more familiar with these 
experiences than others, when the mind is quiet and an individual experiences peace; a 
glimpse of emptiness.  One could interpret this experience as nothing more than the mind 
relaxing, ceasing conceptualisation, and the rest is our old interpretive awareness trying to 
fit it into our conception of the world again, defining the experience in contrast to 
conventions.  Meditators are credited with commonly achieving states of mind like this, but 
also consider the artist, virtuoso musician or master craftsman who lose themselves in the 
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act of creation.  The discriminating mind seems to stop functioning for a time, so the 
sensation cannot be directly assessed, except to reflectively say that in that moment the 
individual becomes aware not of themselves but of the process being undertaken.  For 
Dōgen this is not surprising as “the Buddha Dharma has always maintained the oneness of 
body and mind.”315 
Even if we accept the possibility of the dispersal of ignorance through a direct realisation of 
interdependence, there still remains the existential separation between thought and action 
to be overcome.  Thus enlightenment may be metaphysically possible under this account 
but this does not solve the existential problem of nihilism: why should an enlightened being 
act compassionately?  For if enlightenment is ‘seeing reality as it is’ there is nothing in this 
realisation that would lead one to a moral conclusion.  As Dōgen said, “We should 
remember there are dogs who bark at good people.”316 
 
Conclusion 
The significance of this chapter is to draw out problems inherent in the assumption of a 
reductive model of metaphysics and offer a viable alternative.  A non-reductive model not 
only offers an explanation of two truths understood concurrently at the metaphysical level, 
it also reveals the validity of separated experiential awareness and the variously revealed 
‘worlds’ that ensue.  This provides grounds for a more detailed elaboration of transcendent 
justification undertaken in chapter 2 and sets up the solution to the Zen moral problem 
which will be addressed in chapter 6.  Specifically, the aspect of relation to reality identified 
as nihilistic in chapter 1 is revealed to be the source of existential creativity. 
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I have argued that this framework is compatible with both contemporary thought and the 
Buddhist soteriological project.  The next chapter will further elaborate upon the 
disintegration of ‘levels’ of interpretation and the implications this holds for immediate 
experience.  This move is essential for reconciling this metaphysics with Zen, as Zen must be 
experientially realised.317 
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Chapter 5: Interpenetration 
 
Since ‘morality’ does not hold ultimately, the alleged ‘amoralism’ of enlightened beings has 
been revealed to be a logical triviality.  However one should not then move to dismiss the 
question of the origin of compassion.  That enlightened beings are traditionally recognised 
as acting for the benefit of others must be accounted for if this thesis is to provide a 
metaphysical account of Buddhist soteriology and resolve the full extent of the Zen moral 
problem.  To this end the ‘interpenetration’ of phenomena, derived from the work of Zen 
Master Eihei Dōgen (1200-1253), will be examined and, in the following chapters, will be 
brought to bear upon the various applications and interpretations of Zen. 
The preceding chapters developed a metaphysical framework from the principle of 
interdependence resulting in an antifoundational explanation of both the necessary 
connection and apparent separation of phenomena.  This framework revealed the 
subjective differentiation of minds, and the epistemic limits this entails, including the 
relative experience of suffering.  Furthermore, conscious ‘mind’ was identified as a causally 
efficacious aspect of a wider inter-causal network of environmental effects, indicating that 
the influences upon, and effects of mind are understated conventionally.  I propose that this 
framework is compatible with, and helps to elucidate Dōgen’s position, which in turn 
informs the implications of interdependence, completing the metaphysical interpretation of 
Zen in this thesis. 
The recorded thought of Zen Master Dōgen has become immensely popular in academic 
circles over the last century, both in his native Japan and increasingly worldwide.  The 
notorious difficulty of interpreting Dōgen’s works, and in turn providing accurate 
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translations, may in fact help to spur on this interest in such a unique figure in Japanese and, 
indeed, Buddhist literature.  Linguistic hurdles include his unorthodox use of the Japanese 
language, the inclusion of citations in antiquated Chinese and the grammatical 
reconstruction of well-recognised textual passages.  The more significant complication is 
how these linguistic peculiarities are used by Dōgen as a pedagogical tool to illustrate his 
understanding of Dharma, and in all cases to draw attention to, in tune with his 
predecessors, the limitations of language and of discriminative thought.318 
There are some important points to keep in mind when examining Dōgen’s thought.  
Although throughout the Shobogenzo and Eihei Kōroku distinctions are made between 
schools of Buddhist thought and their exponents, Dōgen maintained the belief in a single 
Buddhist truth.319  Even so, one must take into consideration the influences of his particular 
time and place.  In various passages Dōgen is damning of Japanese, Chinese and Indian 
schools of Buddhism, indicating the independent significance he placed on an accurate 
Buddhist teaching.  As Dōgen’s education began in the Tendai school, this can be seen as a 
strong influence on his development, even though he ultimately dismissed their position.320 
Dōgen’s dialogical method involves connecting stories from the history of Zen, drawing 
together apparently disparate statements by emphasising the shared nature of the truths 
they express.  Taken altogether a matrix of understanding seems to be woven, with no 
explicit external basis, yet entirely internally consistent.  While some of Dōgen’s lectures 
and fascicles in the Shobogenzo are targeted towards a general lay audience, most of his 
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explanations are in aid of the monks  and as such should not be expected to stand 
independently, but rather build up in conjunction with each lecture provided, gradually 
deepening the practitioner’s understanding.  Oftentimes Dōgen uses the words and deeds 
of the patriarchs to express some understanding, and in most cases two historical anecdotes 
will be played off against each other.  In virtually every case Dōgen will add his own 
potentially divergent perspective on the matter, often criticising the patriarchs, all the while 
revering the Dharma lineage.   
This should not be unexpected if we are to make sense of one of the dominant themes in 
Dōgen’s thought – the unity of practice and attainment.  By understanding Dōgen’s position, 
the possibility of recognising the two truths together is revealed and the Zen moral problem 
can be overcome. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections.   
The first section, The Problem of Ignorance, examines the origins of Dōgen’s soteriological 
drive and draws parallels with the implications of interdependence developed in the last 
chapter.  The limitations of such parallels are also addressed.  The main themes to be drawn 
from Dōgen are introduced and the nature of Zen ‘nothingness’ is set-up. 
The second section, Dōgen’s Metaphysics, explores Dōgen’s metaphysical influences which 
led to his particular confrontation with the problem of ignorance.  Following this, the 
principles Dōgen developed in response to the problem are examined, further expanding 
upon the metaphysics of interdependence through the implication of the ‘interpenetration’ 
of phenomena. 
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The third section, An Empty Buddha-nature, is a specific reading of Dōgen’s use of ‘Buddha-
nature’ based on the implications of the metaphysical framework of interdependence 
developed thus far and is a response to the concerns of ‘Critical Buddhism’.  Supporting this 
position is Dōgen’s scathing critique of the concept of ‘original nature’ derived from Chinese 
Daoism and an examination of the subtleties of interpretations of ‘non-dualism’.  The ‘not-
two-ness’ of reality as such presents the entanglement of conventional and ultimate modes. 
The fourth section, Flowers in the Sky, focuses on the Kuge fascicle in Dōgen’s Shobogenzo.  
The concept of ‘sky flowers’, usually functioning as a simple example of delusion in Buddhist 
literature, is here used to illustrate the direct implications interpenetration has for 
understanding Buddhist soteriology and Zen practice in particular.  For Dōgen, the 
significance of delusion is to be found in the realisation of enlightened beings, and not 
simply as the folly of the ignorant. 
 
The Problem of Ignorance 
Early in his spiritual development, Dōgen was motivated to find a resolution to a 
troublesome dilemma, “Both exoteric and esoteric teachings explain that a person in 
essence has true dharma nature and is originally a body of ‘Buddha nature’.  If so, why do all 
buddhas in the past, present, and future arouse the wish for and seek enlightenment?”321  
Both the motivation and the metaphysical position of beings is brought into question, as the 
ultimate nature of reality in the East Asian Buddhist cosmology appears to conflict with the 
appearance of ignorance in the world.  If all is Buddha-nature, then practice would not be 
necessary and we would take a position similar to that of the Daoists, wherein one does 
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nothing and ‘leaves nothing undone’.  Dōgen did not accept this as an option, however,322 as 
he found the necessity of practice evident.323  The problem of ignorance is really a reversal 
of the core epistemological question, ‘how can we come to know anything about the 
world?’  The question posed from the foundation of innate Buddha-nature is instead, ‘how 
can we not know?’   
Here the question leads one to search after the nature of the divide between our individual 
selves and the world, and by extension an explanation of our separation from one another.  
This parallels the problem of necessary metaphysical connection and existentially realised 
separation examined in the previous chapter.  The metaphysical extension of 
interdependence was shown to implicate a proximal separation due to delay across 
temporal and spatial distance, resulting in localised environments and the subjective 
experience of identifiable (as differentiated) segments of reality.  While any such 
identification is necessarily limited in scope, and thus impermanent, the ultimate emptiness 
of conventionally real entities has been obscured by the functional role they play in worldly 
interactions.  In this manner the illusion of imagination and conceptual overlays comes into 
conflict with reality as it is, to the point where the function of ‘mind’ obscures mind itself.  
Thus, while all individuals are metaphysically connected, apparent separation is shown to 
arise from the metaphysics of interdependence.  
Such parallels can only reasonably be taken so far, since Dōgen would not have addressed 
the nature of reality as set out through a metaphysical framework.  This should not matter, 
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however, if the framework is a valid method of elucidating the nature of cause and effect.  
“Students of the way cannot dismiss cause and effect.  If you discard cause and effect, you 
will ultimately deviate from practice-realisation.”324  Nishijima and Cross note that Dōgen 
was concerned with combating the idea that Mahāyāna transcends ‘cause and effect’, a 
problematic interpretation which was widespread among Zennists in Dōgen’s time,325 and 
one which has troublesome consequences.  Dōgen quotes Master Genkaku: “’Emptiness’ 
run wild negates cause and effect; and in a morass of looseness, invites misfortune and 
mistakes.”326  Unfortunately we have seen that the mistaken interpretation of emptiness is 
still prominent, and I connected this to the problem of transcendent justification in chapter 
2.  For this purpose we have undertaken a detailed investigation of the nature of 
interdependence.  In this vein we should continue, by now investigating Dōgen’s 
understanding of cause and effect and the significant implications he draws through 
‘interpenetration’. 
Dōgen’s understanding of interpenetration adds a more complex layer to the metaphysical 
framework  than the implications of interdependence examined thus far.  This complexity 
will allow for a recognition of the concurrent validity of the two truths.  Dōgen writes, 
“When we look at atoms that does not mean we fail to see the world of Dharma.  When we 
are experiencing the world of Dharma, that does not mean we fail to experience atoms.”327  
The conventional reality of ‘atoms’ is not superseded by the Buddhist truth, nor is the latter 
necessarily obscured by the former – both levels of interpretation can be simultaneously 
realised.  Thus, metaphysically, the phenomenal aspect of entities interpenetrate one 
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another without interference, while the causal nature of empty entities, according to the 
framework, is that interference.  The metaphysical link between these two aspects is the 
nature of mind.  The phenomenal is existentially realised, while causation is epistemically 
identified, and while either mode can encompass the other, the distinct characteristics of 
the alternative mode is then lost. 
The existential expression, while adding to the complete implications of interdependence, is 
found within the framework, albeit posited metaphysically.  An individual mind is subject to 
experience and the causal flux of interdependence can thus be read relative to the unique 
position of the mind in question.  The problem is that this metaphysical explanation of 
subjectivity obviously loses the character of subjective experience, what Chalmers identified 
as the ‘hard problem of consciousness’, and without an existentially vivid account of 
subjectivity the thought of Dōgen cannot be fathomed.  For Dōgen explains that the 
appearance and disappearance of dharmas, which accounts for all phenomena, is not the 
appearance and disappearance of the self.328  The experience of samadhi329 is the mutual 
realisation of both subjective and objective sides of reality. 
Confusion need not arise between the impossible separatedness of expressed ‘dharmas’ 
and ‘Dharma’ in reality, where the latter is akin to ‘reality as such’.  Dōgen’s understanding 
appears to return to the mutual ground of this distinction.  Expressed dharmas are Dharma, 
if they are not reified.  Thus presenting the apparent paradox, dharmas are only ‘true’, that 
is express reality, if they are not taken as Dharma.330  This would remain an epistemological 
puzzle, if it were not for the fact that dharmas, like all such expressions, are causally 
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efficacious.  As an expressed dharma only exists by virtue of mind, the interdependent 
characteristics of mind are realised in the application of dharma.  The expression of a true 
dharma, rather than a mere conceptual entity, is directly manifest in the application of the 
realisation which is in accord with the world and, for Dōgen, corresponds to the spiritual 
realm of the Buddhas and Zen Patriarchs. 
At the physical level interpenetration can be intuited from the consequences of 
metaphysical interdependence, since every environment must be connected to, and thus, 
ultimately, contain every other.  But this interpenetration is indirect as extension plays a 
part in the separation of phenomena in time and space.  The other aspect of 
interpenetration is the direct and immediate consequences of ‘mind’, and this is how an 
explanation is formed as to the perpetuation of empty phenomena and how enlightenment 
can occur.  Hee-Jin Kim states, “Dōgen’s interpretation of mind inherited the best elements 
of Hua-yen, tathāgata-garbha, and Zen traditions, yet overcame some vulnerabilities 
inherent in them, and went beyond them by being deeply practical and existentialist.”331 
A statement made by Dōgen, alluded to in the previous chapter, states that “the ten-
thousand things advance and confirm the self”.332  Recognised through inverted 
metaphysics, the ten-thousand things are the self, providing an affirmative, though 
unorthodox, interpretation of the “the triple world is mind only” found in the Lankavatara 
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Sutra.333  This is a reading from an explanation of causal interpenetration.  The existential 
interpretation, regarding dharmas (above), directly seeks an expression of reality itself. 
Following the analysis from Chapter 2, alternative interpretations must be sought which do 
not rely upon the positing of essential nature and can thoroughly implement the 
implications of interdependence.  As a Mahāyāna Buddhist, Dōgen can be recognised as 
following Nāgārjuna and adopting his critique of emptiness when examining the reality of 
phenomena.  This apparently simplistic connection is problematised as Dōgen also develops 
Kegon notions of interpenetration, as infinitesimal repetitions of the same, and the Ch’an 
concepts of ‘true self’ and ‘Buddha-nature’, which appear to be essentialised concepts.   
Dōgen himself did not see a conflict between Nāgārjunian emptiness and these concepts, 
any more than Nāgārjuna saw a conflict between ultimate and conventional modes of 
expression.  Dōgen examines the claim that “to penetrate one dharma is to penetrate 
myriad dharmas” and, expressing the validity of emptiness, says that this “...is not to make 
one dharma relative to another, and is not to make one dharma absolute – to make 
[something] absolute is to hinder it and be hindered by it.”334  This expresses both the causal 
ineptitude of a non-empty entity, as we have examined, and introduces the stopping of the 
mind as a consequence of the false ideality. 
Returning to the problem of interpenetration, whereby if all things have identical nature, 
then the differentiation that is evident to us in the world must be explained.  Explanations 
can be granted, enabling differentiation at a less subtle level than that of original nature, in 
which case our examination should turn to the nature of these differentiations.  For it is at 
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this level which individuates distinct objects or phenomena and so constitutes each 
individual’s identifiable essence.  I will go on to use the term ‘interpenetration’ with the 
proviso that this is used in an incomplete constructive sense, whereby the phenomena in 
question is not identified as having any essential nature, shared or independent, and that 
each phenomenon’s relation to every other is of empty interdependence. 
For Dōgen neither epistemology nor metaphysics are a concern, as this would be to draw a 
distinction between mind and world and thus remove oneself from the actuality of both.  
Commentators have put this down to his ‘non-dualism’ and, as mentioned previously, his 
desire to avoid reified concepts. 335  However Dōgen intentionally made use of reified 
concepts in his writings and sermons.  This being his mode, forcing a distinction between 
the equivalent of epistemology and metaphysics would undermine his project.  As far as 
non-dualism holds, one could not make sense of the passage “the blue mountains walk”336 if 
such a distinction between mind and world were maintained.  This is not a subjective 
existential description either, ‘mountains’ and ‘walking’ can only be brought together in this 
context when subjective relativism is removed. 
A dualistic interpretive framework requires the admission of two parts; the expressed and 
its opposition.337  Non-dualistic thinking cannot fit this model of logic, so when examining a 
‘non-dualistic’ understanding one must decide whether to develop a new logical framework 
to account for the additional possibilities it allows (or removes) or accept the inevitable 
paradoxes which result from examining such a position within a binary framework.  As I 
have claimed that all systems are necessarily limited then the adoption of such a logical 
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framework, while certainly fruitful in other inquiries, does not serve the scope of the current 
thesis.  The metaphysical framework of interdependence, while limited, has the advantage 
of being a mere extrapolation from principles directed towards realising reality itself.  A 
possible escape from the dualist limitation can be found through an elaboration of the 
nature of reality, understood as ‘nothingness’. 
If we consider ‘reality’, the opposite ‘un-reality’ completes the duality, but if we remove 
what is not real from our consideration we are left with nothing on the other side.  This is 
where interpretation creates the limits of reified systems and is the point from which the 
Zen sense of ‘nothing’ can be found to arise.  ‘Nothing’ is not ‘un-reality’, it is a null-proxy 
for a system that requires an entry where none are available.  This is why ‘nothing’ refers 
back to the other side, ‘reality’, and in doing so something is revealed about reality itself: 
there is no other side.  There is no ‘nothing’ which exists independent of some opposition to 
reality, as this would be a reified ‘nothingness’.  ‘Nothing’ does not transcend reality, in fact 
any statement of ‘nothing’ imposes the very opposite.  As we have seen, this reified nothing 
is the root of nilihism.  Nishitani connects this directly to ignorance, stating that “man 
cannot escape that perversion so long as he takes a stand on nihility, because it was 
precisely through that perversion that nihility came to light: the pit that lies open at the 
bottom of that perversion is nothing other than nihility itself.”338  The alternative is to turn 
to a radicalised ‘Absolute Nothingness’ which is nothing other than ‘nothing’ as the empty 
place holder, turned back onto reality as it is.  As every reified position entails nihilism, the 
only escape is to ‘transcend nothing’ by taking the middle-path and recognising 
interdependence. 
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Dōgen’s Metaphysics 
While I have taken interdependence to be a necessary principle in the development of a 
Buddhist metaphysics, historically the implications of contingent existence have been 
interpreted in varying ways.  The metaphysical principles of Kegon (Ch. Huayan) Buddhism, 
particularly interpenetration as ‘simultaneous interfusion and non-impeded mutual 
penetration’, are recognised as a major influence on Dōgen’s thought. 339  At least one 
aspect of the philosophical ground of interpenetration can be found in the Avatamsaka 
Sutra and the essays of Fa-tsang, ‘on the gold lion’ and ‘on a mote of dust’.  “The basic idea 
is one of unity in plurality: All in One, One in All.  The All melts into a single whole.” 340  The 
notion is addressed by Dōgen whenever he describes the universe as ‘one bright pearl’ in a 
similar manner to ‘Indra’s net’, wherein phenomenon manifest within macrocosmic 
entirety, ad infinitum.  “Each and every phenomenon is not only seen to contain each and 
every other phenomenon, but all phenomena are also seen to contain the totality of the 
unobstructed interpenetration of all phenomena.”341 
However, there is an essentiality in the Kegon understanding; that the ultimate nature of 
reality is ‘embryo-like’, infinitely repeated, across layers of levelled metaphysic; and there 
does remain a core to this reality which is not maintained by Dōgen where he addresses 
interpenetration.  In the Genjo-kōan, Dōgen writes, “The whole moon and the whole sky are 
reflected in a dew-drop in a blade of grass and are reflected in a single drop of water.”342  
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The realised states of either moon or dewdrop do not hinder one another and it is in this 
manner that the moon and dewdrop are said to interpenetrate.  There are parallels here 
with the metaphysics of interdependence developed in the last chapter.  Significantly, this is 
only possible when all aspects of reality are recognised as ‘empty’. 
What I called ‘inverted metaphysics’, in the previous chapter, illustrates the always ready 
inversion of epistemic understanding.  Following inverted metaphysics, the nature of any 
empty ‘thing’ can be recognised as the effect of the universe, minus what we would usually 
identify as that ‘thing’, acting on that point.  The question can be asked from either 
direction, even though both can be identified as interdependent.  To emphasise separation, 
one speaks of the interaction of (empty) entities, whereas to focus on connection one may 
speak of dependent causation. 
As recorded in numerous examples of Zen literature, the apparently random and seemingly 
irrelevant answers given by Zen masters to questions can be understood (though not 
predicted) as the intentional reversal of the focal direction of the question.  A Zen master, 
holding up his staff, says: “If you have one, I give you mine; if you have none, I will take it 
away from you.”343  As attachment to a specific level of interpretation is just as dangerous to 
a student’s development as reified fixation on some object of thought, the alternative and 
incompatible position is posed to reveal the ultimately false nature of the statement or 
position expressed by the student.  If someone were to emphasise separation, by identifying 
some specific object, then a master may respond by stressing its interdependent 
connection.  If someone were to emphasise connection, then they may stress the 
significance of differentiation.  In either case, interruption through direct action can be 
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applied; such as calling for a response, forcing a pragmatic reaction or simply striking the 
questioner.344  This is a crucial point concerning Zen – in action the dualism of connection 
and separation cannot be maintained.  Any conceptualisation at such a point is false, which 
is plainly manifest in the conflict between the concept and the action itself.  An enlightened 
being’s thoughts and actions are ‘not two’.345 
The effect of modifying the ground of focus is particularly stark when the distinction is 
between causation ‘out there’ in the world, and the same phenomena expressed as an 
aspect of mind.  For example, Huineng’s response to monks debating positions on the 
movement of a flag: "Not the wind, not the flag; mind is moving."346  Every object or event is 
potentially the centre of focus as the metaphysical nature of epistemic identity is formless.  
Furthermore, since every different position adopted has different epistemic results, the 
nature of the experienced world, and so too one’s reaction to the world, is dependent on 
the position held.  At least, this is true conventionally.  Ultimately, it should make no 
difference which position is currently being used, since from the direct experience of reality, 
every position is subject to the interpenetration of dependent arising. 
 Consider the Kōan of Baizhang and the fox, 347 wherein an old Zen teacher states that 
‘persons of great cultivation’ are “not subject to cause and effect” and is consequently 
reborn as a fox for five-hundred lifetimes.  Identifying the error in the old teacher’s 
statement, Baizhang resolves the chain of rebirth by stating that “a greatly cultivated person 
does not ignore cause and effect.”  Dōgen, holding up his whisk, as the Buddha once held up 
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a flower on Vulture Peak, simply remarks “Cause and effect are clear.”348  As the Buddha 
stated, “This arising, that arises. When this is not, that is not. This ceasing, that ceases.”349  
This is cause and effect, and understanding cause and effect is the meaning of 
interdependence.  This is only possible as all phenomena, all entities and all events; are 
empty.  All phenomena are produced by empty phenomena and produce empty 
phenomena. 
This again raises the peculiar position, derived from emptiness, that none of the entities we 
describe exist.  You will recall Nāgārjuna’s statement that ‘nothing whatsoever arises’ is 
seen to be a consequence of interdependence.  To answer the parallel questions: ‘how is 
separation possible?’ and ‘how does ignorance arise?’ – it doesn’t.  It is an illusion.  The 
question is derived from the delusion it is inquiring into, thus, from the ground on which it is 
posited, a solution cannot be found.  This is also true of the nihilism problem, which has 
been described as the Zen moral problem.  This ‘nothing’ of nihilism must be radically 
epistemically ‘transcended’ which entails abandoning the question.  This ‘transcendence’ 
should not be understood as a removal from the world of the conventional, rather it is a 
return to the reality that conventional overlays conceal. 
There is no separation without connection, no ignorance without enlightenment.  Wisdom is 
not gaining something, but destroying falsities to reveal an underlying reality.  In this 
manner, it is said that once enlightenment is achieved it cannot be undone.  “A broken 
mirror does not illuminate or reflect.  A fallen flower does not jump back onto the 
branch.”350  While this describes the metaphysical position of the state of enlightenment, 
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that it is already behind our conventional perceptions, it should not lead us to belief in an 
‘original nature’.  The underlying reality should not be considered as driving our 
conventionally apparent actions from an ontologically different ground, as this would only 
reinforce Dōgen’s original dilemma.  The transcendent Buddha does not act through an 
enlightened being.  Every individual is responsible for their own actions.  As Dōgen tells us, 
“even in the state of attainment of the truth, we should practice.”351 
The maintenance of a concept of Buddha-nature which does not nihilate the necessity of 
practice can only be established if the metaphysical ground of this understanding is not 
divided into transcendent levels of ‘truth’.  While Dōgen emphasises the dualism of 
opposites which are co-entailing throughout his examination of kōans, he simultaneously 
affirms non-dualism, or better: an understanding of “not two”.352  The solution to this 
apparently conflicted position is not to confuse the finger for the moon it is pointing to.353  
Dōgen’s use of reified opposites and maintenance of ‘not two’, together, emphasise 
immanent reality.  In this manner Zen masters continually refer to ‘concrete’ examples in 
the world, such as “this monk’s staff”354 and so forth.  Dōgen’s emphasis on zazen can also 
be understood as such an expression.  Zazen, however, is a unique instance of immanence, 
with specific implications, which are addressed in the next section. 
Before moving on it is helpful to consider the distinctions of Dōgen’s position to the 
developments in modern ‘western’ philosophy, which have been likened to the various 
extrapolations of ‘interdependence’ in Buddhist thought.  As my framework of 
interdependence potentially falls into the same category we should be careful not to lose 
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the subtleties of Zen thought in favour of preserving the conceptual schema.  ‘Process 
philosophy’ can be considered a key example of such a parallel framework.  Not dissimilar to 
the framework developed from the metaphysics of interdependence here, Whitehead 
maintained that ‘to exist is to exert causal influence’.355   This simple proposition presents a 
necessarily complete universe picture, in that any entity that exists is necessarily causally 
connected (directly or indirectly) to every other entity. 
Whitehead’s method of elaborating ‘process metaphysics’ involves a transition from talk of 
static ‘objects’ to that of processes; so that rather than speak of a ‘chair’ we would describe 
the phenomena by the process it undertakes in conjunction with its environment.  In this 
manner when somebody sits on a chair we are confronted with the interdependently arisen 
event ‘chair-ing’.  While this move is bold and opens up many possibilities for engaging with 
and understanding our world, in particular making evident the interconnectedness of 
reality, it cannot overcome the limitations of language and reified thought more generally.  
Whitehead did not see his ‘process’ mode as conflicting with the ‘objectified’, traditional 
view of reality, but rather as a complimentary understanding.356  From the perspective of 
objectified thought, a process can more easily be recognised as impermanent and is 
necessarily made up of multiple ‘objects’ and so is seen to be in accord with the Buddhist 
understanding of impermanence and interdependence, drawing widespread 
comparisons.357  Significantly, Whitehead was a determined theist and saw the essential 
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nature of the flux of reality having ultimately originated from God and that this innate 
essence remains and is passed on through various manifestations of reality.358  Steve Odin’s 
work, Process Metaphysics and Hua-Yen Buddhism, draws on the commonality between the 
‘core’ in Kegon metaphysics and Whitehead’s flowing essence, while this is exactly the point 
from which my investigation of Dōgen must depart.   
Dōgen deviates from the Kegon metaphysics dramatically, as he did not maintain the 
existence of an essential ‘core’ (of Buddha-nature), instead making recourse to Nāgārjunian 
emptiness.  On striving for being without the Buddha-nature, Dōgen refers to the fifth 
patriarch, stating “The Buddha-nature is emptiness, so we call it being without.”359  The 
formless reality of Buddha-nature is necessary to implicate its function in manifest reality, 
since, returning to Nāgārjuna, a non-empty thing cannot interact.  The practice of Zen, as 
actively approaching a realisation of reality ‘as it is’, cannot be distinguished from the 
‘ultimate state’ of that reality.  Metaphysically understood as ‘groundless’, the formless 
Buddha-nature is absolutely self-reliant but acquires existential content in relation to 
immanent events.  In this manner, practice and attainment are two aspects of the same 
reality, separated by a subjective (epistemic) distinction.  The practice itself, ala zazen, 
becomes the ‘ultimate’ practice and expression of the Buddhist soteriological project. 
As the Sōtō school is classed as ‘gradualist’, to contrast its doctrine with that of the ‘sudden 
enlightenment’ of the Rinzai school, one may expect that Dōgen, who is credited with 
founding the Sōtō school, should conform to this distinction.  Besides stressing the 
importance of practice, Dōgen makes extensive use of kōans in his teaching.  The 
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‘sudden’/’gradual’ distinction does not approach the depth at which Dōgen’s metaphysics 
necessitates the inseparability of practice and attainment, as this is a more fundamental 
critique of action which applies equally to conventionally situated and enlightened beings.  
Discussion on ‘sudden’ or ‘gradual’ schools, on enlightenment, is interesting and perhaps 
fruitful in terms of pedagogy, but cannot be applicable to a metaphysical analysis of Dōgen’s 
thought.   
Buddhism for Dōgen is not something which can be factored out into different schools – 
either it is an expression of the Buddhist truth or it is not.360  Abe notes that Dōgen “strictly 
refused to speak of a ‘Zen sect’, to say nothing of a ‘Sōtō sect’, which he was later credited 
with founding.”361  At times Dōgen seems to take the harshest critical view of the masters of 
the past, all the while attributing the utmost respect to the transmission of the teaching 
through the patriarchs.  To understand this properly it is important to examine the position 
of ‘Buddha-nature’ in Dōgen.  Like the transmission, being temporally enacted yet eternally 
occurring, Buddha-nature is universally applicable.  For this reason the distinction between 
‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’ truths is not favoured in Dōgen.  The distinction itself misses 
the point.  It is everyday things which express Buddha (which are Buddha) although Buddha 
is not exhausted in any instance.  When ‘oneness’ appears, it is not as a unity or final 
reduction, the ‘not-two-ness’ is common reality.  This unity is the unchanging teaching, both 
subject and object, both conventional and ultimate. 
Dōgen’s position is bound to cause confusion; he does not propose anything beyond this 
world and yet directs our attention to the function of causation and interpenetration, 
appearing to indicate an elaborate metaphysics.  While this would make the current project 
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much simpler, it would certainly be a misinterpretation of Dōgen.  There should be nothing 
more normal than the ‘blue mountains walking’ or every instance of zazen being 
enlightenment itself.362  To clarify Dōgen’s position, we should include an analysis of the 
nature of time, which results in the overturning of any apparent metaphysical overlays of 
separation.  The immanence of experiential reality is affirmed by focussing on the unique 
instance of each moment, which is impermanent and utterly interdependent.  By focussing 
on the experience of time the metaphysical principles developed thus far begin to find 
direct practical application. 
While examinations of Dōgen’s metaphysics are increasingly common, it is interesting to 
note that the implications of interpenetration have been avoided in favour of focusing on 
his conception of ‘being-time’ (Uji), allowing connections to the work of Heidegger to be 
drawn out.363  The Kyōto school’s fascination with Dōgen, coupled with their western 
existential bent, is at least partially responsible for this.  The other major focus in ‘western’ 
Dōgen studies is philosophy of language.  It is certainly possible to draw comparisons of 
other thinkers to Dōgen, but any such comparison would be extremely limited, even among 
other Buddhists.  Dōgen moves from metaphor to myth to pedagogy to pragmatics within a 
single passage.  I fear that the superficial level at which Dōgen’s work could be so compared 
would be applicable to most Buddhist thinkers and often reveals little of Dōgen’s particular 
expression.  The obvious philosophical position that can be extracted from his work is his 
use of uji, though here it will be considered in conjunction with the wider implications of 
interpenetration in Dōgen’s thought. 
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The division of moments of time (past, present, future relations) occurs within conventional 
limits.  Uji, however, denotes a ‘passageless passage’ which denies the validity of such 
conventional designations.364  Time, for Dōgen, cannot be broken into moments as this 
reductive essentialisation leads to a reductio ad absurdum.  It is the experience of time 
rather than the demarcation of temporality which is of key concern for Dōgen.   To 
elaborate upon this point, one finds every moment of time as instantaneously arising, and 
every such instant of time subject to the stream of causes and conditions leading up to it.  
On the other hand Nirvāṇa is held to be ‘timeless’, beyond such discriminations, and 
metaphysically applicable across all times.365  Usually, the moment of enlightenment is 
considered to be unique in the general temporal schema due to the position (held by many 
Zennists though not by Dōgen) that ‘original mind’ has always existed.  According to this 
understanding, enlightenment was akin to a re-alignment with one’s true nature, indicating 
a genuine metaphysical distinction, which, as we have seen, cannot be maintained through 
interdependence.  For Dōgen enlightenment is the exercise of that which is already present, 
a continual activity that is enlightenment itself. 
From this point it is easy to jump to conclusions, that Dōgen is proposing some form of 
monism, which would provide a simple solution to non-dualism.  I claim this is a mistake, 
and is in fact a tendency derived from dualistic thinking, whereby ‘nothingness’ in Zen 
comes to the fore as a reified concept.  Instead, as we have seen, this ‘nothing’ should not 
be proposed in opposition to being, nor simply identified with it.  Dōgen addresses this issue 
to some extent wherever he discusses ‘Buddha-nature’. 
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An empty Buddha-Nature 
Dōgen’s unique place in the history of Japanese Zen has much to do with his studies in 
China, bringing back a wealth of Chinese Buddhist philosophy to bear on Japanese Buddhist 
culture, including an extensive collection of kōans.366  As examined previously, the impact of 
Chinese thought on Buddhist philosophy in China was extensive, so we find in Dōgen a 
reappraisal of particular ideas which had either not filtered through to Japan, or had been 
adopted as an incomplete reading.  Chief among these, and in addition to Kegon 
‘Interpenetration’, is the Daoist-influenced notion of ‘Buddha-nature’.367  It is upon the state 
of this concept that the accusation ‘Zen is not Buddhism’368 has been levelled.  Dōgen’s 
response offers a possible admission and reappraisal of Zen. 
The potential of sentient beings to become enlightened united with the concept of the 
universal way of nature, Dao, is radically extended by Dōgen.  In response to Master Sai-an, 
who stated that, “All living beings have the Buddha-nature”,369 Dōgen says we should drop 
‘have’, thus correlating all living beings to Buddha-nature.  Further than this, Dōgen 
universalises Buddha-nature to all existence, and not merely sentient beings. 370   
This is not to propose a single universal entity, ‘Buddha-nature’, akin to Dao.  As Hee-jin Kim 
remarks, “Buddha-nature is more than the defacto sum of all beings and more than the 
naive identity of the Absolute and the relative, or of the necessary and the contingent.”371  
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Kim suggests this could be considered a discrete form of panentheism.  The argument runs; 
since all sentient beings are mind and interdependence is mutual co-creation, all things are 
mind.  Thus we conclude that all things are sentient. 
This reading certainly allows for easier comprehension of statements such as ‘blue 
mountains walking’, but the panentheistic interpretation runs afoul of emptiness.  As 
indicated by Nāgārjuna, the function of interdependence is only possible as all entities 
considered thus are empty of intrinsic existence.  The concept of ‘mind’ required to accept 
the panentheistic reading, while commonly found in Zen, cannot be considered empty.  
Ignoring the connection of theism with ‘mind’, the real problem stems from the underlying 
connection of ‘emptiness’ as ‘tathātā’ (thusness).  To maintain that conventional entities 
‘are just as they are’ is to go against the purpose of emptiness, which is to break through 
mere appearances to undermine conventional phenomena and arrive at reality as it is. 
Dōgen goes on to examine the statement made by Master Dai-en, which appears, 
superficially, to present the opposite position, “All living beings are without the Buddha-
nature”.372  Dōgen finds no conflict between the statements made by Master Dai-en and 
that of Master Sai-an.  He states, “Just see that karmic consciousness is totally boundless.  
All living beings are without Buddha nature.”373  The two apparently conflicting positions are 
recognised by Dōgen as interpenetrating interpretations of manifest reality, each reveals a 
different side of Buddha-nature.  “Buddha nature does not have Buddha nature as a 
nature”,374 since the ground of being is intrinsically empty.  Yet, interpreted from 
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interdependence, “see how Buddha nature produces the conditions for Buddha nature.”375  
Once again the connection between emptiness and interdependence is stressed.  
Ultimately, the connection of these two should be revealed as ‘not two’, and only in that 
realisation can phenomena be accorded tathātā.  The dualism of ‘everything is Buddha-
nature’ versus ‘everything is not Buddha-nature’ must be overcome. 
The sixth patriarch of Zen, Huineng (Jp. Daikan Enō) features prominently throughout Zen 
literature, and extensively in Dōgen.  Renowned for ‘tearing up the scriptures’, Huineng was 
the last in the direct lineage of Zen masters in China, beginning with Bodhidharma, to 
symbolically transmit the robe and bowl as symbols of attainment.  Huineng cited 
Bodhidharma himself as the explanation for his deviation from tradition, as Zen is described 
as “a special transmission outside the scriptures, not founded upon words and letters, 
directly pointing to one’s mind.”376 
One section in the Shobogenzo finds Dōgen attacking the validity of the Platform Sutra, 
specifically the passage “seeing one’s nature”.377  “The Sixth Patriarch’s Platform Sutra 
contains the words seeing the nature, but that text is a fake text; it is not the writing of one 
whom the Dharma-treasury was transmitted, and it is not the words of Sokei.” 378  It is 
important to note that Dōgen does not reject the validity of the 6th patriarch, only that 
particular written record.379  Of philosophical importance is Dōgen’s utter rejection of the 
concept of ‘original nature’.  This alone should serve as a warning to anyone contemplating 
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a simple ‘holistic’, universal reading of Dōgen.  Dōgen’s dislike of the concept of ‘original 
nature’, and the Daoist philosophy which may have helped influence Buddhist thought 
towards such a reading, stems from the fundamental role of practice accorded by Dōgen.  
The problem for Dōgen is the duality inherent in the statement ‘to see one’s original 
nature’, implicating a necessary separation between the ‘seer’ and the ‘original nature’ 
which is seen.  The complication here is Dōgen’s constant reference to ‘Buddha-nature’, 
which when connected to the metaphysical idea of a ‘primordial Buddha’, that the Buddha 
lies inherent in the ‘system’ of the universe, presents us with a position resembling that 
‘original nature’.  For Dōgen though, one cannot ‘see’ this nature, instead one must come to 
realise they are that nature.  To take the panentheistic reading, it would in fact be this 
nature asking the questions, enacting everyday feats and connecting one’s existential reality 
with walking mountains.  Considered in this way, it is each unique instance of reality as well 
as their connection which must be recognised in order to see reality as it is, which is 
problematised by admitting multiple interpretations of single phenomena as interconnected 
and equally valid (or equally invalid).  In order to solve this problem and its intricacies I claim 
we must come to the realisation that there is no underlying, essential nature separate from 
the functioning of conventional reality. 
In developing a ‘naturalisation’ of Dōgen’s ‘mystical realism’, Kim emphasises the tathātā 
element of revealed reality as a means of expanding upon the non-dualistic nature of 
Dōgen’s thought.  Kim proposes Dōgen’s distinction between ‘ultimate water’ (primordial) 
and ordinary water as an example of this immanence.380  He says the mode of the ‘ultimate’ 
just is normal water in “the radicalisation of it in its total exertion”.  However, from within 
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an apparently flowing stream, the movement of water cannot be seen to flow.  Only from 
an external standpoint can water be understood to flow downwards.  The radicalisation 
reveals the removal of all standpoints to reveal undivided reality. 
As noted earlier, the term ‘non-dualism’ is often used in the literature on Zen, and Dōgen in 
particular, indicating the overturning of a dualist framework.  Considering the pedagogical 
focus in Zen exegesis, I avoid using this term for two reasons: first, the negation of dualism 
implies a dualism to be negated, which is the creation of a dualism of ‘dualism and non-
dualism’.  Often this is seen to be the case, where two apparent opposites are forced 
together, their opposing nature is recognised before it is overturned, there does exist a 
duality in the rationale that raised the issue.  As a derivative concept ‘non-dualism’ fails to 
nominate that metaphysical underpinning which constitutes reality ‘as it is’, unless ‘non-
dual’ is taken to imply monism, but I have previously dismissed this possibility.  Indeed we 
could coin a term such as ‘pre-dualistic’ in attempting to rectify this, but this again implies 
that dualism arises from something and now denies that our present argument does in fact 
stem from a dualistic position. 
The second reason for avoiding ‘non-dualism’ is due to the exclusivity of the term.  
Metaphysically there cannot be two positions, nor multiple positions, implying that there 
exists only a holistic unity.  The proposition of a unity is untenable.  To the expression ‘not 
two’ we may add ‘not one either’.  This problem highlights the intricacies of Dōgen’s 
position and the implications of interdependence understood metaphysically.  It is not 
enough to recognise the apparent separation of one phenomenon from another, one must 
also realise its connection – and it is not enough to simply reduce the myriad things into one 
universal ‘whole’, separateness must not be forgotten.  Recall the fox kōan, the learned 
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being is not ignorant of cause and effect.  The distinction between conventional and 
ultimate reality also functions in this way. 
 Nishitani picks up the intricacies of the ‘non-dual’ position, stating that,  
we do not presuppose a separation of subject and object and then work towards their 
unification.  The unity of the absolute near side is not the result of a process but rather the 
original identity of absolute openness and absolute emptiness.  Its standpoint is neither 
monism nor dualism of any sort.  It is the absolute one, the absolute self-identity of the 
absolutely two.381 
Zazen is a unique instance of the ‘not-two-ness’ of mind and world as action.  Dōgen tells us 
that it is from this position that we must realise that “the blue mountains walk”.382  
Considering this statement metaphysically, through an understanding of emptiness, “The 
whole Universe is utterly without objective molecules: here and now there is no second 
person at all.”383  Indeed from this perspective one can understand that, due to 
interdependence, there is ultimately no distinction to be made between individuals, nor 
between the anthropic particulars of sentient humans and the ‘inanimate’ environment in 
which they exist.  To experience the reality of interdependence is to experience the nature 
of every action interpenetrating with every interconnected phenomenon, including the 
walking of mountains.   
Furthermore, Dōgen states that sitting in zazen the whole world is enlightened.384  Kim 
posits that “To Dōgen zazen-only was at once metaphor and reality.”385  Given Dōgen’s 
method of intentional contradictory positions and, what Kim describes as, ‘mysticism’, the 
distinction between metaphor and reality does seem to have been blurred.  Since I maintain 
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that all systems of interpretation are necessarily limited, then any description of reality 
could easily be described as a metaphor without undermining the functional validity of the 
framework.386 
That all phenomena, even rocks, have Buddha-nature, I see to be a consequence of causal 
feedback (of mind) in total interdependence.  Here there are only ever manifest instances 
(an entity, a mind) which are impermanent; empty.  As consciousness approaches the 
absolute it ceases to function as a subjectively separated mind.  The absolute is Nothing; it is 
not other than the inversion of all worldly things.  While this inversion is identical with the 
manifest instances focused on, in this inversion the epistemic mode of realisation is 
dramatically altered.  A realisation of the emptiness of phenomenon in total 
interdependence, modifies the actions of a being towards these empty phenomenon.  
Understood as the inversion of metaphysical causation, the mind of an individual being in 
satori is actually the action of the whole universe minus that individual.  Thus, in zazen, 
‘body and mind drop away’ and the world is enlightened. 
In response to the Kōan ‘Does a dog have Buddha-nature?’,387 Dōgen tells us that this can be 
derived from the understanding of the necessary emptiness at the heart of being, and is 
consistent with the statement that ‘Buddhas are without buddhas’.  “Remember, it is a 
springing free from the whole body of self-entanglement.”388  In this manner all things 
affirm the ‘True self’.  The two truths identify the core nature of the true self conversely: 
conventionally the myriad, ultimately nothing; conventionally ignorance, ultimately 
enlightenment; conventionally saṃsāra, ultimately Nirvāṇa.  To investigate either side 
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leaves the other obscured, and yet the investigation actually takes place on the ground of its 
opposite.  The true nature of mind is always already ultimate truth.  This is Nishitani’s 
‘absolute near side’.  This is why Dōgen so strongly emphasises zazen, as it is both the 
‘closest point’ (one’s own mind) and the event in which the duality of discrimination 
dissolves. 
As we have seen, this can be intellectually explained as inverted metaphysics, however, the 
practice of zazen is essential for Dōgen.  “This Dharma is abundantly present in each human 
being, but if we do not practice it, it does not maintain itself, and if we do not experience it, 
it cannot be realised.”389  This fits with the connection of practice and attainment.  Yet, not 
to let a simple distinction go by, Dōgen also tells us “zazen is not movement or stillness, not 
practice and realisation”.390  Every statement can be reversed by emphasising either 
connection or separation.  To focus on either falls into reification and nihilism.391  The true 
nature of Zen is to ‘see reality as it is’, which can only be realised ‘where there is no place to 
stand’.  This is the complete ‘middle-way’ and is only possible through realisation of the 
interpenetration of dualistic extremes.  It is only from this groundless position whereby the 
truth of conventionally experienced suffering and the truth of the ultimate reality of non-
suffering are reconciled.   
 
Flowers in the Sky 
Finally we will turn our focus to a concept that reveals the extent of interpenetration which I 
believe has not been emphasised enough in contemporary studies of Dōgen.  For this 
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purpose we will now focus on the Kuge (‘sky flowers’) fascicle of Dōgen’s Shobogenzo.  The 
significance of this section, and the phenomena of ‘sky flowers’ as interpreted by Dōgen, is 
the dual sense of dharma as an expression of the world, or delusion, and Dharma as 
representative of the Buddha’s teaching, or reality.  Dōgen affirms both, and in so doing 
directly connects enlightened realisation to conventional ignorance and suffering. 
The term kuge “is usually used in Buddhism as an image for illusions or hallucinations, but 
Dōgen takes them as the flowering of Dharma.”392  Dōgen writes, “when stupid people hear 
the tathagata’s words that ‘what is seen by clouded eyes is flowers in space’, they imagine 
that ‘clouded eyes’ means the upset eyes of ordinary beings.”393  Thus they conclude that all 
Buddhist teachings are unreal.  And yet, Dōgen continues; this is exactly how patriarchs 
teach.  The emptiness of dharmas is necessary for Buddhism to function.  This is recognised 
as the positive expression of emptiness. 
In chapter 2 I addressed the problem of the nihilation of one level of reality through 
transcendent justification, claiming that this was the basis of the Zen moral problem.  
Dōgen’s understanding of interpenetration removes the possibility of deference to some 
transcendent level.  Specifically, one cannot nullify the experience of ignorance by the 
‘ultimate truth’ of Buddha-nature and thus ignore the conventional problem.  He writes, “Do 
not stupidly see cloudedness as delusion and learn that true reality exists elsewhere.”  
‘Cloudedness’ is a manifestation of reality and the ultimate nature of delusion is not 
separate from the presentation of that delusion.  “If both [subject and object] were 
delusion, there would be no possibility of establishing any truth.  There being no truth to 
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establish, [to assert] that cloudedness and flowers are delusion would be impossible.”394  
The interpenetrating nature of truth and delusion are co-entailing. 
Dōgen tells us that Buddhas cultivate ‘flowers in the sky’ and thus attain enlightenment.395  
A Buddha must teach and understand reality through the recognition of saṃsāra, which is to 
recognise the function of interdependence as cause and effect.  “After seeing the flowers in 
the sky, one should also see the flowers perish in the sky.  To think that once the flowers in 
the sky cease they should not exist anymore is the view of a small vehicle.”  As the 
intercausal nature of empty entities necessitates, all phenomena are impermanent, and so 
arise and perish in dependence upon causes and conditions, and they in turn become the 
causes and conditions for subsequent phenomena.  With enlightened realisation the 
foundations of empty causation is broken and, as Buddhist soteriology maintains, the 
enlightened being realises the reality of non-suffering.  Here Dōgen reminds the 
philosophers, who speculate beyond their direct insight, that this does not revoke the reality 
of conventionally realised kuge, nor does it override conventional suffering.  This relates 
both to the nature of consciousness unrestricted by duality and the origin of the compassion 
of the Bodhisattva through wisdom.  In Dōgen’s poetics, “they develop a plurality of 
cataracts.”  Rather than destroying ‘sky flowers’ through enlightenment, they are affirmed 
and realised in their total interpenetrating extension. 
 Dōgen writes, “To turn one’s back on the Truth is wrong, and to approach the Truth is also 
wrong.  The Truth is the approaching and the turning away, which, in each instance of 
approaching or turning away, are the Truth itself.  Is there anyone who knows that this 
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wrong is also the Truth?”396  The interpenetration of phenomena, subjectively realised, 
cannot in the first place sustain the essential identity of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.  Such assertions 
are only meaningful within the context of their proposition, and even then a skilful Zen 
master can reverse the duality, drawing attention to the inherent emptiness of all positions.  
The resulting groundlessness should not be taken as meaningless however, as the 
metaphysical framework of interdependence should make clear.  There are distinctions to 
be made concerning reality, and while the interpretive direction these distinctions take will 
always be conceptually limited, the application and direct realisation of reality ‘as it is’ 
entails that an utterance made from the base of Zen nothingness is reality itself. 
With direct implications for our consideration of the truths of suffering and non-suffering, 
Dōgen examines the explanation of the Sanron Sect that the two truths are ‘affirmation and 
negation’. 397  They assert that, of the four noble truths, the first two are conventional and 
the latter two are ultimate.  In other words they connect the truth of suffering with its 
cause, and the truth of the cessation of suffering with the eightfold path.  The same division 
was made in chapter 2 when setting up the problem resulting from the nihilation of 
conventional suffering.  Dōgen asserts that this division is mistaken.  For Dōgen as all four 
truths are Buddha-nature.  
The symbolic significance of the flower in Zen, from triggering Mahākāśyapa’s smile to the 
falling blossoms of Haiku, presents something of the ephemeral immediacy of reality.  
Consider Nishitani’s use of the example;  
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Take the tiny flower blooming away out in my garden.  It grew from a single seed and will 
one day return to the earth, never again to return so long as this world exists.  Yet we do not 
know where its pretty little face appeared from nor where it will disappear to.398    
We are existentially confronted with the incomprehension of how the flower, in all its 
beauty and unique tathātā, can come to exist and then cease.  The motivation behind the 
proposition of impermanence and the connection to emptiness should not be disregarded; 
it is a response to our confrontation with change in the world.  The kōan “What was your 
original face before you were born?”399 directly addresses this existential impasse.  What it 
is that comes and disappears only exists as subjectively realised.  Beyond this there is no 
problem, as there is only the flux of interdependence.  Beyond this emptiness and 
impermanence make no sense. 
Dōgen recognises the reality of Zen in the existential, emphasising causation and the 
interpenetrative nature of perspective.  The purpose of the Buddhist project, in its 
simplicity, is to unravel the conceptual dilemmas which bind us, karmically, to saṃsāra.  
Coming to realise the nature of reality, behind our conflictive conceptions, allows one to 
end the suffering associated with attachment to false views.  Dōgen sums up the entire 
understanding by returning to the root motivations of the Buddhist project.  In the end, he 
says, “it is only that flowers, while loved, fall; and weeds while hated, flourish.”400 
 
Conclusion 
Dōgen’s understanding of interpenetration modifies the metaphysics of interdependence in 
two main ways.  First, the focus of the project is necessarily shifted from an abstract 
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metaphysical enquiry and returned to the basis of the Buddhist soteriological project; which 
is to address the existential confrontation of change in the world, conventionally realised as 
suffering.  This accords with the connection of epistemology and metaphysics in the 
previous chapter, and entangles these aspects to suggest the reality of a groundless 
immanence that is beyond the scope of any systematic conception. 
The second, and related, major modification stems from Dōgen’s emphasis on practice.  The 
only way to approach reality ‘as it is’, is through a direct engagement with the reality that is 
oneself.  Dōgen recognises that this ‘true self’, free of conceptual overlays, does not exist.  
This accords with emptiness and interdependence.  The inverted metaphysics developed in 
the previous chapter serves as a limited illustration of this point.  The action of ‘no-self’ in 
the world, directly realised, is the manifestation of the reality of Zen. 
With this framework at our disposal, the next chapter will re-examine the Zen position and 
draw meta-moral principles in order to resolve the Zen moral problem. 
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Chapter 6: Moral Implications 
 
This chapter returns to the problem of nihilism as revealed in Zen philosophy.  Historical 
records of Zen present us with actions of supposedly enlightened individuals, actions which 
directly conflict with Buddhist moral precepts.  The Zen moral problem has been identified 
as a consequence of justifying conventional actions by allusion to a ‘transcendent’ amoral 
state of being.  Such transcendence has been shown to be metaphysically fallacious and 
ultimately incompatible with the Buddhist soteriological project.  In order to make sense of 
the compassion of enlightened beings metaphysically, we must understand the two truths 
concurrently.  Without recognition of conventional suffering, compassion could not arise; 
and without recognition of ultimate non-suffering, enlightenment would not arise. 
The metaphysical framework of interdependence, which has been developed in this thesis, 
will now be used to draw moral implications from the principle of interdependence.  The 
interpenetration of phenomena, examined in the previous chapter, allows us to recognise 
the uniqueness of conventionally realised positions while uniting them in a ‘groundless’ 
metaphysic.  This necessitates a reappraisal of key concepts in the philosophy of Zen, 
including ‘no-mind’ and spontaneity, recognising the full scope of enlightened realisation 
and hence revoking the possibility of a nihilistic interpretation by emphasising the 
immanent effect of moral action. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. 
The first section, Nansen’s Cat, focuses on a specific kōan which epitomises the Zen moral 
problem.  Dōgen’s response to the kōan presents us with a dramatic re-appraisal of the 
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conventional moral position of enlightened beings.  Dōgen suggests, putting aside the 
semantics of enlightened ‘transcendence’, that Nansen could have done otherwise and 
indeed it would have been better if he had. 
The second section, No-mind, reveals the misappropriation of the concept of ‘no-mind’ in 
Zen philosophy.  Huineng clearly connects ‘no-mind’ and ‘mindfulness’, presenting them 
together as a complete concept (one aspect requires the other); via a recognition of 
emptiness and the very antithesis of a mere mode of ‘not thinking’.  An individual acting 
with ‘no-mind’ does not merely react, but moves with recognition of the particularities of 
their dynamic environment.  In this manner, natural spontaneity is only a valid expression of 
the realisation of ‘reality as it is’ if it is coupled with a self-reflexive awareness which is 
empty of ‘self’.  
The third section, The Arising of compassion, directly connects wisdom and compassion to 
the realisation and embodiment of ultimate truth.  Implementing the above reading of ‘no-
mind’, the non-suffering of ‘true self’ is overlayed with the recognition of the conventional 
suffering of other beings.  Rather than a natural, purely metaphysical, basis for ethics, I 
propose that enlightened morality is radically unnatural at the conventional level, in 
accordance with Buddhist soteriology and enlightened spontaneity. 
In the fourth section, Meta-Moral Principles, I present the metaphysical principles, 
developed from interdependence, which have direct ramifications for moral considerations.  
From this basis I conclude that every action is morally relevant and every question is a moral 
question.  From the enlightened perspective, recognising the necessary limitation of 
systems of interpretation, ‘skilful means’ are necessary to select how to answer any inquiry. 
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Nansen’s Cat 
The Zen Canon is filled with tales of masters violently attacking their students; yelling, using 
verbal abuse, punching, kicking and even cutting off fingers.  It is common to hear stories of 
the stick being used as a meditation aid in contemporary Zen practice.401  The simple 
explanation usually given is that each case of violence is aimed at forcing students to bridge 
that impossible mental gap between conventional understanding and enlightenment 
through a shock or direct confrontation with impermanence and mortality.  If this 
explanation is accepted as the whole story regarding Zen teaching, then we find ourselves 
on a dangerous path.  If even the most violent methods are heuristically valid, we conclude 
that the end justifies the means.  It is difficult to argue against this point, since as we have 
seen the attainment of enlightenment is worth immeasurably more than conventional 
experience.402  However, I believe Buddhism also forces us to take the ‘means’ into account 
in a very significant way. 
Here we will consider the following well-known kōan: 
Nansen403 saw the monks of the eastern and western halls fighting over a cat. He seized the 
cat and told the monks: "If any of you say a good word, you can save the cat." 
No one answered.  So Nansen boldly cut the cat in two pieces. 
That evening Joshu404 returned and Nansen told him about this. Joshu removed his sandals 
and, placing them on his head, walked out. 
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Nansen said: "If you had been there, you could have saved the cat."405 
There has been considerable debate on the meaning of this passage.  The core of the kōan is 
the conflict between Nansen’s immoral act of killing the cat and his moral act of teaching 
the monks in the very same action.  Joshu responds to the contradiction with a 
demonstration of his own, which Nansen commends, yet deciding where to stand on the 
issue is left to the students of Zen.  Simply repeating here that ‘there is no place to stand’ 
will not resolve the moral problem.  Immediate action is required.  Whether the event ever 
really took place is irrelevant, as Nansen demands we speak the truth of Zen if the cat is to 
be saved. 
Dōgen is recorded as presenting two related insights regarding this particular kōan, 
presenting a distinct way of addressing the puzzle.406  First he reiterated the standard 
perspective, akin to transcendent amorality’; that the actions of an enlightened being 
cannot be assessed as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.  As we have seen, from the position of ultimate 
truth, such conventional discriminations are rendered invalid.  The privileged position of an 
enlightened being, beyond good and evil, is both a consequence of the epistemic position of 
ultimate truth and is maintained as an aspect of Dharma in the Buddhist sutras, and so 
remains a valid point. 
Secondly, and most significantly, Dōgen gave two replies to the kōan; one from the 
perspective of a bystander and one as an alternative to the perspective of Nansen himself.  
“If I had been there I would have said: Certainly, you know how to cut the cat in two, but 
can you cut the cat in one?”  Thus Dōgen presents his own conceptual conflict in direct reply 
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to Nansen’s ultimatum.  The immanent reality of the cat is presented as one piece originally, 
and if Nansen’s action is really to ‘cut’ the minds of the monks to see this reality directly, he 
is presented with the challenge of cutting the cat in one.  If the ultimate and conventional 
truths are considered separate, as this kōan is usually interpreted, then the ultimate truth 
towards which Nansen’s action is supposed to direct the monks, does not necessitate any 
particular immanent act.  If Nansens’ act is directed towards enlightened realisation then it 
would be possible to cut the cat in one or two and achieve the same end. 
Next, Dōgen tells us that if he had been in Nansen’s position he would have spared the cat, 
since the cat’s death was not necessary to convey the teaching.  Furthermore, in killing the 
cat Nansen still acted through a self-inflicted dichotomy and not with the complete freedom 
expected from a Zen master.  The implication of freedom to the enlightened perspective has 
significant ramifications for our discussion.  If more than one possibility is open to an 
enlightened being, surely they would select the ‘best’ outcome, taking into consideration 
their own perspective on interdependent reality and the perspectives of conventional 
beings that their actions will affect.  Yet this is complicated by the ‘transcendence’ of moral 
values from the enlightened position.  Positing the ‘best’ action is a conventional 
discriminative act and once again would remove the freedom of an enlightened being.  I will 
return to this point presently. 
First we should recall the implications of interpenetration from the last chapter.  For Dōgen 
there was not some enlightenment separate from the practice of Zen, he saw them as one 
and the same.  In this way, even though we cannot critically analyse the moral nature of 
enlightened action, we are still able to assess the consequences of such actions 
conventionally.  Dōgen tells us that there are two actions occurring in the same instant in 
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the same physical space when Nansen cuts the cat.  One is the enlightened act with no 
karmic consequences, while the other (spatio-temporally identical to it) is the immoral 
action of taking the life of a sentient being.   
Since there is no transcendent reality to be attained, the method of practice and teaching 
engaged in are, in every instance, the constituents of ultimate reality.  To ‘see reality as it is’ 
the enlightened individual must be directly aware of, and take into consideration, 
conventional experience.  In concluding chapter 2, I suggested that “salvation is not found 
beyond the means used to attain it.”  Here I will reiterate the naturalistic reading of karma 
and suggest that the necessity of following the Buddhist precepts to attain enlightenment is 
not due to the influence of some supernatural credit system but is rather derived from what 
following the precepts entails.  Dōgen connects practice and attainment because correct 
practice frees one from delusion and thus, just is seeing ‘reality as it is’.  In this manner, 
“Awakening does not free one from the world; it frees one for the world.”407 
The distinction being overturned here is the ‘difference’ between the different worlds 
stemming from one’s perspective upon the world: as enlightened or conventional modes.  
These two perspectives, which are metaphysically a multitude of individual views, co-exist.  
They are perspectives of the same space and time.  This means that to live in the 
conventional world, that is to have an every-day perspective, is to live in the enlightened 
world.  Hence to change between modes is a change of perspective.408  Thus to overcome 
suffering is to realise that ultimate actuality, that suffering does not exist.  However, in the 
same instance to live in the enlightened world is to live in the conventional world, and this, I 
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claim, is the foundation of compassion.  Even though enlightened beings themselves do not 
experience suffering, as the root of suffering is undermined through enlightened awareness, 
it is because enlightened beings are aware of the suffering experienced by non-enlightened 
beings, that enlightened individuals assist all other beings.  This, I believe, also has 
consequences concerning the evaluation of morality conventionally as applicable to 
enlightened beings – and this includes the cutting of cats. 
This entanglement of the conventional and ultimate modes necessitates a radical 
reassessment of those ‘basic’ principles of Zen which have been adopted and consequently 
connected to the Zen moral problem.  Relative ‘nothingness’ becomes nihilism in opposition 
to the conventionally real, such that when this ‘ultimate’ truth is prioritised, conventional 
truth is reduced to nothing.  Rather than being mutually exclusive, ‘absolute nothingness’ 
and immanent reality should be synonymous.  ‘Nothingness’ as ultimate truth reveals 
conventional truths in their thusness, so it should affirm and contextualise conventionality.  
As the ‘Fox Kōan’ suggests, an enlightened being should not be ‘unaware of cause and 
effect’; they cannot ignore conventional reality.  Where Zen philosophy has been adopted 
this entanglement has been ignored, and historical references to immanent everydayness 
are interpreted as mere instances of poetic licence in favour of the transcendency thesis of 
enlightenment.  I have previously shown that maintaining a position of transcendence 
cannot sustain Buddhist soteriology and is incompatible with the heart of Zen.  Nowhere is 
this problem more apparent than through the misappropriation of the concept of ‘no-mind’.  
 
224 
 
No-Mind 
In recent times the term ‘Zen’ has become popularly associated with decontextualised 
aspects of Zen thought and applied to every field imaginable.409  Specifically, what is 
abstracted from Zen is the pragmatic application of the concept ‘no-mind’ ( Jp. mushin, Ch. 
wu hsin), taken as a psychological tool of approaching any task and completing it ‘without 
thinking’.410  Most scholars pay little regard to such misappropriations in popular culture, 
other than stating that the concept has been taken out of its original context.  When that 
same misappropriation is recognised at the level of the Japanese military, as noted in 
chapter 2, the Zen moral problem is taken more seriously.  In order to solve the moral 
problem of the ‘mindless’ samurai warrior, or the self-interested business-type, the concept 
of ‘no-mind’ must be thoroughly elaborated from its original context.    
‘No-mind’ can be recognised as a Chinese philosophical derivative of the Indian Buddhist 
‘no-self’ (Anātman) doctrine, developed with the Daoist concept of wu wei.  As discussed in 
chapter 2, the Dao as an essentialised and transcendent entity, which is also the origin and 
explanation of action as wu wei, is incompatible with interdependence.  This is the reading 
Dōgen also rejects in the form of ‘original nature’, seen as implying a false dualism and 
problematically reifying Buddha-nature.  Indeed, the very idea of wu wei appears counter to 
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Dōgen’s emphasis on the necessity of practice.  As he stated quite plainly; “If we do not 
practice it does not maintain itself”.411 
As an experience, no-mind is valid, which has led to its wide-ranging adoption.  The 
pragmatic and psychological effects of the ‘dropping off of mind’ are well documented.  To 
quote D.T. Suzuki, “The aim of all the artistic discipline in Japan gathers around self-
appreciation of it, which is at once its own realisation.  ‘Muga’ or ‘Mushin’ or effortlessness 
is thus the consummation of art.”412  Philosophically, the investigation of this phenomenon 
has been generally limited to an understanding of no-mind as non-discrimination.  The 
application of no-mind, both in Zen and the various fields into which the concept has been 
appropriated, does not end with the cessation of discrimination.  Experientially, the 
‘perfection’ of no-mind is attributed to the possibility of wu wei, entailing effortless action, 
or action without thinking. 
For Huineng there is a big difference between ‘acting and not thinking’ and ‘acting with no-
mind’.  In the first the mind aspect is nullified, in the second the distinction between mind 
and action is overcome.  Thus, in the latter sense, every action is mindful, which is in effect 
the opposite position to not thinking.  However, to complicate matters Dōgen reminds us 
that, “The ‘mindfulness’ of the common man and the mindfulness of the buddhas are far 
apart: never liken them.”413  So let us return to examine a philosophical explanation of the 
characteristics of the experience of no-mind.  
There is a further characteristic related to the experience of no-mind, which is being 
completely ‘in the moment’, leading to an emphasis on everday activities; “eat when 
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hungry, rest when tired.”414  The significance of such statements is summarised by Abe; “In 
this realisation you are no longer separated from yourself, but are just yourself, no more, no 
less.” ... “When you realise your own suchness you realise the suchness of everything at 
once.”415  This is the sense of no-mind emphasised by Dōgen, and others,416 directly guiding 
the overcoming of ‘self’ to become identical with the action being carried out.  The ‘not-
two-ness’ of no-mind denies the inherent separation attributed to individual ‘minds’ from 
the subjective standpoint, and thus mind approaches the metaphysical reality of the 
inherent non-existence of mind.  This is what Dōgen called ‘the dropping off of body and 
mind’; Bankei adopted the phrase ‘the unborn’,417 emphasising the ultimate non-arising of 
mind; Nishitani called it ‘the true self’418; and Hisamatsu ‘the formless self’419, drawing 
attention to the existential relation to reality as such which is groundless, utterly devoid of 
self-nature.  In every description, the mode of attaining such insight is attributed to no-
mind. 
The misappropriation of no-mind can be seen to stem from a misunderstanding of the 
distinction between two closely related metaphysical possibilities.  The predominant view 
can be associated with the attribution of ‘other-power’.  The distinction I am about to draw 
is distinctly problematic, as many of those thinkers I have referred to from the Kyōto school 
do adhere to the principles of ‘other power’ as espoused by Hōnen and Shinran and 
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developed as Shin Buddhism.420  According to this view, the self is disintegrated, allowing 
the universe to act through that agent (ala Dao).  This is an attractive position as the 
metaphysical complexities and problems such as morality from the enlightened perspective 
dissolve into the usual mystic ineffability found in theistic traditions.  The second possibility 
is that the individual overcomes the self (habits) and becomes an agent able to act 
universally. 
As I noted, the distinction between these two positions is very fine and, if carefully 
examined, one should find that they need not conflict.421  Considered from interpenetration 
and a perspective shift as inverted metaphysics, the universe acting through an empty agent 
is identical to the universal freedom of the actions of an empty agent.  The positions only 
conflict when elaborations are made, whereby either the self or the universe (as ‘original 
nature’) become reified as essentially existent.  This then entails a separation between the 
two modes of interpretation, each seen as incompatible from the perspective of the other, 
which also forces a distinction between action derived ‘ultimately’ and that derived merely 
‘conventionally’.  One level is attributed priority, and the other is nihilated against it through 
a transcendent justification.  The Zen moral problem is thus created. 
To prevent the creation of the Zen moral problem, and the wider philosophical implications 
associated with it, the position of the ‘self’ must not stray from Nāgārjuna’s ‘middle way’, 
avoiding reification and nihilism.  For Huineng, no-mind cannot have an essential base, since 
the concept is precisely the negation of such essentiality of mind, and which, in its true 
                                                      
420
 Shinran Shonin – Adherents include D.T. Suzuki, Abe Masao and Tanabe Hajime of the Kyoto School. 
421
 “This distinction is, of course, merely for heuristic purposes, as the Truth is, ultimately, one and indivisible: 
Self-power is other-power, other-power is self-power.”  (Han-Shan T., Pure Land of the Patriarchs, Trans. Lok 
T., p.34.)  See also Suzuki, D.T., ‘The Development of the Pure Land Doctrine in Buddhism’, The Eastern 
Buddhist, Vol.3 No.4 (1925), pp. 285-326.  For an examination of traditional Zen accounts of the inferiority of 
the Pure Land school, see Ingram, P., ‘The Zen Critique of Pure Land Buddhism’, Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion, Vol.41, No.2 (Jun. 1973), pp.184-200. 
228 
 
nature, cannot be limited.  Mind is inherently empty, utterly contingent on the content and 
environmental context of thought.  To realise no-mind is to remove the false overlay of 
inherent existence and thus, one of no-mind is able to harmonise with the great variation 
and impermanence of phenomena in the world.  This is the manner in which Hisamatsu calls 
the nature of self ‘formless’.   
This presents an interesting issue, which again proves controversial.  Any artificial limitation 
ultimately prevents the formless expression of no-self, which includes attributing and 
complying with a vow.422  The vow of the Bodhisattva, to put off personal salvation until all 
sentient beings are released from suffering, is recognised as the supreme expression of 
compassion in Mahāyāna Buddhism.  With any focus there is an isolating bias that separates 
us from the world.  This is like the other side of Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’, that we must 
actively choose something, and there are no limits on this other than the limits of the will.  
Rather than being completely unthinking, which would be to consciously annihilate oneself, 
the end seems to be an increase to a super-conscious mode of being.  But every will, being 
necessarily limited, inevitably comes into conflict with the world.  Instead, defying 
Nietzsche, the will must come to affirm its own emptiness, thus freeing ‘will’ from itself.  
The natural explanation of the Bodhisattva’s compassion is not to be found in the 
expression of a vow, but in the character of the ‘mind’ this vow cultivates. 
In Daoist arts the beginners mind is praised for its flexibility, spontaneity and lack of 
inhibitions, contrasted with a more ‘developed’ deliberating mind.  These qualities are 
manifest too in the mind of an enlightened being.  In this way the ‘original nature’ of the 
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 Note that I am deviating from the traditionally accepted view, that the Bodhisattva vow is compatible with 
Zen, indeed it is a necessary component of the Mahāyāna project, in order to draw the philosophical 
implications of ‘formlessness’ through to their ultimate metaphysical conclusions.  Whitehill examines this 
conflict in ‘Is There a Zen Ethic?’, The Eastern Buddhist, v.20/1 (1987), p.25. 
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mind is praised while deliberation is derided.  The problem with this simple dichotomy is 
that deliberation is equally a part of ‘original nature’.  The artificiality which constricts 
freedom and efficiency in the Daoist sense and is the root of suffering for the Buddhists is as 
much ‘Buddha-nature’ as the expression of no-mind is.  However, there is a further 
distinction between the beginners mind and the mind of the enlightened master.  This can 
be interpreted as their respective freedom or conditionality regarding their emergent 
position in the world.  As we have seen in the preceding chapters, although there is an 
epistemological distinction, both states are rooted in the same metaphysical continuity.  The 
difference is one of response, of relation to the world, which is intersubjectively distinct.   
Recall that in Daoism the emphasis is on the synonymous nature of the original and 
enlightened modes of being.  This correlates with the Daoist political stance, which is 
‘anarchistic’ in a very general sense, whereby individuals are free to follow the natural Way 
of the universe which governs all harmoniously, provided individuals are not caught up in 
the adherence to artificially imposed rules and regulations.  The sage is one who ‘unlearns’ 
in order to reach their natural state of accord with Dao.  From this Daoist position, the ‘no-
mindedness’ of a master craftsman is completely in accord with the sage’s awareness of Dao 
– they both work in accordance with Dao which naturally runs through all existence.  The 
only beings who struggle against Dao, and are thus ultimately unsuccessful, stressed and 
antagonistic, are the intellectual human beings; specifically the Confucian scholars whom 
Daoism reacted against. 
From the Zen position, the problem of transcendence arises when we ask after what allows 
no-mind to take place.  The Daoist examples of master craftsmen and virtuoso artists who 
express this state, the same types of examples cited by popular Zen literature, reach the 
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heights of their abilities by practicing and refining their actions.  That individuals must 
develop their skills is not opposed by Zennists, after all Dōgen continually stressed the need 
for practice.  What is problematic is that the ideal portrayed in these examples is an 
expression of habitual embodiment of the techniques restricted to a particular system.  
Even though, as we have seen, the key principle in Daoism that makes these instances 
remarkable is the claim that in mastering one system, all systems are mastered, every 
example is always within a single system, always dependent upon the development of 
technique.  Characterised this way, creativity is muted; movement is reaction, conditioned 
from without.  This makes a practitioner predictable, limited, and prone to conflict with the 
world extended beyond their limited mastery.  The sage’s universalisation of Dao is not 
identical to the limited mastery of individual modes.  An additional step is required to 
transcend the limitations of habitual enterprise.  A master must be spontaneously 
creative.423 
If spontaneity is possible then what does this say about the individual and their position 
within the universe?  Firstly we must address what spontaneity actually refers to.  To be 
spontaneous one must act, and not merely think (this is important), without pre-
consideration, that is to bypass deliberative consciousness.  Only when conscious 
consideration is taken away from the act is it paradoxically possible to be entirely conscious 
in the moment of action. 
If we explain this idea psychologically, and we would be tempted reductively to assume 
that, a spontaneous action is one removed from the thinking mind and thus based purely on 
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 “The hands may move according to the technique given out to every student, but there is a certain 
spontaneity and personal creativity when the technique, conceptualised and universalised is handled by the 
master hand.” - Suzuki, D.T., Zen and Japanese Culture, p.142, Fn.3 on ‘Myōyū’. 
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reflexive responses.  A reflexive action would apparently reduce us to nothing more than a 
physical automaton, hardly the epitome of human potentiality.  But it is the freeing up of 
the mind which is primarily most important.  Perhaps our physical self is reduced to nothing 
more than another natural mechanism, but how much of our existence is currently 
mechanised without our knowing it?  Emotions, social interactions and pleasure/pain 
preferences often seem spontaneous to us along with physical reactions (such as a sneeze 
or a pain stimulated reflex action) and beyond our consideration of them we seem to have 
little or no control over them.  Perhaps the first step is to remove our own illusion of control 
so that our considerations become disjointed and we find our physical selves in an 
environment which does not radically differ from these selves. 
Spontaneous responses are sought after in Zen, in response to puzzles or practical exams.  
These answers reflect more than the ineffability of the puzzles - often dual, incompatible, 
necessarily intertwined positions.  There is also an immediacy of reaction that is supposed 
to reflect a presence of dynamic mental awareness in this very moment.  The ‘reaction’ here 
is not purely conditional on the environment, though this is a major part of it, instead it is a 
cry from the very heart of our conscious being, or non-being, and is that which differentiates 
us from pure automaton.  It is easy to get lost just on the surface of this practical realisation; 
wherein ‘no-mind’ is left as an unthinking, emotionally devoid, automatic and dynamic 
response.  Compassion will not arise here.  Such a state is ideal for combat, as we will 
examine in the next chapter; unthinking, unfeeling, yet fast and completely situationally 
responsive.  However an individual reacting on this level will advance no further, and upon 
reflection may even descend into nihilism.   
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One advantage of such an automatic state of being is that it is only sustained as long as the 
mind does not enter the act.424  As a result there can be no artificial separation of the 
conception of ‘self’ and the ‘true self’.425  If the mind is freed up, unrestrained by emotions 
or egoistic calculations it may well come to a realisation of itself in the world.  If one is not 
completely psychologically separated from their physical existence by this stage, one’s 
physical actions may shift towards altruism.  The existential problem is the same for a 
soldier as for a lounge-chair political philosopher; we separate our thoughts from our 
actions.  One part of spontaneity is bringing these into one instance, which requires, after 
the simpler step of actions becoming ‘unthinking’, that one must become fully aware.  The 
other aspect of being spontaneous, an extension of the first, is to act not upon our common 
physical/ emotional influences but to somehow transcend them.  If, as I have suggested, 
becoming self-aware through no-mind is a key to enlightenment, then enlightenment can be 
considered an increase in awareness.  It is certainly not mindlessness.  No-mind is the 
perfection of ‘mind’;426 an increase, not decrease, achieved via simplicity. 
If a Buddha or Bodhisattva is spontaneously compassionate, then these spontaneous 
responses must arise from something beyond simple conditioning, since compassion is 
necessarily a dynamic response.  This creative force is not within the normal realm of 
determination.  Indeed, for something to be truly creative it could not merely be a direct 
result of common influences.  If one is to be creative, or spontaneous, or simply have the 
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 Consider, for example, what happens when one is forced to think through something normally undertaken 
automatically – for example: explaining the steps in a dance, recalling the lyrics to a song, or teaching a learner 
to drive; in each case the ‘expert’ may momentarily stumble, be forced to systematically think through an 
internalised sequence, or possibly even crash. 
425
 See Nishitani, K., Religion and Nothingness, p.107 – “...we do not presuppose a separation of subject and 
object and then work towards their unification.  The unity of the absolute near side is not the result of a 
process but rather the original identity of absolute openness and absolute emptiness.  Its standpoint is neither 
monism nor dualism of any sort.” 
426
 That is, to realise the true nature of ‘mind’ as empty; as expressed in the Prajñāpāramitā - ‘the perfection of 
wisdom’. 
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potential to be disharmonious then there must be something about human consciousness 
that allows this disjunction. 
There is a distinction between being in a state of ‘no-mind’ and being ‘mindful’, yet these 
two ‘extremes’ are not opposites.  To be completely mindful without no-mind is to be 
fixated, and to hold false views.  To have no-mind without being mindful is to be 
conditioned, and thus ignorant.  So how could we possibly make sense of having no-mind 
while being mindful?  It is possible to be focussed and open at the same time; one can be 
clever and creative, wise and free simultaneously.  More than this, one does not ‘wake up’ 
from a state of no-mind (after the event), the state necessitates that one is absolutely 
aware.  Only then is ‘being in the moment’ possible.  More than being conscious, this is ‘true 
self’-consciousness.  Being removed from deliberation of the act, one is actually able to 
realise where in what position one is.  Realised interdependently this entails what one is.  
This position frees up the mind which deliberates,427 destroys the illusory dichotomy of 
thought versus action and allows spontaneity without mere reaction.  In this manner 
‘mindless’ practice gives rise to mindful no-mindedness.  Thoughtless action, through 
systematised repetition, promotes mind to ‘true self’-awareness and allows systematised 
reaction to be dynamically transcended.  This is not some radical transcendent state, it is 
coming to realise a characteristic of the human condition.  No-mind is simply the silencing of 
deliberation so that focus is moved from past and future oriented thought428 to the 
immediate present. 
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 Thus, an enlightened being is still able to make use of conceptualisation and language without succumbing 
to essentialisation of the objects of language.  (See D’Amato, M., ‘Why The Buddha Never Uttered A Word’ in 
D’Amato et al (eds.), Pointing at the Moon; particularly pp.49-50.) 
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 Such as: fears, desires, plans, regrets, etc. 
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The Arising of Compassion 
So our main problem, concerning the human condition, is the discord between the world we 
experience and the world as it ‘really’ is.  Morality is a form of discrimination, and as such is 
an aspect of the former and, moreover, is to be overcome if one’s perception is to 
harmonise with and thus experience reality directly.429  This position can easily be 
misinterpreted to mean that, free from morality, we can act immorally.  This is the nihilistic 
reading.  Two points must be made here.  Firstly, this misunderstanding is due to re-
attribution of a discriminative stance to a non-discriminative individual, that is to say that 
the interpretation of moral or immoral must be attributed from outside an enlightened 
individual.  The second and related point is that the historical Buddha and Bodhisattvas are 
always, externally, characterised as benevolent beings.  They themselves are not 
deliberatively acting morally; they are simply acting in accord with reality.  So there is 
something about an existent enlightened being and the nature of their world that, at least 
partially, corresponds to our idea of what it is to be morality ‘good’. 
It is important to recognise that reality in itself cannot be considered ‘either’ good or ‘evil’, 
reality simply is.  Good and evil remain in the domain of epistemology; specifically our 
interpretation of reality.  In this sense ‘morality’ is relative both to the situation and to the 
observer.  However it would be a mistake to assume that such discriminating morality is a 
necessary feature of any perspective.  As I have just noted, it is such discrimination that 
isolates an individual from the world and prevents them from perceiving reality as it is.  The 
problem, simply, is that to overlay values on a valueless world is to misread reality. 
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 Though it is important to note that there is a difference between enlightenment and mere non-
discrimination.   
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To begin our examination of the moral implications of interdependence, we must raise a 
further complication: morality cannot be examined through conventional metaphysics.  At 
the metaphysical level there is no morality, there is only bare cause and effect.  Morality 
requires a higher-level integration with some value system.  For example, that this object is 
crushed is only a bad or good thing if this object is related by us into some wider context in 
which it plays a part.   
According to the metaphysics of interdependence developed in this thesis, it is possible to 
make sense of a non-reductive conception of causation, specifically a ‘top-down’ effect in 
addition and interconnected with the commonly accepted ‘bottom-up’ effect.  This presents 
an interesting metaphysical effect regarding morality.  If it is ‘bad’ that this object may be 
crushed, and there is a moral agent, holding this value, who is capable and aware, then the 
object will not be crushed.  Thus a conventional moral has a metaphysically identifiable 
causal effect.  If the example seems crude then consider a wider example such as pollution 
through consumerism.  It may be true that a large majority of people will compete with one 
another for some commodity despite its environmental consequences, and so we would 
expect pollution to increase.  However if group consensus develops, whereby the 
undesirable end of these actions becomes prominent in the minds of those agents, then the 
motivation to prevent the trend proceeding is actively carried out.  We could attribute this 
change to something occurring outside the system, which cannot be dismissed, but it is also 
important to recognise that this change has its origins within this very system. 
Morality cannot be examined purely through metaphysics, but it does have a metaphysical 
basis.  To summarise the core of the metaphysics of interdependence: Everything is 
connected, though separated, and it is through this separation that existence occurs by 
236 
 
means of the nature of its interconnectedness.  ‘Good’ and ‘bad’, creation and destruction, 
self and other, are mutually interpenetrating occurrences.  There is nothing ‘beyond’; the 
universe exists through the relation of various modes (levels) of itself.  The ‘groundless’, 
self-contingent basis of this is the same as the basis of ‘pure mind’, which is the same as the 
basis of ‘pure matter’.  From this understanding we may examine the metaphysical basis of 
our interaction with the world, the proper mode of which I am calling ‘morality’. 
Immediately we should like to distinguish between two ‘moralities’ here.  The first being 
conventional morality which is derived through consensus between individuals in a society 
or system of interpretation.  The second being ‘ultimate’ morality or that which is held to be 
universally correct, irrespective of the particularities of any particular system.  Despite the 
apparent simplicity of this distinction, following the Zen thinkers previously examined, I 
maintain that morality does not exist beyond its conventional underpinnings.  In saying this I 
am not, however, dismissing the idea of some ‘ultimate’ morality in the sense of being 
universally applicable, though I am necessarily limiting it, for this ultimate form is only 
possible through conventional morality.  In other words, a universally valid morality is just a 
form of conventional morality.  So the problem now is how does this ‘ultimate’ mode relate 
to conventional, and necessarily limited, morality?  The answer lies in that re-examination of 
philosophical ideas: morality is not a philosophy of theory; it is a philosophy of action and 
our relation to action. 
Recalling the examination of no-mind in the previous section, we now turn to a more 
detailed examination of ‘skilful means’.   For Dōgen, “all doctrines the Buddha gave are 
nothing but skilful means (upāya) used to achieve the goal of non-attachment.”430  
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 Cheng, H., Empty Logic, p.49. 
237 
 
Literature discussing the Buddhist concept of ‘skilful means’ focuses almost exclusively on 
the praxis of the Dharma.431  The interpretation from praxis argues that these teachings are 
useful only for a specific individual (at a particular time, etc) and are not ‘true’ in any 
universal sense.  This reading follows the consequences of emptiness. 
As I have said elsewhere the most remarkable feature of this realisation is that while it is 
dependent upon the context (of the individual) for the realisation to be reached, the 
realisation itself is completely transcendent of the unenlightened perspective, whatever that 
individual’s particular instance of reality may be.  Enlightenment applies equally to a god-
being as it does to a human or a hungry-ghost.  The ultimate reality is identically valid in 
each case.   
There cannot be any categorical determination of what is right or wrong, since every 
situation will be different and hence the moral emphasis, being a situated reality (not a 
transcendent one), will likewise change in each case.  There is no morality from the 
enlightened state in and of itself.  Asking questions about the ultimate understanding will 
only result in nonsense at the conventional level.  However once this perspective is brought 
to bear on worldly situations the moral emphasis is immediately brought into view, at least 
for enlightened beings.  For everyone else, particularly those who touch upon this ultimate 
reality (satori), they are still in and of the world, and so calculation is required before 
morality can be understood.  The closer one comes to complete realisation the more their 
actions will immediately fall into ‘harmony’ with the universe,432 however, this is where 
complete disruption may occur.  Ordinarily, entering a state of not-thinking is possible due 
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 I see this as the next step after the development of the metaphysical framework from interdependence.  
Indeed, John Schroeder attributes praxis as more significant to reading Nāgārjuna than the common (purely) 
metaphysical interpretation.  (See Schroeder, J., ‘Nāgārjuna and the Doctrine of “Skillful Means”’, Philosophy 
East and West, Vol.50, No.4 (Oct. 2000), pp.559-583.) 
432
 This can be understood as finding Dao but only in a completely conditioned sense. 
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to habitual memory, to conditioning which is in effect simply ‘going with the flow’.  This 
notion goes against Buddhism.  The entire Buddhist project is to escape the wheel of 
causation, the conditioning of the individual due to karma.  If one were to just go along with 
karma they could never escape.  Of course there is a certain value to quietism in Buddhism, 
since it is due to our striving against nature that we develop negative karma.  Though this is 
not enough to make the jump to enlightenment.  This jump requires the very thing which 
quietism impedes.  Let’s call it ‘creativity’; the ability to skilfully modify one’s actions in 
radical ways.  
So what are the metaphysical implications of upāya?  An enlightened being can see a 
destination for sentient beings, by virtue of having attained this position for themselves, and 
can see at least some of the possible means of benefiting said beings.  They also possess the 
ability to select these means skilfully, as best fits the particular situation.  This skill is not 
context specific (unlike the skill of a virtuoso pianist for example) though, since it leads 
towards enlightenment (seeing the world free from delusion) it is said to aid every 
undertaking.  In this manner I maintain that an enlightened being may not necessarily be the 
most learned in any one field, but they are certainly the best learner.433   
This idea returns to considerations of the conflict between ‘self power’ and ‘other power’ 
prominent in various Buddhist schools and in the debate between Buddhism and Daoism.  
When someone is forced to rely solely on themselves the result can be a difficult struggle434 
and yet, through ‘faith’, an individual may find solace and security in the belief of some 
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 This could be seen to be the merit of philosophy.  While philosophical enterprises may lack the 
soteriological drive expected of dharma (and a philosopher can get caught up in the construction of reified 
systems which lack practical means of testing or expression) philosophy can ideally lead to the open 
questioning of all things including, ultimately, philosophy itself.  This is as opposed to a discipline that requires 
the memorisation of a system and rule-set, bereft of critical analysis. 
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 This is often characterised as a struggle with Mara or ‘the devil’ – an expression taken up in the next 
chapter. 
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omnipotent being or force guiding their actions.  It does not matter whether this greater 
force is understood to be ultimately ‘good’ or ‘evil’ as the affect is the same.  The individual 
becomes confident in as far as their ‘faith’ allows, they feel directed and moreover; 
blameless.  But there is no reason why such faith must be externalised.  We seem 
predisposed to seek meaning in the world outside of ourselves and happily grasp onto 
‘meaning’ even if it is not in coherence with our better judgement.  It would seem that the 
difference between ‘faith’ in ourselves and ‘faith’ in others is no simple metaphysical 
predisposition, say as a result of our social evolution, but is strongly based on the 
experiential difference between these two modes.  Our ‘selves’ are characterised most 
strongly by our dynamic and often wilful reactions to the world whereas the ‘other’ is 
objectified and made static.  Given our desire for meaning we would much rather base it in 
the latter, static, realm rather than our fluctuating selves which gave rise to uncertainty in 
the first place.  I propose that those individuals who claim to practice ‘self power’, more 
often than not, would be seen to objectify themselves in order to do so, thus making no 
difference between the two modes.  However, the groundless metaphysical framework of 
interdependence provides an alternative possibility.  
If we follow the concept of ‘emptiness’ accurately then we can find no place for 
objectification, neither in the ‘other’ nor of the ‘self’.  All that remains is this dynamic 
uncertainty.  There is no actual difference, practical or otherwise, between interacting with 
ourselves or others.  Both can be objectified, both are dynamic and baseless.  If we wish to 
have a base for ‘faith’ it is pointless to find it outside ourselves for, given the metaphysics of 
interdependence, the same basis will exist in us.  The opposite is also true.   
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From the Buddhist perspective morality is understood as moral perfection and is directly 
linked to perception of the world.  One who is deluded cannot be a moral being.435  In this 
way to be ‘moral’ is to see the world as it really is and to be actively engaged in it.  This 
active engagement is the important part and possibly the hardest to analyse philosophically.  
For this to work the dichotomy of thought and action, of mind and body, must be overcome.  
Even the tendency to avoid vices and abhor bad habits must be transcended.  In this sense 
anger, for example, is not something you should aim to rid yourself of – you must first 
realise that anger is you.436 
The solution to the Zen problem of transcendence is this:  from the ground of ‘nothingness’ 
Zen has nothing to say about right and wrong, but this is misleading if it is taken to mean 
that Zen has nothing to do with reality.  Zen is reality and every pursuit within it, and hence 
it is about right and wrong.  However, Zen cannot act as a transcendent justification, a 
normative standpoint, because in itself it is nothing.  It is exactly the means through which 
one engages with the world that can be considered right or wrong.  Japanese militarism in 
the early 20th century is not because of Zen, success or failure in the business world is not 
because of Zen, the actions of a monk or samurai in ‘no-mind’ is not because of Zen.437  It is 
this point, the impossible openness of Zen that led scholars like Christopher Ives to bring to 
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 Though we can certainly assess their actions conventionally – for example someone who strictly follows 
some code of virtue may be conventionally ‘better’ than someone who is simply sadistic.   
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 This affirmative move is made by Jiddu Krishnamurti in The First and Last Freedom, p.134 - See discussion in 
the next chapter. 
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 Of course Zen is at fault if ‘Zen’ is understood as ‘the historical practice of Zen’ - following Robert Sharf, who 
maintains that “the most compelling arguments are not theoretical, but rather ethnographic.” (Sharf, R., 
‘Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience’, Numen, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Oct., 1995), p.260.)  
This is in contrast with the alternate position, following D.T. Suzuki, that ‘Zen’ refers to the underlying religion/ 
philosophy that the historical practices ‘point towards’.  (See Suzuki, D.T., ‘Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih’, Philosophy 
East and West, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Apr., 1953), p.25 - “he may know a great deal about history but nothing about the 
actor behind it.”)  Similarly, the principles developed here indicate towards the latter interpretation. 
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light the conflict, that “Zen has generally failed to criticize ideologies—and specific social 
and political conditions—that stand in tension with core Buddhist values.”438 
Let me elaborate on that last point.  The problem of morality attributed to Zen is not such 
an apparent issue for other Buddhist schools because they are steeped in doctrine which 
categorises right and wrong.439  It is simple enough to identify which actions violate 
Buddhist precepts.  Zen, however, famously ‘burns the scriptures’ (Huineng) in order to 
return focus to the root of Buddhism.  From this standpoint there is ultimately, 
philosophically, no doctrine to fall back on.  However the religious practice of Zen is not 
presented as utterly groundless, since it is itself focussed on maintaining rituals and 
traditions.440  Pragmatically, some structure must be maintained in order to prevent 
students simply getting lost in emptiness.  The enlightened mode of Zen cannot be isolated 
from conventional reality.  One can’t talk about Zen as a moral thing, but one can talk about 
individual’s actions as moral.  The basis for this discrimination is the teachings of the 
Buddha, serving as a template, as they do with all Buddhist schools.  The problems enter the 
picture when one makes judgements based on some ‘higher’ value.441 
So what is the impetus for compassion?  A simple answer can be derived from the 
metaphysics of interdependence.  If there is no self identifiable from everything else in 
existence then the enlightened individual simply identifies themselves with all other beings 
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 Ives, C., ‘Not buying into Words and Letters’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, V.13, 2006, p.1.  In defence of Zen, 
Ives goes on to say “Recognizing that no critiques are free of ideologies of their own, Zen critics must 
acknowledge their own political and economic positioning.” – Ibid. P.8. 
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 Though ultimately the issue of transcendence will remain a philosophical problem, Ives stresses that “the 
tradition fosters dynamic action” – Ives, C., Zen Awakening and Society, p.106. 
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 Sharf states that “Classical Zen ranks among the most ritualistic forms of Buddhist monasticism.”  (Sharf, R., 
‘The Zen of Japanese Nationalism’, History of Religions, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Aug., 1993), p.2.)  For the discussion at 
hand one should consider the development from the ‘unity of Zen and the precepts’ in Dōgen, to the 
development of ‘imperial way Zen’ at the close of the 19
th
 Century.  (In Ives, C., Imperial Way Zen, p.168.) 
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 For example, Nansen killing the cat.   
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and acts accordingly.  The problem with this seemingly elegant solution is that emptiness 
undermines the ego, even a universally extended one.  A universal extension of 
conventional subjectivity is simply impossible.  An enlightened mind is unattached.  Rather, 
instead of identifying with all individuals, I propose the enlightened perspective is 
recognition of the many modes of being and thinking just as they are.  Tagore muses, “The 
true goodness is not the negation of badness, it is the mastery of it.”442 
Philosophically speaking, there is no morality ultimately, as we earlier established, yet 
conventionally there is morality.  Ultimately there is reality but all of the designations have 
fallen away.  Interestingly, from within this mode the enlightened being is compassionate, 
not nihilistic.  They aim to help sentient beings, rather than ‘smash left and right’.443  We 
have seen that an enlightened being is compassionate because, conventionally, suffering 
exists.  If there were no conventional suffering there would be no Buddhist path, no 
philosophies, no religion.  To simply say “everything is one”, nihilating the conventional by 
deference to the ultimate, is to deny our very existence and in the same blow to destroy the 
possibility of compassion. 
No-mind is the annihilation of the subject as distinct from the situation of which it is a part.  
In this state there is no such thing as a mere ‘observer’.  This is more significant than simply 
thinking without deliberation or calculation – the subject/object and mind/body distinctions 
are completely overcome.  Calculation works by abstracting reality, creating an imaginary 
projection and then overlaying the results of this back onto perception of the world.  While 
clever and useful this is fundamentally a delusive mode of being.  No-mind does not 
necessarily deny calculation – to understand this is crucial to see the problem with the 
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 From Pisarev, D., quoted in Clarkson, J., A History of Russia, p.323. 
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misappropriation of Zen: ‘no-mind’ is not ‘not-thinking’.  Calculation simply should not be 
mistaken for the world itself, moreover there can be no delay between thought and action.  
Critical thought can occur simultaneously but it can never deny the reality of the present 
moment.  One cannot say, for example, that “this situation is wrong it should in fact be like 
this....”  Action is spontaneous, allowing for actual creativity, but still deliberate. 
Obviously the mode just described has no place for moral rule-like values.  For morality to 
function at this level it must already be internalised.  Compassion does not entail 
deliberation, instead one must already be able to see and react to the subjective reality of 
‘other’ individuals in their immediate tathātā. 
 
Meta-Moral Principles 
Given the position of subjective activity within the metaphysics of interdependence, it 
should be possible to draw principles based on this framework by which to evaluate the 
assessment and limits of morality.  The ‘true self’ is bereft of intrinsic existence, as a 
contingent aspect of interdependence, and as such is subject to the metaphysical effects of 
the conventional reality of suffering.  Only when the conventional and ultimate modes are 
realised simultaneously and acted upon, through the state of ‘no-mind’, is the possibility of 
‘enlightened morality’ opened up.  While this antifoundationalist metaphysical framework 
cannot provide a concrete basis to establish a conventional system of morality, 
interdependence requires that certain limits be adhered to when interpreting the 
conventional if any such system is to avoid conflict and find fruitful application in the world. 
The possibility of a universalisable conventional morality is certainly a problematic assertion 
when faced with the proposition that every system is limited and every phenomenon is 
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impermanent.  If the world is impermanent, and it does appear to be so, then morality is 
impossible since no morality can be permanently established.  Even if moral values could be 
carved in ‘metaphysical concrete’, a permanent moral code could not possibly account for 
the dynamic nature of the world it aims to categorise.  But morality indicates more than the 
conceptual categorisation of ‘values’ derived from generalised events.  A system of morality 
aims to describe the implications of actions, morally assessed, as meta-principles relating to 
one’s interaction with the world.  Something is right or wrong because it has positive or 
negative implications at some level.  Here we must be careful not to mistake the principles, 
which are required to be conceptually stable, with stability in reality beyond the 
systematisation of these principles. 
So-called ‘classical’ morality is incompatible with Buddhist, Daoist, and particularly Zen 
philosophy, however this has not stopped interpretations and practices being structured 
along, what we could conceivably identify as, ‘classical’ lines.  In these traditions there are 
strongly established characterisations of what is ‘right action’ and ‘wrong action’ and this is 
no mere arbitrary categorisation for the explanations are embedded in their philosophy.  
Most basically, philosophically, what is ‘wrong’ is anything that separates you from the 
truth, from enlightenment.  And the most basic principle, practically, is to prevent suffering, 
not only for oneself but for others also such that one’s mind, body and environment 
become free of distractions and ripe for realisation. 
Although it is impossible to categorically establish what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ generally, so 
that it applies to every situation, since the world is dynamic and constantly changing, there 
are certain actions that can be undertaken that would prevent suffering and aid enlightened 
understanding and there are those which would have the opposite effect.  Metaphysically 
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we can identify two aspects of the same conventional morality; ‘morality’ is spoken in 
words, but is found in the world. 
To answer the Zen moral problem we must return to consider the dilemma of the four noble 
truths posed at the end of chapter 2.  That there is an end to suffering is enlightenment.  
That suffering exists conventionally, is intersubjective reality.  The metaphysics of 
interdependence with interpenetration necessitates that we make sense of these “two 
truths” together.  This is the only way to make sense of enlightened compassion.  An 
enlightened being cannot look at the world without seeing the suffering of other beings.  
From this position they know they cannot separate themselves (their no-self) from this 
suffering and to serve those beings’ impermanent desires only fuels the problem.  The 
absolute freedom that is enlightenment is absolutely bound up with the responsibility of 
compassion – not as a vow or restriction but as a direct consequence (or characteristic) of 
enlightened understanding.  Without compassion enlightenment is not possible.  The two 
are (ultimately) co-entailing, so both compassion and wisdom must be practiced in order to 
attain the final goal. 
Whatever the ‘right’ mode of action may be, in any philosophy or belief system - with one 
exception, there is an assumption that it is not what comes easily to us.  Most obviously this 
is expressed as prioritising some method of conscious consideration or a determined 
individualistic faith over one’s more basic passions.  The categorical exception to this is pure 
determinism where the ‘is/ought’ problem cannot arise since in this case there cannot be an 
‘ought’ which is not.  I find this exception, however, epistemologically absurd as, even if it 
were a matter of fact, it has no bearing on the human condition; that is we do not 
experience our existence as determinate. 
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This case and my objection is interesting as it points to (at least my understanding of) what 
‘ethics’ entails.  Where there is no ‘is/ought’ distinction morality does not make sense and (I 
claim) this is in contrast with the human condition which is essentially a moralising of the 
experienced world.  It is the conflict between our experience of existence (moralised) and 
our inability to interpret meaning logically or scientifically from this same world that 
existentialism and doctrines of ‘amorality’ are founded upon.  When existence is posited 
before essence ‘ought’ becomes unreal, perpetually conflicting and unfounded upon what 
‘is’,  just as the opposing position (essence before existence) finds fault in what ‘is’ with 
respect to what is proposed as an innate ‘ought’.  In both cases morality is in contrast to 
what is given as existent; morality assumes an ability to act so as to alter determinate 
structure. 
The steadiness of the enlightened perspective, an acceptance of whatever comes, presents 
a problem for morality.  “In times of misfortune, misfortune is fine.”444  Morality refers to 
reality (what ought to be).  This implies action (ought).  So a feeling that everything is ‘right 
where it belongs’ cannot be considered morality (of this type).  In turn this appears to 
require principles of conduct.  Explanation must give ramifications relating to the mundane; 
for example, this is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ because this will result.  But now it would seem that any 
justification of a principle which is consistent445 is a natural principle explained as akin to 
‘cause and effect’ (karma).  But if it simply happens, there is no need for morality. 
If morality could be explained wholly naturally, then why would morality be necessary?  The 
immediate explanation stemming from the metaphysics of interdependence is the 
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experience of separation.  This can be related to the individual along the lines of Aristotle; 
that no man wittingly does bad for they harm themselves.446  Yet we individuals tend to be 
somewhat witless, we act for immediate gratification and find our desires continually 
thwarted by the changing world.  The philosophical response to this predicament develops a 
preoccupation with ‘enlightenment’ – the more we know, the less likely we should be to 
harm ourselves.  If the results of all karma were immediate, if the effect resulted only on the 
plane of the cause, then negative actions would be immediately limiting.  If people were 
mindful, if we did not stop upon the limited definitions of conceptualisations in place of 
real-world objects; then right action would be easy.  But this is not so. 
So why shouldn’t we all just do what makes us feel good right now?  The implication of 
impermanence and the limitations of systems reveal that such thinking is a trap.  Then there 
is the further implication of freedom, examined in the last section.  If you can ask the 
question, then it is possible to select the outcome of such a confrontation.  Recognising the 
implications of interdependent metaphysics would lead one to choose to become free of 
such demonic paths, since they are ultimately self-destructive.  This doesn’t just apply to 
moral considerations but any conceptual position.  Since everything can be questioned, 
every position can be rebelled against.  But human beings (like moral problems) are not a 
simple binary system – there are many options, many solutions and, according to a non-
reified interpretation, nothing is created or destroyed in an instant.447 
Morality is based on that very force that we mistakenly call the existence of self.  It responds 
to the interest of self, and the selves of others.  If there is no ‘self’ then what is this force?  It 
cannot simply be denied.  Also this force is the basis of all directed action.  Under normal 
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circumstances one simply extends this idea to encompass other beings or entities (other 
than themselves) – for example one’s family, community or some meta-principle or moral 
code.  According to our understanding of śūnyatā these are all equally vacuous.  Here is the 
principle; what is that force with no identification of self-identity (at any level)?  This is to 
ask after the force of volition at the level of ‘Buddha-nature’. 
From the enlightened perspective the question, ‘Why help another being?’ would never 
arise.  As recognised in the metaphysics of interdependence, because ‘other beings’ exist 
interdependently with oneself, their suffering exists, so from the position of wisdom it must 
be recognised.  Interdependently the content of the question concerning others is identical 
to the question concerning oneself.448  If one were to reply with the nihilistic reading, “But 
everything is empty!”, then the concept of emptiness must be properly followed through.  
Ultimately, suffering is empty, but so is action.   This includes the arising and cessation of 
suffering.  Non-action is also empty.  No response is implied by the imposition of emptiness, 
and this includes not responding.  So to take a nihilistic reading, whereby the emptiness of 
others suffering is taken as a reason to ignore its conventional manifestation, one is forced 
into the logical position where they cannot act and they cannot not act. 
The nihilist / essentialist then seeks to overcome the apparent paradox by finding some way 
out of ‘emptiness’.  If wisdom of ‘emptiness’ is seen to be insufficient for an individual to be 
moral it would seem that an additional factor must be added – one is tempted to posit a 
necessary leap of faith; to posit a ‘vow’ to escape nihilism.  But if we accept that a ‘vow’ is 
necessary then we must determine upon what criteria one can be chosen.  As we have seen 
variations on the implications of the identification of the emptiness of phenomena has 
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resulted in radically different positions being developed.  Both the Bodhisattva and 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch accept a lack of values in the world, the base of ‘nothingness’, and 
follow a self-imposed vow; compassion or ‘Will to Power’ respectively.  The vow is an 
addition, the selection of which cannot be intersubjectively justified.  If the criterion for 
selection of a vow is to be drawn from the worldly results of that vow, then these results 
must be deliberatively differentiated, thus undermining the basis of the endeavour.  Once 
again the problem of attempting to overlay a static principle upon a dynamic world arises.  A 
vow cannot change if it must be systematically adhered to, and we have seen that in a 
dynamic world the relation of an individual to it must be responsively dynamic.  Consider 
what happens when two individuals who share the same metaphysical basis, yet have 
selected divergent vows, come into contact.  At some point conflict will result and the vow 
itself can never resolve such a conflict. 
I will here make the definitive claim that we must do away with vows, and this includes the 
vow ‘not to vow’.  Everything is useful provided it is used only as far as its usefulness extends 
and is not carried on beyond this.  This is the essence of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, and this idea 
does not translate well into principles, except vague ones.  In this way understanding 
impermanence, rather than preventing morality, is necessarily at the core of moral thinking.  
The way of reconciling reification and nihilism, of nothingness and the great myriad things, 
is emptiness.  Things which are not essentially existent cannot be temporally existent.  “This 
is a leaf.  It will be dust.  It was once part of a tree....”  
Returning to the nihilistic reading of the emptiness of self, focussing on the necessity of 
embodiment one may level criticism at the conventional actions of individuals that are 
interpreted to be in conflict with the (nihilistic) reading of no-self: for example, a monk 
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versed in emptiness who cries out in pain.  The criticism suggests that this indicates he has 
not ‘transcended’ worldly considerations.  The problem of transcendence has been well 
covered, so within this context I would like to return our attention to the actions of the 
Buddha as a suggestion of what is wrong with this interpretation of Buddhist truth.  While 
starving himself and meditating according to ascetic principles near to the point of death, 
Siddhartha accepted the help of a woman, in the form of food, to ease his own suffering.  
This event marked a realisation of the middle path between extreme asceticism and 
hedonism.  It is a serious question to consider, how one can be compassionate towards 
others if they are not first compassionate to themselves?  It is all the more serious when 
considered within the interdependent framework.  To overcome suffering no instance of 
suffering can be ignored. 
The metaphysics of interdependence necessarily connects all actions.  If morality exists at 
any level, and it does – it exists conventionally, then it has universal ramifications.  Even if 
conventional valuation is ultimately empty, because it is held by an individual, their actions 
are a manifestation of this view.  Every action has a moral impact and as such nothing is 
insignificant.  Call this the simple implication.  The complicated implication must follow the 
origin of an ‘ethic’ through the epistemological limits, via an embodied mind, as a part of 
interdependent physicality, influenced by intersubjectivity.  The final step is the most 
significant. 
Following on from the discussion of skilful means in the last section, not only can every 
event be understood as morally relevant, but every question can be understood as a moral 
question.  From the perspective of enlightenment, following the framework from 
interdependence, one is faced with the limitation of all systematic interpretations and the 
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utter groundlessness of metaphysics as a whole.  Thus, when asked a question relating to 
the nature of reality, and ultimately every question will thus relate, an enlightened being 
must skilfully create an answer to fit the state of the questioner.  This does not imply ‘lying’, 
as the answer must be a reflection of the meta-condition between the questioner and 
reality.  As such a moral answer will be the one which accurately guides the questioner 
towards realising ‘reality as it is’.  
 As presented in the kōan ‘Nansen kills the cat’, answering a question is as much an 
interdependent and morally relevant action as the interpenetrating act of killing.  When 
speaking about ultimate reality, and speak we must, it is like ‘hanging from a branch by 
one’s teeth’.449  Dōgen extends the kōan along the lines of interpenetration, complicating 
where the branch ends and the individual begins.450  Like all kōans, there is not a single 
correct answer which can be learnt and repeated back.  Whatever expression arises it must 
come directly from that ‘absolute nothingness’ synonymous with the realisation of ultimate 
reality, it is an expression which cannot be abstracted.  All moral problems are based on a 
proposition of a choice.  A necessary requisite may appear to be the ability to act one way or 
another, but this is not necessarily so.  Even in the case where correct moral action is 
impossible there need not be the ‘illusion of freedom of action’ for choice to be possible.  
The most accessible and radical application of choice is modifying the ‘level’ at which one 
approaches a situation.  If no solution is available one need only change perspective, 
transform, expand or contract the current limits of enquiry.  In other words, in a losing 
situation one can change the rules of the game or the manner in which it is assessed. 
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 I have described the ‘morally right’ from the metaphysical position as those actions which 
accord with reality ‘as it is’, in as much as these actions are harmonious with intersubjective 
reality, by taking into account the conventional experiences of other sentient beings.  
However, at the same time the metaphysical source of the possibility of morality is tension.  
Without a conflict there is no need for morality, in fact without conflict the consideration 
that is ‘moral’ makes no sense.  In this manner, both the wisdom and compassion of 
enlightened beings are seen to be contingent.  Just as coming to see ‘reality as it is’ is 
dependent upon the interdependently manifest content of reality, it is only due to the 
conventional existence of suffering that compassion exists.  Placing enlightenment ‘beyond 
good and evil’ is comprehensible in so much as it presents the distinction between 
enlightened and conventional modes of being.  However, these two modes should never be 
understood as incompatible.  As we have seen, enlightened (epistemological) transcendence 
does not nullify conventional existence, nor revoke conventional ‘morality’.   
Here I would like to propose a related position, which has rather dramatic consequences.  
While justification unquestionably takes place at the conventional level, Ultimately nothing 
is justifiable.  The direct implication of this is that from the standpoint of emptiness we are 
responsible for everything we do and every choice we make.  The metaphysical base of 
‘justification’, like morality, depends upon a conceptual tension, though in this case a 
difference in relation to what ‘is’ rather than what ‘ought’ be.  The need for this difference 
can be seen when a justification is made concerning all or nothing, as in ‘transcendent 
justification’, we are left with nihilism.  Justification not only looks at the causes of an event 
but, and more to the point, their outcome and how this outcome coheres or comes into 
conflict with a selected, projected worldview.  A justification attempts to explain a point of 
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view, as to how it affects the world, through reference to itself.  As I said, it points to 
difference in order to function, that difference being one of projected outcomes or 
interpretation and that difference comes down to a distinct change in the world.  Any 
difference, if it is to be valid, can be explained but the focus of justification is looking at two 
or more possible outcomes and selecting one over another – and this selection is crucial.  
Whatever is selected, it could be otherwise.  As an aside, which should be quite obvious by 
now, justification is not compatible with determinism.  Justification relies on the need to 
elevate one outcome over another, in a world where alternatives are not possible nothing 
can be justified, everything simply is. 
The emphasis here is clearly on justifying one’s own actions through something external to 
oneself, this is what cannot be done, and the reason for this is precisely that we are not 
determined.  Justification looks at two possible aspects; one being one’s own action or 
desire, along with the projected other in conflict with it.  Broken down in this way 
‘justification’ requires an openness for these possibilities in the world, however if the other 
is removed the characteristic of the single, personal act becomes like that of the 
deterministic: it simply is.  This is not because we cannot explain our interpretation to 
others, of course we can justify our actions in the conventional way, the complication arises 
when one tries to justify to oneself.  Our present state certainly could be otherwise, 
however the justification is not an explanation of how we came to this point; the 
justification is how we came to this point.  The process of justification is the process of 
forming a volitional will.  The selections, oversights and interpretations that go on while 
‘justifying’, all of which are only determined in as much as they are habitual, are the 
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expressions characteristic of our will.  Justification breaks down because we are 
deterministic: we determine ourselves. 
The problem of nihilism originates not in the outside world but in us.  We have no problem 
creating meaning, we can justify practically any framework we choose to put forward, but 
we cannot compare these frameworks, since, from their own subjective foundations, they 
do not accept a common base.  At the basis of every framework is the choice we make to 
pursue it and for this we can find no justification.  The reason there is ultimately no reason 
to choose one framework, of morality for example, over any other is because ultimately that 
choice is open and we are each ultimately responsible for it. 
In most cases we do not recognise the freedom of our choice since we are focussed on the 
outcomes and are habitually adjusting our worldview and selected interactions to accord 
with the ‘best’ outcomes.  Where we do notice our intersubjective inner conflicts is when 
the choices we are making do not have any comparable worldly outcomes.451  We may 
examine many various explanations of why people choose the frameworks they do 
(psychology, sociology, biology…) and these are intelligent and generally successful 
evaluations so long as the individuals in focus are influenced by their environment and 
history in a manner which I am calling ‘habitual’.  No explanation can account for the choice 
that appears for a free will, its actions can be guessed at based on the framework it has 
chosen, but it cannot be predicted.452  Because this unknown is the origin of meaning, we 
contemplate nihilism and isolation in the world, and yet this is where spontaneous creativity 
arises.  We could correctly call this origin meaningless, for meaning is its creation and thus 
cannot be attributed to it, though it is more accurate to describe  this position as being 
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‘outside the domain of meaning’.  Once again, from the ground of the origin of will, it simply 
is. 
So both the world at large and our innermost ‘choice’ are outside of meaning and yet 
somewhere in the middle is our human experience, the realm of the human being and of 
meaningful existence.  So are we free to choose anything we wish?  The freedom of the will 
hints ‘yes’ while our embeddedness as part of the interdependent universe suggests the 
opposite.  Each of us must act from within our context and so really the actualisation of any 
framework will be unique from these grounds.  Yet, we have the ability to ‘see through’ our 
present state, to see the emptiness of the entities we interact with for example, and so our 
mental states are apparently able to ‘transcend’ our physical limitations.  It is this 
phenomenon that creates the confusion of the apparent separation between body and 
mind, as we examined in chapter 4. 
 
Conclusion 
An understanding of the metaphysics of interdependence eliminates the Zen moral 
problem, finding the problem to be founded on false grounds.  The complications of the 
concept of morality, at the level of the conventional and the ultimate, calls for a re-
assessment of their mode of justification and redirects focus in pursuit of realisation of 
‘reality as it is’.  The interpenetration of mental causal effects results in an intersubjective 
mode in which an enlightened being is aware of entanglement with the beliefs and 
experiences of all sentient beings.  The radical existential freedom at the ground of the ‘true 
self’ prevents the simple adherence to a ‘vow’ and results in every action being categorically 
moral, and every question posed as a request for a directive correction of the disjointed 
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mode which brought it about.  The selection of such responses is down to the spontaneous 
creative potential from the state of ‘no-self’, which is satori. 
The objective here is not to set up a new moral theory, but to indicate the principles which 
are directly implicated from an extended understanding of interdependence.  Following the 
emphasis of Zen, these principles are merely empty placeholders and are utterly without 
merit, unless they are directly practically applicable.  This is the focus of the next and final 
chapter, developing the principles of pragmatic application, culminating in the expression of 
meditation as daily life. 
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Chapter 7: Practical Application 
 
Buddhism is fundamentally pragmatic, concerned with the cessation of suffering.  The Zen 
tradition is filled with affirmations of everyday experiences and the practices involved in 
their mindful execution,453 yet the ‘transcendence’ distinction has resulted in widespread 
oversight of the relation of conventional and ultimate modes of being.  While many 
Buddhist thinkers, including Gautama Buddha, shunned metaphysical speculation, this 
thesis promised fruitful results from this philosophical investigation.  By establishing the 
necessity and implications of interdependence as a metaphysical principle, the relationship 
of the conventional experience of suffering to the ultimate nature of non-suffering can be 
metaphysically explained.  From this foundation it is possible to establish both meta-moral 
principles and practical guidelines.  Following the principles developed in the last chapter, 
we will now consider how it is possible to practically apply them.   
Meditation in Zen is an affirmation of everyday action, and yet simply sitting is not sufficient 
to encompass zazen.  To emphasise this point, the artist Sengai,454 complimenting his 
illustration of a sitting frog, wrote “If a man becomes a Buddha by practicing zazen...”; 
implying that to follow this logic through, all frogs must surely be enlightened owing simply 
to the maintenance of their postures.  To complicate matters ‘just sitting’ is often exactly 
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how meditation is characterised in the Zen tradition.455  The quietude of Zen philosophy, for 
instance saying that Zen is simply “eat when hungry, sleep when tired”, obscures that 
significant aspect that Dōgen thoroughly emphasised: practice.456 
Following on from the correlations drawn with Daoism in chapter 2, there become 
difficulties with distinguishing the ‘practice’ of a specific path (say that of the Bodhisattva) 
from the mode-specific goal of pragmatic success (such as in the art of archery).  Indeed, 
Daoist ‘attainment of the Way’ can be read as championing the boundless perfection of 
pragmatic enterprise.  Such a reading is taken up by Angus Graham in his paper ‘Taoist 
Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of “Is” and “Ought”’,457 however such perfection comes 
with an important proviso.  “Presumably the Taoist should be aware of everything relevant 
to his intent.  But he has no fixed ends, only fluid goals to which he spontaneously tends, 
which will accord with the Way to the extent that he is indeed aware of all factors relevant 
to them.  The more aware he is, the more likely he is to obtain them”.458  Thus, according to 
Graham, ‘to respond with awareness’ becomes the Daoist mandate, based purely on the 
drive towards the fulfilment of immediate goals.  This is the promise of attaining the Dao - 
success in any field - indicating that one’s awareness must (somehow) be extended across 
the relevant factors of any field.  We may draw similar conclusions concerning Zen, though 
first we must address the relation of such a mandate to Buddhist soteriology. 
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A return to pragmatism also resurrects the concerns of nihilism.  If our sole concern is what 
is useful then Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’ returns to nihilate all relative values.  Here the 
purpose of basing this study in metaphysics becomes apparent; with nothingness as a 
metaphysical (baseless) base, the implicit consequences of interdependence must 
necessarily follow, regardless of one’s starting position within this metaphysical framework.  
In order to succeed in any field, one must ultimately become aware of the metaphysical 
implications of interdependence.  Furthermore, if one is to fulfil their purpose absolutely 
then their immediate goal must itself be brought into question. 
In the previous chapter I claimed that when all vows and laws are rejected, rather than 
becoming nihilistic, every question becomes a moral one.  Without transcendent 
justifications every position is opened up as an aspect of the web of intersubjective effects.  
A sentient being’s response to reality, if it is non-habitual and genuinely aware, is capable of 
being spontaneously creative, unnatural and radically world-altering.  This potential would 
allow the Buddhist soteriological project to function.  Where this action is guided by 
wisdom, the realisation of the interdependence of all phenomenon leads one to work 
towards resolving the tension in the world, predominantly the suffering experienced by 
others.  This interplay of immediacy and extended awareness presents the awakening 
individual with the necessary yet almost paradoxical mode of ‘mindful no-mindedness’.  This 
very expression is what is taken up in this chapter as the guiding principle of ‘the formless’.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. 
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The first section, Way of the Demon, examines the antithesis to the moral account put forth 
in the previous chapter.  By showing the final failure of nihilism, and the limitation of any 
reified system, the implications of interdependence are shown to be universally applicable.  
Succinctly, the limits of the pragmatic principle established here determine that given any 
starting point, the extension of one’s consideration to recognise interdependence 
necessitates moral interaction. 
The second section, The Martial Art, critiques the application of Zen to various forms of art 
with special reference to the martial arts.  This key example serves to illustrate the 
application of the pragmatic principle and the nature of interdependent action.  It is shown 
that the goal of defeating an opponent in combat, expanded to the ultimate ideal, 
necessitates a reassessment of the mode of action from which the original goal emerged, 
resolved into the development of the moral principles of interdependence. 
The final section, Formlessness, sets out the nature of the principle for a pragmatic 
engagement with the world which expresses the groundlessness of interdependent 
metaphysics.  This final section marks a return to Daoist metaphysics, reconsidered in the 
light of Dōgen’s critique and the concept of an ‘empty Buddha-nature’, examined in chapter 
5.  The result is a universally applicable, existential guiding principle that results in a dynamic 
epistemological stance - “where there is no place to stand”. 
 
Way of the Demon 
I believe that the moral implications developed in the previous chapter are necessary 
consequences of an interdependent universe.  Nevertheless, within the recorded history of 
this universe many modes of action have been developed and found to be pragmatically 
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fruitful.  Given the rejection of transcendent justification, we cannot simply discriminate 
against an effective system simply because it appears to ignore some system of ‘morality’.  
To justify the application of moral principles by reference to the metaphysical system that 
presented them is baseless question begging.  For this reason, in this section the antithesis 
of this project will be re-examined.  We must consider the consequences of rejecting all the 
moral principles of the last chapter by removing the concept of an interdependent ‘self’ 
from our understanding of the world.  If we follow the nihilism presented by Nietzsche, as 
addressed in chapter 1, is it then possible to overcome our embeddedness in the world, to 
transcend it and become superhuman?  If this antithesis is successful then the validity of 
interdependence, as a self-proclaimed baseless metaphysics, is brought into question. 
This section will consider the antithesis of the position that has been pursued in this thesis: 
namely that wisdom entails compassion.  The previous chapter noted that the realisation of 
the non-existence of ‘self’ should revoke the possibility of selfish motivation.  However, as I 
went on to maintain that reality is fundamentally groundless and that conventional values 
must be recognised as a valid aspect of interdependent reality, one may feel that this 
emphasis on immanent reality is enough to posit relativistic justifications.  Here we must 
deal with this last sliver of nihilism and consider what it would mean to be a demon.  A 
demon is that which stands against the natural or divine will.  It is the personification of a 
human vice or desire.  It is a human who pursues a demonic end.  A demon is power; a 
singular spike in the flux of existence.  It is the antithesis of the slave; Nietzsche’s 
Übermensch.  A demon is focussed passion.  It is the Capitalist hero, the ultimate warrior, 
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the pinnacle of individualism.459  The demon is what nature’s ‘individuals’ strive for.  The 
way of the demon is the pursuit of power. 
In Nietzsche’s Daybreak we find the following passage, titled ‘the demon of power’: 
Not necessity, not desire - no, the love of power is the demon of men. Let them have 
everything - health, food, a place to live, entertainment - they are and remain unhappy and 
low-spirited: for the demon waits and waits and will be satisfied. Take everything from them 
and satisfy this, and they are almost happy - as happy as men and demons can be. 460 
Not only is the drive for power the strongest motivator of an individual, claims Nietzsche, it 
also nullifies the values of all other ‘goods’.  In the absence of power, one is willing to give 
everything up to satisfy this drive.  In his irreverent manner, he adds: 
But why do I repeat this? Luther has said it already, and better than I, in the verses: "Let 
them take from us our body, goods, honor, children, wife: let it all go - the kingdom [Reich] 
must yet remain to us!" Yes! Yes! The "Reich"!461 
Again Nietzsche suggests the subterfuge of theology, where the positing of some higher 
power is simply a means of curtailing the power of others, to bow before it, and 
consequently lifting one’s own (the ‘righteous’) status.  Interestingly, Martin Luther’s 
theology of the ‘two kingdoms’462 epitomises what I have earlier termed the ‘transcendency 
thesis’, whereby the kingdom of heaven (and its values) are necessarily separated and, as 
Nietzsche is indicating, maintained as superior to worldly values and the kingdom of men.  
Nietzsche, of course, claims that without this false overlay all there is, is will to power.  In 
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 ‘Demon’ here is a cipher for modes that appear profitable but are ultimately destructive; in the Buddhist 
sense it is what binds one to saṃsāra.  Concerning the expression of ‘demonic’ influence, Stephen Batchelor 
writes; “A devil’s circle is addictive.  It raises you to dizzy heights of rapture only to bring you crashing down 
into troughs of despair.  Yet I do not hesitate to start the diabolic cycle again.”  (Batchelor, S., Living with the 
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 See Martin Luther’s ‘On Secular Authority’; “Here we must divide Adam’s children, all mankind, into two 
parts: the first belong to the kingdom of God, the second to the kingdom of the world.” - in Höpfl, H. (Ed.), 
Luther and Calvin on secular authority, p.8. 
263 
 
this natural struggle of the fittest Nietzsche claims only the Übermensch will triumph.463  
Yet, this struggle is recognised in Buddhist saṃsāra as those very forces an enlightened 
being is liberated from.  So how does a Bodhisattva compete with a ‘superman’? 
What separates a Bodhisattva from a demon?  The most obvious answer is compassion, but 
so simply stated this reveals little of the issue at stake.  There seem to be many paths and 
modes of being that lead to expression as a demon, yet we are told that there is only one 
position of a Bodhisattva and that this ultimate stance is only achieved by the ‘middle way’.  
You will recall Nāgārjuna’s explanation that this ‘middle way’ is to avoid falling into the 
extremes of essentialism and nihilism.  These extremes are co-entailing, while being 
presented as the negation of its opposite.  In every case the mode of a demon is always 
limited – either essentialised, and falling into nihilism; or nihilistic, and dependent on 
essentialism.  In developing the metaphysical framework in this thesis, it was shown that 
either position remains an incomplete representation of the phenomena it describes.  If a 
demon wished to overcome this limitation, to become more powerful, it would have to 
recognise the function of the negation of its own position.  The ultimate demon would be 
forced to take into account the existence of alternative modes, of other minds.  Even if the 
individuality of the demon is stressed, this can only be established through reference to its 
wider situation, its environment, which as we have seen must include the dispositions of 
other individuals.  Could the ultimate extent of the will to power be compassion?  Must the 
Übermensch be moral?464 
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 Of course, following Nietzsche, this first requires that we radically redefine ‘morality’; here I follow the 
principles developed in chapter 6 connecting morality to pragmatics.  Regarding this possibility, Solomon 
(From Hegel to Existentialism, P.117) suggests that the characteristics of the Übermensch do not deny that 
they could be as moral as anyone else, provided the conventions support their own ends.  
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Here I have made an assumption regarding the limitations of an individual that should be 
examined before jumping to the conclusion that compassion is somehow more powerful 
than an individual who is self-motivated.  To briefly return to the debate between self and 
other power, it is crucial to recognise that either can be demonic.  Our project in ‘morality’ is 
not found in this debate, but rather behind it, a meta- understanding.  Whether this 
motivation to aid others comes from within the individual or from some outside source is 
irrelevant.  A supernatural motivation could be divine or demonic – and the only measure 
for this is ourselves and those around us.  Those around us may too be demonic or morally 
motivated, just as we ourselves are.  How can one tell the difference between a positive 
motivation and a negative one?  Can we feel the difference between being motivated by 
greed, for example, or a real desire to help?   
In response to these questions I will avoid all discussion on the subject of altruism and 
instead make an explicit (and certainly problematic) claim in the vein of the Zen moral 
problem; neither is good or evil.  Every motivation, the way I have described it, is demonic to 
some extent.  This is the nature of a human being.  We struggle within and against and along 
with the world, this is the nature of saṃsāra.  In such a state Nietzsche tells us that only a 
demon can change the world.  But the promise of enlightenment is not to become a demon 
but to be free of demonic motivations.  Jiddu Krishnamurti wrote that only when one comes 
to terms with what one is can one become free of violence – “Then you are able to be what 
you are: a psychological disturbance which is violence itself.”465 
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 Krishnamurti, J., The First and Last Freedom, p.116.  The similarities of this sentiment with the Buddhist 
thought examined here is evident, Tsung-mi, for instance, wrote, “Since evil is also the mind, one cannot use 
the mind to cut off the mind.  One who neither cuts off [evil] nor does [good] but freely accepts things as they 
come is called a liberated person.”  (Gregory, P.N., Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism, p.238.) 
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Recall the ‘nihilist’ position from chapter 1: God is dead, the transcendent metre of morality 
has fallen.  In the words of Dmitri Pisarev, “What can be broken should be broken; what will 
stand the blow is fit to live; what breaks into smithereens is rubbish; in any case, strike right 
and left, it will not and cannot do any harm.”466  Furthered by Nietzsche’s affirmative move, 
whatever doesn’t kill you makes you stronger, strength is recognised as the greatest value.  
Indeed it is only strength which is capable of forging and maintaining value.  This is seen to 
be the fundamental drive in nature – the will to power.   
The struggle of life permeates our existence.  The plants in the fields as the raindrops fall, 
each leaf from a stem, reaching for the sunlight.  Each plant, each leaf, so different and yet 
the force of life is in all alike.  If there was but one force how could it become so segregated 
– competing against itself?  How can one tree outgrow another only to stunt it in its shade, 
while they share a common root system.  Of course free animal life takes this even further.  
We put this down to accident.  Each living entity only has its own survival in mind (or in 
nature) and so, even if it has the capacity to do so, will rarely act for the benefit of another 
unless it is a credit to one’s own survival.  There is no ‘morality’ here, not in any classic 
sense, yet there is a directedness.  But, we say, there is no unified direction other than what 
may happen to appear from group interactions over time (ecosystems happen to occur for 
instance) – how could this be when each entity is only in it for their own survival.  This kind 
of statistical direction (of ecosystems or social groups and the like) is but a peculiar dynamic, 
an emergent force to be considered from the perspective of the all pervasive ‘will to power’. 
Returning to the question of compassion; we can present both the exception and the rule.  
In order to expand one’s personal power, the demon must take into account its wider 
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influences and the effects these have on its power plays; including the impact of the minds 
of others.  The perfection of this understanding is (arguably) the meta-moral position akin to 
that of the Bodhisattva.  However, the demon that is wholly compassionate can no longer 
be considered demonic.  The emphasis here is on motivation, of the necessity of being 
interconnected and the implications for resulting action, and we are all at least slightly 
compassionate if only for our own existence.  If we take Camus’ opening proposition to The 
Myth of Sisyphus as a normative imperative - that “There is but one truly serious 
philosophical problem, and that is suicide.”467 - then we must accept that any self-conscious 
being that has control over themselves must have chosen existence over nothingness.  This 
was the rejection for the existence of the perfect nihilist in chapter 1.  Now this logical 
imperative must drive the power-seeking demon from a purely negative ’nothing’, of non-
being, to engagement with that ‘nothingness’ which interpenetrates with every identifiable 
phenomenon as impermanent, interconnected and absolutely contingent.  Without this 
development they must remain trapped in one side of a self-inflicted dichotomy, perhaps 
relatively powerful but limited to a specific time and place. 
The demonic drive is a response to the natural call to power.  At every level, at every point 
on the path to enlightenment, the path can be abandoned – one can get caught up on one 
idea of reality, one can affirm themselves over all else and can fight for those beliefs.  
Justification is a symptom of demonics.  Reality does not need to be defended.  We find 
justification where there is more than one possible response – a recognition of the 
incompleteness of a system of interpretation and one’s responses.468  One can follow the 
nihilistic manifesto and scream at the universe at every step – except the final one – 
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Nirvāṇa.  Enlightenment is nothing more than recognising reality.  Reality is that there is 
nothing to scream at.  This is the sense in which Nishitani claims that nihilism overcomes 
itself.469  A demon, being restricted to a single nihilistic mode, cannot be enlightened.  From 
that state we can have projects, we can slip into various modes of being, yet these projects 
will remain the total extent of one’s understanding of the world.  The limitation of a single 
system is then the artificial limitation of the human being.  ‘Power’ is a relative concept.  To 
have ‘ultimate’ power one must be capable of transcending any particular mode of being, to 
be unbound by a single system, and adapt to new relative fields. 
Nietzsche’s vision of the Übermensch was of a being who walked the earth unafraid, as a 
creator rather than subject, transforming every negative affect into an affirmative drive to 
overcome.  However, even in a Nietzschean sense, suffering still exists.  While conventional 
suffering is transformed into a ‘good’ thing, strengthening us in our struggle with it, 
suffering as an existential phenomenon still exists.  The ‘suffering’ is transformed into a 
restriction of power, that which rejects our will.  Thus the desire to overcome this suffering 
is the same as any attempt to overcome any interpretation of suffering – it is a desire for 
freedom.  We can argue that the only possible way to overcome suffering, in any form, is 
enlightenment in the Buddhist sense.  In the terminology of pragmatism, power is freedom 
which is only possible through the cessation of suffering. 
As another example, and one that will fling us into the depths of the problem proper, 
consider a masochist.  One of our most common conceptions of suffering, physical pain, is 
transformed into pleasure for this individual.  So, to carry over the argument from the last 
paragraph, their relative suffering would be an absence of physical pain (in our sense).  Now 
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negation - Nishitani, The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, p.64. 
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the way to overcome this suffering, following Buddhist ‘enlightenment’, is not to seek pain 
in order to gratify this desire for pleasure – this is the crucial distinction between sukka and 
Nirvāṇa – rather it is to overcome the very craving which causes this suffering to occur.  I 
chose this example because, for many of us, this is an easy situation where we may look at 
this individual and think to ourselves ‘something is not right with this one.  We should give 
them psychological help.’  Perhaps this assumption is justified, since they may well be 
harming themselves during this pursuit, or they may eventually escalate their actions into 
the harming of others as the concept of pain becomes universalised as a good thing in their 
minds.  What is important is that every situation that presents us with suffering, every mind-
state in which we desire, including those ‘normal’ modes of being, are a sickness requiring 
‘help’.  In this understanding Buddhism is not naturalistic, in fact it goes against nature – 
after all this is what enlightenment is all about – extinguishing (Nirvāṇa).  To achieve the 
freedom needed to express ones power ultimately, the natural drives for power must be 
overcome. 
Now let us examine a classical moral hypothetical and reverse our focus.  A child is in a 
pond, struggling for breath.  Do you help the child (knowing you are capable of doing so)?  
We must question a Buddhist motivation here.  There is no self, all things are empty and so 
the suffering of another being is just as empty as your own suffering (which you are 
supposed to realise and so overcome).  So consider a normal individual presented with this 
situation.  Yes, you must save the child; this is your desire.  But why stop at rescuing them 
from drowning?  Why not help them to end all suffering?  Indeed why not help all beings 
thus?  Surely to do this you must save yourself.  So when you see the child, you jump in and 
pull them to shore - but who are you really saving from drowning? 
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This motivation presents a strange twist to the idea of morality.470  You don’t do something 
to pursue a reward or out of fear of punishment.  You don’t do something because it brings 
you pleasure.  It’s not even about considering the future because (a) you don’t know what 
the consequences of your actions will be and (b) your actions affect the outcome.471  The 
reason you act is because it is.  Anything that suffers, whatever it is, whatever its definition 
of suffering, even if it does not have one, it is suffering.  Of course the same can be said of 
pleasure, but pleasure of itself is not conventionally considered a problem. 
What would happen if we tried to apply this to business ethics?  Could an economic theory 
be based upon a model wherein all suffering is suffering, wherever it occurs, equally 
accountable?  In the business of pleasure and suffering there is no zero-sum game.  Marxists 
argue that capitalism works through the exploitation of the lower class in order to benefit 
those at the top – outsourcing suffering as it were.  But the human condition is not a linear 
system, it is not quantitative nor fixed in its extent.  Happiness begets happiness, anger 
proliferates anger, likewise fear, despair, laughter, violence – in the language of the human 
being, profit creates profit and loss, loss.  For the Buddhist it is clear that suffering leads to 
suffering, but also, they argue, that conventional pleasure also leads to suffering.  What has 
happened to profit in the Buddhist model?  The Buddhist path does not posit benevolence 
as an end but as a means towards the freedom of the individual.  This freedom allows the 
development of wisdom and offers the greatest potential for the realisation of power. 
Using the drive for power as a paradigmatic example for pragmatic motivations generally, 
we can begin to set out the ‘pragmatic principle’.  In order to fulfil the complete pragmatic 
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demands of any position, the referents of the position must necessarily be recognised as 
interdependent.  As such, they are subject to the principles derived from the metaphysical 
framework established in this thesis.  Since, metaphysically, it has been shown that no 
phenomenon can be explained or characterised without reference to its environment, it is 
to this extended environment that one’s pragmatic ends must refer.  As this extension 
necessitates interdependence, the reciprocal interpenetration of the focal phenomenon and 
its environment presents a dynamic world, upon which no reified system can be 
permanently overlayed and remain valid.  To extend validity, and thus power, one must be 
adaptive and recognise the implications of existing interdependently.  Most significantly, to 
pursue a single pragmatic goal, such as a personal increase in power, one must take into 
account the impact of other beings, including their particular motivations.  This 
intersubjective awareness has dramatic repercussions, not only regarding the technicalities 
of fulfilling personal desires, but also the very idea of self. 
 
The Martial Art 
In order to elaborate upon the pragmatic principle our focus will now turn to the particularly 
interesting example of the association of Zen concepts to martial arts.472  While concepts 
and practices from Zen have been adopted into many disciplines, the martial arts presents a 
field which directly conflicts with the Buddhist emphasis of non-violence.473  This field is also 
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 The martial arts and their philosophies are vast and greatly divergent and while this association could only 
legitimately be extended to schools of East Asian origins, the relevance of the characteristics examined in this 
section is more widespread and, as will be shown, are even applicable to other fields. 
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a special case among the traditional ‘Zen arts’474 with regard to the immediacy of feedback 
of one’s actions, owing to the engagement with an equally positioned opponent.  It is this 
aspect which is of greatest interest as a test case for both the pragmatic principle and the 
application of the complete concept of ‘no-mind’ as examined in the previous chapter. 
The most direct connection of Zen to the martial arts is the explanation of the fighting forms 
as a form of ‘moving meditation’.  A popular story of the origins of Shaolin kung fu involves 
Bodhidharma introducing the martial practices as a form of exercise for the monks who 
otherwise remained motionless for long periods in zazen.475  As meditation though, in 
movement one would appear to have lost many of the characteristics, such as reducing 
distractions, for which secluded sitting was favoured.  These increased difficulties are only 
magnified for one engaged in combat, which lead us to wonder how one could possibly 
‘meditate’ in this mode and why such practices should even persist.  One may be tempted 
to simply explain away the attribution of ‘meditation’ as fanciful, however this would fly in 
the face of the emphasis on daily practice in Zen – “For when this wise and deeper world 
opens, everyday life, even the most trivial thing of it, grows loaded with the truths of 
Zen.”476  Regarding an active exercise of mindfulness, Nagaboshi, in his Bodhisattva 
Warriors, notes that, “One advantage of such a meditation method is that while it is easy to 
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be either verbally or self-deceptive, it is very difficult to be kinetically so.”477  This distinction 
readies a significant philosophical point. 
While sitting in meditation one becomes aware of bodily and mental details otherwise 
hidden in the sensory overload of everyday life, however one must at some point re-enter 
this world (even if only to maintain one’s physical requirements).  The goal of mindfulness 
meditation (vipaśyanā) is to continue to apply this mindfulness in one’s day to day activities.  
Those active forms adopted as ‘Zen art’ serve as an exercise in the application of this 
mindfulness, in accordance with the experience of ‘no-mind’ as detailed in the previous 
chapter.478  In this manner, the ‘art’ is a direct expression of the artist.  As a practice, the art 
form becomes a mode of feedback for the practitioner.  In this respect the martial arts stand 
out as a particularly potent test.  Martial art presents a clear goal, not to be defeated, and, 
unique to this art, this goal is inversely reflected by a directly engaged opponent.  An act of 
attack is mirrored as an act of defence for the opponent.  The inability to respond 
appropriately is not trivial or merely subjective; ultimately it is a matter of life and death.  
One is forced to directly confront one’s own vulnerabilities, and ultimately, one’s mortality. 
The threat of direct physical violence was more prominent in the ancient world than today.  
Evidence suggests that the Buddhist monks at the Shaolin monastery were practicing 
combative arts prior to Bodhidharma’s introduction of Ch’an, and that this practice was 
actually inherited from a long history of training in the Daoist inspired martial arts.479  Such 
claims should not upset historians of the martial arts or Zen as the story of the relationship 
between Zen and the sword is one of integration and moulding of teachings to fit new 
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contexts.  When considering the connection to violence, keep in mind that prince 
Siddhartha was himself trained in combat, being one of the Sakyumuni clan of warriors.  
However, after his enlightenment his attitude towards violence appears pacifistic.480  There 
is no simple way to reconcile violence with Buddhist practices, and it is perhaps for this 
reason that this aspect has been heavily emphasised in contemporary studies of Zen.481 
“The problem of death is a great problem with every one of us; it is, however, more pressing 
for the samurai... It was, therefore, natural for every sober-minded samurai to approach Zen 
with the idea of mastering death.”482  An art form as meditation presents a mode in which 
one experiences the results of their practice, becoming aware of their own developments 
and shortcomings, as presented in through their own actions.483  In combat, as meditation, 
one’s own actions interpenetrate the actions of their opponent; the feedback is relational; 
intersubjective.  The radical freedom that arises with increased awareness, as discussed in 
the last chapter, is simultaneously realised on both sides.484  Both individuals aim to defeat 
the other, both are capable of spontaneous creativity, whatever happens next cannot be 
scripted.   
These points, regarding the peculiarities of Martial Arts as a meditation practice, outline my 
philosophical interest in presenting the example here.  The further, but related, point is the 
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accusation that Zen is a corruption of Buddhism, as outlined in chapter 2.  The above 
quotation from Suzuki serves to illustrate the focus of these accusations, particularly in 
relation to the influence in Japan of Bushido.  D.T. Suzuki has been a prime target in the 
accusations levelled against Zen, due in part to his prominence in the West and interest in 
Bushido.  Victoria writes, “But perhaps his most creative contribution to the discourse of his 
day was the assertion that the Zen-trained swordsman (and, by extension, the modern 
soldier) ‘turns into an artist of the first grade, engaged in producing a work of genuine 
originality.’”485  In fact Suzuki’s interest drew on a long history of relating Zen practice to 
‘creativity’ in the arts, the martial arts and ‘the sword’ in particular.  Satō, in his paper Suzuki 
and War, deals directly with accusations of Suzuki’s position made by Victoria in his Zen at 
War and presents a strong case in defence of the prominent figure.486   
 Katsu Kaishu (1823-1899), a statesman of the Meji period, stated in a public address “The 
way of the sword and Zen are identical....”  The expression ‘life giving sword’ was coined in 
the 17th Century by swordsman and Zen enthusiast Yagyu Munenori, a contemporary of 
Miyamoto Musashi.  Both were in correspondence with the Zen Priest Takuan Sōhō.487  
Takuan wrote, “Completely oblivious to the hand that brandishes the sword, one strikes and 
cuts his opponent down... Understand this, but do not let your mind be taken by 
Emptiness.”488  As previously noted, it is this emphasis on ‘no-mindedness’ which led to the 
oversight of mindfulness and fostered the Zen moral problem, due to its pragmatic appeal.   
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Far from recommending the adoption of a mindless state, both Suzuki and Takuan 
maintained that thought is absolutely necessary when engaging in the world.489  Concerning 
Bushido, Suzuki wrote, “Nothing is more malign than ‘the sword that takes life’ when it is 
uncontrolled by ‘the sword that gives life’”.490  The dual forces of creation and destruction 
are here focussed inwards, as the ‘life giving sword’ represents the very destruction of that 
demonic element, examined in the previous section, to overcome it in oneself.  The very act 
of drawing a sword implies the destruction of life, an act which should never be taken 
lightly.  Suzuki’s idea is in the spirit of the fox kōan; that Zen transcends thought and 
morality but does not ignore them.491 
The subtleties of the ultimate truth of Zen as ‘transcendent’ have been examined 
previously.  Here in relation to practical ends, the complication of transcendence and 
immanence lies at the heart of the moral problem, and of this the philosophically minded 
Suzuki was well aware.  Regarding the extension of mindfulness from the experience of no-
mind he writes, “These are not questions of non-discriminating wisdom (Prajñā) but of 
discriminating knowledge (Vijñāna) that involves the intelligence and education of the 
person who has had the Zen experience.”492  Zen consciousness and Zen thought differ 
according to one’s learning and intellect.  At the same time, that ‘transcendent’ truth of Zen 
somehow permeates the enlightened being and is expressed in the very same actions. 
It is not uncommon to find characters in the history of Zen who practiced calligraphy and 
painting in addition to their scriptural studies and meditation and occasionally swordsmen, 
martial artists or masters of tea ceremony, archers, flower-arrangers and so-on.  The Daoist 
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ideal of ‘mastering one way, master all ways’ is continually expressed through Zen stories.  A 
prominent example is that of the tea master challenged to a duel by an unaffiliated 
swordsman (rōnin), whereby the swordsman is overcome simply by the tea masters 
presence, as an expression of ‘no-mind’ (mushin), despite being unskilled with the sword.493  
The idea that developed was that through the ‘perfection’ of an art the practitioner is able 
to reach a position ‘beyond’ the mundane form of the art itself to its transcendent 
connection with all other art forms.  In this way one may move from one art to another, but 
more importantly each and any art is a potential path to enlightenment- because each art is 
a restricted mode of mastering oneself. 
This development was not purely of Japanese origin.  The connection of pragmatic ability 
and the mastery of arts in Zen (Ch. Ch’an) is found in Chinese Daoist philosophy and 
associated pragmatic spiritualism.  Several Daoist concepts have been examined in chapter 
2, along with their relation to the development of Zen thought, which were modified in 
chapter 5 in light of Dōgen’s criticisms of the ‘original nature’ concept.494  In Daoist thought, 
attainment of Dao is expressed as the effortless actions of the master artisan towards 
achieving his/her goal, through an internalisation of technique and related intuition 
regarding the situation at hand.  Since every art, craft or discipline is subject to the universal 
Dao, then to master any one art is to attain Dao.  The implication is that since Dao is at the 
heart of every practice, when one has mastered one practice then the essence of every 
practice has been penetrated.  In this formulation ‘Dao’ functions as the steady bedrock of 
worldly experience so that any specific scenario can be transcended to the eternal working 
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of Dao.495  For Dōgen the only ‘transcendent’ aspect, valid in every situation, is the 
immanence of the Buddhist practice itself.  This is developed as the ‘true self’ by the Kyōto 
school.  In this latter sense, to master ‘the way’ (Ch. Dao) is not to discover something 
beyond the world, but to develop an engagement with reality which is unlimited and thus 
dynamically applicable to any system. 
What does it mean to ‘master’ something in this sense and what could this mean in a 
Buddhist context?  It is clear that enlightenment ‘as omniscience’ must be taken in a certain 
sense.  From the record of the Buddha’s life, where he skilfully develops his conventional 
teaching to adapt to emerging circumstances,496 we can intuit that a Buddha would not 
instantly know how to drive a car for example.  So what is enlightenment then if not 
absolute technical knowledge?  Perhaps the concept may be summed up in the ancient 
Greek adage - “Know Thyself”.  Omniscience in this sense should not be understood as an 
exhaustive collection of ‘knowledge’ but rather a dynamic state of awareness – not a 
database of facts but the ability to ‘read’ situations and re-assess what is present.  
Concerning the mastery of arts/ disciplines, the benefit of enlightenment would be akin to 
an uncanny ability to learn that is not restricted to any specific doctrine or discipline. 
Commonly, as previously examined as a characteristic of Zen more widely, the actions of a 
martial artist are masked behind explications of ‘no-mind’ (jp. mushin).  Since deliberation is 
not possible from this (‘superior’) state, criticism of one’s actions from within this state is 
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also not possible.  From this state one is said to have no karmic effect since there is no 
cognitive individual to whom karma can be applied.  This is contentious since within the 
Buddhist literature even an enlightened being appears to be affected by the karmic results 
of their actions.497  More significantly, the attribution of ‘no-mind’ to the characteristics of 
enlightenment is plainly overstated.498  As we saw in the previous chapter, the ‘no-mind’ 
(ch. wu hsin) expounded by Huineng necessarily included the dual aspects of mindfulness 
and being without mind.  Furthermore, considered within the limited paradigm of the 
martial artist’s drive for success in combat, without both aspects (‘no-mind’ and 
‘mindfulness’) the martial artist’s goal could not be consistently realised.  I maintain that the 
inclusion of both aspects simultaneously necessitates a type of ‘mastery’ which is dynamic 
and able to transcend the limited bounds of the system which gave rise to it, meaning one 
can adapt to new paradigms. 
This presents a ‘Buddhist martial artist’ with a peculiar dilemma.  Nāgārjuna tells us that the 
principle afflictions all “arise completely from conceptualisation”,499 thus for someone who 
understands emptiness violence is impossible.500  Firstly there is no self, so there is 
ultimately nothing to defend or fear or fight for.  More subtly, a strong metaphysical point is 
being made which is brought into being psychologically.  Here I must be careful not to make 
the same mistake of which I have previously accused the ‘transcendency thesis’ – that an act 
is not violent because we see the underlying reality (ultimately) that nothing violent is 
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taking place.  This is strictly (logically) true, however we must keep in mind that violence still 
occurs conventionally.  As developed in chapter 6; this is the very basis of enlightened 
morality and is its metaphysical ground.   
Through enlightenment one’s motivation has changed as well as one’s perspective since 
one’s experience of reality in these two respects has also been radically altered.  
Overcoming violence – ensuing enlightenment, an end to suffering and emancipation - is the 
goal of Buddhism.  To bypass the pitfalls of wide generalities, imagine the position from an 
enlightened perspective; the position of realising ‘emptiness’.  Imagine interactions with 
objects, with oneself and with others.  There is no anger, no desire to destroy, no fear of 
another being better than oneself and no fear of being destroyed.  Yet this is not nihilistic, 
for even while suffering does not exist personally from the enlightened perspective it must 
be recognised as a motivational force in others.  Furthermore, there is beauty501 (recognised 
as a conventional mode) and there is love502 (without attachment).  With this in mind, 
consider the origins of a motivation to create.  It is the conventional reality of this love that 
inspires this desire to create – it is this recognition of others suffering that is compassion.  
To again consider the conventional position of ignorance and the experience of suffering - 
the world appears to be heartless, playing infuriating games with our emotions and 
attempts at rationality.  If life were a novel we would surely curse the author (or praise 
them if we were an absurdist).  Perhaps the amazing thing is that we are able to make sense 
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(both emotional and rational) of our lives at all.  We project meaning onto the world and 
thus we create our reality, while at the same time creating all our philosophical and moral 
problems.  Rather than now ask the question: ‘is it worth it?’ (That is to ask- does the 
pleasure we get from this mode of existence outweigh the misery it causes?) I would instead 
like to jump out of the problem altogether.  What does ‘coming to see the world as it really 
is’ have to do with conventional pleasures or sufferings?  It is a different thing altogether 
and as such requires neither the denial of pleasure nor the avoidance of suffering.  That 
said, there is a need for us, being the limited creatures that we are, to have a certain 
calmness about us before we can concentrate in order to pursue this goal of ‘right seeing’, 
and so in that respect one should aim to temper one’s own desires for this purpose.503   
What does enlightenment have to do with martial arts?  Following my analysis, an 
enlightened being is skilled, they see and feel clearly and are constantly aware, adapting and 
learning based on their circumstances.504  However, the ‘martial art’, like any art form, is a 
single mode with pre-established boundaries; in effect it is a game.  An enlightened being is 
supposed to be highly competent, but would they win a game?  Following the emphasis on 
pragmatics in this chapter, one may assume that such success is guaranteed, however one’s 
perspective must also be expanded in accordance with the wider implications of 
interdependence.  From the perspective of the enlightened being a game is just a game.  
Recall Dōgen’s response to Nansen’s Cat kōan “he could have done otherwise”.  Considering 
the wider context, there are more important things than winning.  As far as martial arts are 
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limited, the enlightened being is not omnipotent (they can be beaten) but in the wider 
context the goal of martial arts is recognised as limited.  If martial arts present the means 
for further development, being development in all areas towards spiritual enlightenment, 
then it should have nothing to do with winning or losing. 
As we have seen, ‘no-mind’, without creative mindfulness, only works within a restricted 
mode.  The directed focus has to be in place for discursive thought to cease and prevent the 
mind ‘stopping’.505  No-mind is a result of an extreme focus, hence the indistinction between 
unity and nothingness (as unity) within this mode.  This mode is a result of the virtual 
ceasing of the physiological system – I say virtual because the system must continue to 
function and thus its function becomes limited to a single focus.  From this state an 
advanced awareness is possible, but this awareness is not posited by the mode of no-mind; 
it is a further step.  Without the move to awareness there can be no realisation, no morality 
and no possible enlightenment.  This awareness is made possible due to the restriction of 
focus on the physiological system, which results in a freeing-up of the conscious mind.  
However this is not multitasking.  By being ‘focussed’ one should be united in mind and 
action – but this is incomplete – by being aware one becomes united with their place (as this 
action) in the universe.  The former is successful in its specific mode; the latter is invincible 
and applicable to all modes. 
Nietzsche maintained that any belief or system should be openly followed through.506  In 
this spirit I have attempted to address the various responses to nihilism, in chapter 1 and 
again in the first section of this chapter.  Any system which is incomplete will either reveal 
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itself to be so, through philosophical investigation or insightful practice, or will limit the 
adherent.  In a dynamic competitive mode this restriction becomes more apparent.507  The 
martial artist limited in this way will always be found lacking in combat with one of 
adequate skill who is not thus limited.  The way forward is always through introspection and 
awareness of one’s own limitations.  Careful pointing towards the practitioner themselves 
should shift their consciousness towards an awareness of these limits in order that they may 
be understood and hence overcome.  This is the meditative benefit of such engaged art 
forms.  The element of awareness produces the effect that, in the end, the originating form 
is no longer important and is transcended.   For the martial artist, this means that the 
highest attainment; mastery of the art; is an awareness beyond the inherent limits of 
combat.  The pragmatic principle, coupled with the moral implications of interdependence, 
indicates that the martial arts master need not fight.508 
 
Formlessness 
Hearing that all phenomena are ultimately empty (of intrinsic existence) but are 
conventionally real, and that we make use of conventionally existent things, one may 
wonder, what then is the purpose of emptiness?  What function does ultimate reality play in 
a conventional world?  The obvious answer is that there is a psychological benefit to 
understanding emptiness, and this fits with the Buddhist soteriological project to overcome 
suffering – if one realises emptiness, one should not cling to or crave these things in the 
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world that are impermanent.  This is a simple explanation but is not readily incorporated 
into one’s everyday life.  In this section I will briefly set up the concept of ‘formlessness’ and 
propose that it can function as a practical mode of engagement with the world and that this 
is a recognition of emptiness.  This consists of two tasks; first to briefly examine the 
meaning of the concept ‘formless’ and secondly to apply ‘formlessness’ to everyday action. 
Shin’ichi Hisamatsu, Kyōto philosopher and contemporary with D.T. Suzuki, developed the 
idea of the ‘Formless Self’ in relation to Zen Buddhism.  Rather than being a ‘self’ in 
potentia,509 the nature of the ‘true self’ is the imminent and ultimate reality of this (illusory) 
‘self’.510  What Nishitani called ‘the absolute near side’ is necessarily empty of intrinsic 
existence and so cannot maintain a specific form.  It is explained to be dynamic, allowing for 
the creation of difference, and absolutely contingent, manifest only in relation to its 
environment. 
The concept ‘formless’ can be defined in the broadest sense as that without recognisable 
character (no form).  As an absolute concept it appears in Indian Buddhist thought511 and in 
this sense is often interchanged with ‘nothing’, ‘empty’, ‘void’, or even ‘non-being’.  Each 
term has its own implications, both within the field from which it was developed and in the 
English language into which the concept is variously rendered.  ‘The formless’, specifically 
read as neither a simple negation nor positing some non-being, has its conceptual roots in 
both Buddhist and Daoist thought.  Later developed by (Zen) Kyōto school thinkers, 
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Hisamatsu and Nishitani, the concept of the ‘formless self’ oriented the idea to existential 
ends.   
There are two senses of formless that are intertwined in both the Daoist and Zen literature.  
The Dao itself is recognised as formless512 – as the ultimate reality, unnameable, unsensible, 
and without form.  Also in Daoism is the second sense of formless – the idea of moving with 
things in the world, being the way of the sage (or enlightened individual), to move with the 
natural mode of reality.  This sense of a formless engagement, to ‘go with the flow’, is 
always posited in conjunction with ‘the formless’ (as the absolute state of ‘otherness’ – Dao) 
but is distinct in its application.  The individual who engages formlessly is not completely 
other than form, since they are certainly not non-being, nothing, void – they exist.  Consider 
this chapter from Laozi’s Dao De Jing that expresses the principle. 
A man is born gentle and weak. 
At his death he is hard and stiff. 
Green plants are tender and filled with sap. 
At their death they are withered and dry. 
 
Therefore the stiff and unbending is the disciple of death. 
The gentle and yielding is the disciple of life. 
 
Thus an army without flexibility never wins a battle. 
A tree that is unbending is easily broken. 
 
The hard and strong will fall. 
The soft and weak will overcome. 513 
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The last line of this passage may appear to resonate well with a Christian ethos, but keep in 
mind that it is by no favour of the Dao that the soft and weak will overcome the strong, it is 
a metaphysical principle.  There is something about the weak that gives an advantage, the 
properties of life no-less, over the unyielding and ‘strong’. 
The ability of water, representing an ideal mode of being embodied by the actions of the 
sage, is often used as an ideal of this potency of the dynamic element - as in chapter 78 of 
Laozi; 
Under heaven nothing is more soft and yielding than water. 
Yet for attacking the solid and strong, nothing is better; 
It has no equal.514 
The metaphor indicates the erosion of rocks, or a coastline, of mountains in the rain or 
metal rusting, are all the result of the innate power of water to have its form modified as a 
result of its circumstances.  In this manner water is able to continue to flow, maintaining its 
dynamic being, while the ‘solid’ static objects slowly weather away. 
And again the chapter concludes: 
The weak can overcome the strong; 
The supple can overcome the stiff. 
So how could the formless form actualised by water be embodied by an individual?  For 
Daoists the answer is through non-action (wu wei) achieved as the expression of no-mind 
(wu hsin).   The concepts are posed as negatives in an attempt to capture their 
unconventional character.  Recall that non-action is not inaction, it is instead action without 
action (wei wu wei) – that is action that arises spontaneously.  As the function of no-mind is 
freedom from delusion and a return to the natural way of things - in order to achieve such a 
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mode of interaction all discursive thought must cease.  For the Daoists, one becomes like a 
mirror for the eternal, formless, Dao.  If Dao is then considered to be empty of intrinsic 
existence, what is reflected by the mirror-like sage is nothing other than the changing face 
of reality itself. 
Adapted to a Buddhist framework, formlessness becomes a correspondence to 
impermanence.  To approach the dynamic world with a single form can only lead to failure, 
if not in the first instance then certainly if an activity is repeated enough.  Since everything 
in the world is seen to be constantly changing there cannot be a fixed mode that can 
usefully correspond to all the variations one will inevitably be exposed to.  The three 
awakening insights accorded to prince Siddhartha Gautama; old age, sickness and death; are 
all striking examples of impermanence, countering the essentialisation and extension of 
more permanent conceptions of the human being and the ‘self’ in particular.515  In this 
simple sense, to be ‘formless’ is to hold no fixed preconceptions and approach the world 
openly. 
The ‘Formless Self’ is at once both one’s ontological state of being and the mode through 
which an enlightened being engages the world.516  Hisamatsu states:  
Chan thus may be said to have two aspects: one is the aspect of the true emptiness of the 
True-Self which, unbound by any form, is completely free from all forms; the other is the 
aspect of the wondrous working of the Self which, unbound by any form, actualizes all 
forms.  These two aspects constitute the "substance" and "function" of the True Self.517   
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The first part of this quotation opens debate into the emptiness of emptiness; that is that 
the substance of the True-Self is no substance whatsoever, and is hence free of form.  This 
has significant metaphysical implications which should be examined in light of the 
framework of interdependence.   
To examine formlessness as a transcendent metaphysical entity, as a ‘non-thing’, denies the 
possibility of interaction with the world.  If such a thing did interact then it would become 
part of causal existence and would not be a ‘non-thing’ in the absolute sense necessary.  
Instead, Nishitani relates the formless self to ‘absolute nothingness’518 which is beyond the 
mere negation of ‘nothingness’ – and so becomes, rather than a negation of all forms, the 
affirmation of all forms in their interdependence.   In effect, to realise absolute nothingness 
is to transcend mere nothingness and conventional delusion (of which the concept 
‘nothingness’ is a part).  We are left with an idea of self which is intimately tied up with all 
reality and empty of independent existence.  From this position, to quote Zen master 
Dōgen; “The ten-thousand things advance and confirm the self.”519   
The substance of the true self is nothing other than its existence as interpenetrating with 
the rest of reality.  To attempt to investigate the nature of the ‘self’, as distinct from the 
world, is then to invoke the inverted metaphysic, developed in chapter 4.  According to this 
metaphysic, the nature of the entity of focus is recognised as composed of everything but 
that focal phenomenon.  Thus, from the state of meditative equipoise, wherein the self 
disappears,520 all apparently ‘external’ influences tell of, and indeed manifest the self.  As 
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one mindfully examines one’s surroundings then, following the metaphysics of 
interdependence, the interpenetration of self with a specific phenomenon allows the 
realisation of one’s own nature to be discovered through engagement with the world.  This 
active realisation (Jp. kenshō) represents a conflation of the identification of ‘subject’ and 
‘object’ and is understood to be a step on the path to enlightenment in the Zen tradition. 
Let us move now from the substance of the self to focus on the function of the self within 
interdependent reality.  Specifically, to examine the possibility of the self as a mode of 
formlessness.  In order to do this we will return now to the key example of martial art. 
Traditionally, in the martial arts, ‘forms’ are recognisable sets of movements or techniques 
that designates the division into a particular school or subset.521  Additionally we find the 
term ‘form’ used to refer to specific sequences of repeated moves, sometimes called 
‘patterns’ or kata (Jp.).  There are several reasons one practices a form.  In addition to the 
significance of the practice as the spiritual tradition of a particular school, the simple 
pragmatic explanations are that the repetition of form teaches technique and cultivates 
physical conditioning.  Each element of the form is a move which can be adapted to a 
fighting situation – and since it has been practiced repeatedly, the mind should never need 
to ‘stop’ (to deliberately assess the situation) before the movement is reactively employed.  
So, through repeated practice the moves become second nature to the practitioner, so that 
it is then possible for the martial artist to experience ‘no-mindedness’ – the body seems to 
move by itself, leaving one’s creative consciousness free to explore the nuances of their 
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521
 For example, various animal forms of Wushu, Tae Kwon Do or Aikido would each be a form or ‘style’ of 
martial art. 
289 
 
actions, rather than being caught up in their mere execution.  This phenomenon is not 
unique to martial practices and can be found in any engaged practice.522 
This leads into the other significant aspect of the practice of forms within the martial arts – 
which was examined in the last section - repetition of a physical sequence as moving 
meditation.  With meditation as the goal, the practitioner seeks to be absorbed in their 
movements in order to become aware of the experience of ‘no-mind’.  There are obviously 
stark differences in this mode to that of seated meditation, and yet in both the mind and 
body are dropped away,523 either seated in stillness or through repetition of the same cycle 
of movement until the body is forgotten.  In both modes the body still exists, the heart still 
beats, respiration occurs.  In both modes the practitioner avoids radical interaction with 
anything, other than their own bodies, their own mind; so that the underlying nature of 
(one’s own) reality can be experienced as it really is.  For Hisamatsu this is the realisation of 
the formless self. 
A meditative mode is needed to existentially realise the ‘substance’, or rather ‘non-
substance’, of the formless self, but the function of formlessness is supposed to be 
expressed throughout reality – in every mode.  Formlessness as function must engage with 
the world.  If this can occur then formlessness cannot be absolutely other than worldly 
forms, the two must be connected if they are to interact.  If formlessness is an expression of 
the reality of emptiness then what does it mean to engage with emptiness in a world of 
                                                      
522
 For example, playing a musical instrument – virtuosity is such a higher level adaptation – in this guise Jazz is 
often used as an example of ‘formless’ musical form. 
523
 Dōgen, ‘Genjo-koan’, in Shobogenzo book 1, p.28.  This experience of ‘nonduality’ is also the aim in other 
‘Zen arts’, such as that of the actor in Noh theatre – see, for instance, Nagatomo S., ‘Zeami’s Conception of 
Freedom’, Philosophy East and West, Vol.31, No.4 (Oct. 1981), p.407: “Appropriation of various modalities of 
one's body in the Noh training, consequently, means to destroy the imbalance between the mind and the 
body, or rather to ‘dissolve’ the ambiguous character of our mind and body so as to restore a primordial 
identity.” 
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forms?  Is it even possible to meditate and be engaged simultaneously?  I want to say the 
answer is ‘yes’, so here it is my task to provide evidence for this position. 
Consider a combative situation involving two martial artists.  For the sake of discussion let 
us assume that they are in general respects equal with regard to strength, speed, stamina 
and even relative levels of skill and experience in their respective styles.  We may even 
assume that they have come from the same school of training – simply to conceptually 
eliminate unnecessary variables.  Even with parameters such as these fixed there are still 
many aspects where variation between the two fighters could present victory or defeat, so 
let us just consider those whereby the ‘formless’ could be applicable. 
If a fighter calculates, while another does not, all other things being equal, the calculator will 
have the tactical upper hand – however this is redundant if the moment of calculation 
causes a delay in reaction – they will be beaten before the tactic can be employed.  This is 
why the immediacy of ‘no-mind’ is favoured in the martial arts.  If a calculation has been 
made in advance of the moment to which it is to be employed, then an assumption has 
been made and the success or failure of the movement depends upon chance.  At best the 
calculation relies upon the predictability of their opponent. 
We should next consider what would make somebody predictable in this situation?  First the 
extreme case; if a fighter were performing a set form or kata then, if their opponent is 
familiar with this sequence, their action in the next moment can be predicted.  If a fighter 
made use of a particular element of such a form, that is one or several techniques, then the 
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execution of that element could be predicted by their opponent.  In other words, in 
response to a predicted move a counter-move can be devised and executed.524 
Nothing I have mentioned so far could be considered ‘formless’.  The point continually being 
stressed in this chapter is that the world is constantly changing so one must constantly 
adapt.  Keep in mind that ‘formlessness’ as a pragmatic concept had developed in response 
to impermanence, and this is directly related to the limits of systems.  Use of a form (an idea 
or a mode of being) is functional, until this use is extended beyond that scenario to which it 
usefully corresponds, either temporally, spatially or conceptually.  To be ‘formless’ and 
engaged implies that one can adopt forms specific to whatever situation they find 
themselves in (an enlightened being would do so skilfully).  If adoption of various forms over 
spatial and situational distance is the mark of the ‘formless’ then it would appear that we 
are all in some sense ‘formless’, knowing well the adage ‘adapt or perish’ we do alter our 
actions depending upon differing situations we are faced with - if we don’t just give up.  But 
this is not an engagement founded on a realisation of emptiness.  Here the example of the 
martial arts comes into its own. 
In order to act ‘formlessly’ one must dwell in the state of no-mind.  In this state there is no 
hesitation, and one might assume that the individual in this state would cease to be an 
active agent and would become completely reactive, dependent upon the actions of their 
opponent.  If this were the case then this ‘mindless’ individual would be little more than a 
conditioned collection of habitual responses.  Their form or style would be predictable, just 
as an individual’s style of handwriting would foretell the characteristics of one cursive 
                                                      
524
 In theory this is not unlike the opening move sequences in Chess.  Or, as a simple martial arts example; a 
practitioner who favours wide-ranging kicks is technically countered by an opponent shortening the distance 
between the fighters.   
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character from its last appearance.  Such stylistic tendencies can never be completely 
dispelled (the significance of embodiment should not be underestimated) but the 
expression of the ‘formless’ can never be simply reactive.  The ‘formless’ individual is 
reflexively engaged, but never determined by their situation.  To be thus would be a mere 
mirror on the world, an important aspect of formless engagement to be sure, but without 
the possibility of change this is not formlessness.  Without reflexive awareness the state of 
no-mind is incomplete.  Recall that from the meditative mode the conscious mind is freed 
up to become aware of its own situation.  Any mode of engagement comes then not as a 
reaction, a habit, but as a unique and mindful response to the situation in its thusness – 
exactly as it is, without preconceived notions. 
So how would a formless martial artist appear?  Let us return to our imaginary 
confrontation.  First, dwelling in a state of no-mind, there would be no delay in their 
response to the opponent.  Since the ‘formless’ experiences each instance as unique each 
response would be unique and so the pattern of movement would not be easily predictable.  
Moreover individual techniques or manoeuvres are themselves nothing more than empty 
forms, thus allowing for countless variations, meldings and adaptations.525  Most 
significantly, that lack of delay caused by calculation does not necessarily indicate a lack of 
cognition for an individual in the meditative state.  In that peculiar reflexive state where the 
mind and body have dropped away, and then brought back into focus, the very mode of 
confrontation itself is up for reassessment. 
                                                      
525
 Such adaptations occur incidentally with any engaged activity, which itself should deter any assumptions 
that forms can be simply ‘scientifically assessed’ (See for instance Smith, J.W., The Worms at the Heart of 
Things, p.372) or that concepts such as ‘the formless’ are merely ‘religiously inspired’ with no practical affects. 
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So formless engagement allows the opening up of variables, of dynamic (unpredictable) 
reflexive action, to the pragmatic extreme that the rules of engagement are discarded.  If 
victory is one’s goal then any means are open to achieve it.  Where the idea of formlessness 
has touched martial arts the result tends to be eye-gouges, groin strikes, picking up the 
nearest heavy object to clobber one’s opponent, and so on – which isn’t considered very 
sports-person-like and is usually not acceptable behaviour for a Buddhist.  The trouble here 
is that the ‘formless’ reassessment doesn’t go far enough.  If we can reassess the means to 
achieve our set goal, then why not reassess the goal itself?  If a formless martial artist really 
experiences each instance as a unique moment, then that moment is not restricted to two 
individuals, facing off, wanting to do harm to one another.  Interdependence indicates that 
every situation can be reassessed.  Perhaps a more considered course of action, if the 
option were available, would be to just walk away.  It is conceivable that a martial artist who 
followed this path would rather suffer a blow than inflict one. 
To be formless, an individual must actualise the principle of śūnyatā and thereby come to 
accord with the metaphysics of interdependence.  By maintaining no form (or set of forms) 
as one’s own form, one naturally recognises impermanence and all pragmatic engagements 
must be thus based.  The realisation of the conventional reality associated with ‘other’ 
minds must guide a mindful individual towards a harmonic engagement with this 
intersubjective reality.  Rather than being a highly technical calculation, the state of ‘no-
mind’ (appropriately coupled with ‘mindfulness’) is the direct awareness of one’s position in 
this reality.  Compassion is the natural response, which is nothing other than the path of 
enlightenment.526  “There is no dharma that can be clung to nor any Buddhahood that can 
                                                      
526
 As we examined previously the expression of compassion is spontaneous.  Whitehill notes that “There is 
considerable resistance evident in Zen interpretation to the notion that the enlightened person 
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be attained.... Simply allowing the mind to act spontaneously is cultivation”.527  This is not 
deliberative, but as spontaneous as any conventional personal drive (such as hunger or 
anger).  As with every aspect of reality directly realised; when confronting an opponent, one 
confronts oneself. 
 
Conclusion 
I set out to argue that a ‘formless’ engagement in the world is pragmatically fruitful, and 
while I hope that some evidence of this has been shown, I’ve now sneakily moved the goal 
posts and said that a formless engagement must reassess what is pragmatically fruitful.  
From that reflexive point this mode of ‘formlessness’ can be applied to any mode, not just 
martial arts, and similarly (though perhaps with less dramatic examples) ‘formlessness’ can 
be derived with any mode as a starting point.  As I have implied here, this is the beginnings 
of something like morality being implicated into worldly interactions.  To move through 
vastly different situations, to engage with each on its own terms and reflexively respond 
without being made to tremble is the mode of the ‘formless’. 
I maintain that if the association of Zen and the Martial arts were carried through, then any 
martial artist following Zen would actually act compassionately.  This is not due to any 
philosophical imposition but follows directly form a desire for a specific pragmatic outcome, 
specifically a desire for victory.  Wherever the demonic strive for power arises, the ultimate 
recognition of the interdependent nature of this drive necessitates that one also recognise 
the principles which follow from interdependence.  Being formless, these principles do not 
                                                                                                                                                                     
compassionates thoughtfully, in a calculating way with the usual hesitations.”  (Whitehill, J., ‘Is There a Zen 
Ethic?’, The Eastern Buddhist, vol.20/1 (1987), pp.24-25.)  However, he goes on to say that Zen does not 
oppose deliberation, rather the tradition rejects calculation as the mode in which the Bodhisattva’s 
compassion functions, thus allowing for our earlier discussion on the ‘freeing up of mind’ 
527
 Tsung-mi, quoted in Gregory, P.N., Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism, p.238. 
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stipulate any specific course of action; they must remain open to (skilful) interpretation.  
However, they do posit the impermanent nature of any specific course, that any 
essentialised system is limited.  Thus every moment must be engaged with in its own 
specific immediacy with the knowledge that you and your actions actively interpenetrate 
with this multi-faceted reality.  
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Conclusion 
 
The identification of the enlightened state as transcendent and ‘amoral’ in Zen philosophy 
has allowed for the misappropriation of Zen.  Concepts such as ‘no-mind’ have been 
abstracted from their expression as part of the Buddha-dharma and applied to various 
limited objectives.  In contrast, while acknowledging the ‘tearing up of scriptures’, Huineng 
described ‘no-mind’ as necessarily coupled with ‘mindfulness’.  Dōgen went further and 
argued that the enlightened state is not a state in isolation, but is intertwined with 
conventional experience, implicating the mode of enlightenment as one of continual 
practice.  Even within these testimonies; mindfulness invokes a focus and practice implies 
direction – we are left with the philosophical problem of explaining the validity of the Zen 
expression of the Buddhist project with a focus on ‘nothingness’.  Compassion remains an 
artefact of dogma unless the pervasive problem of nihilism is addressed. 
Nishitani suggests that the arising of nihilism is a call to introspection, to investigate that 
‘absolute near side’ of the universe that brings nihilism into being.  Where Nietzsche 
proposes the Übermensch, the forging of one’s own values and the triumph of the ‘will to 
power’, Nishitani maintains that the only resolution is to overcome oneself, as it is this self-
reification that creates the problem of nihilism in the world.  Where nihilism arises in Zen, it 
is through the reification of the state of the enlightened being leading to the conception of 
transcendence.  In this sense the ‘nothingness’ of the absolute is ultimately valued and turns 
to nihilate conventional reality, justifying the apparently (conventionally) ‘immoral’ actions 
of ‘enlightened beings’.  It is this nihilistic reading which must be overcome; this ‘nothing’ 
must be transcended in order to resolve the Zen moral problem. 
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The philosophical analysis of this problem thus requires the careful avoidance of both 
nihilism and reification for Zen to be reconciled with the Buddhist soteriological project.  
This thesis proposed the construction of a metaphysical framework based on Nāgārjuna’s 
connection of emptiness and interdependence in order to explain both the apparent 
connection and separation of phenomena and the possibility of enlightenment from Zen 
principles.  The goal of this framework was to make sense of the two truths concurrently in 
order to explain how enlightened wisdom and compassion could function simultaneously; 
the problem being that within a metaphysical instant, with a single focal subject, the latter 
implies suffering whereas the former denotes non-suffering.  If the two are metaphysically 
reconciled, and the possibility of enlightenment is established, Zen and the wider Buddhist 
project are philosophically validated.  In this regard, interdependence, taken as the key 
principle, was shown to have far-reaching implications. 
The first step was to revoke the possibility of justification across ‘transcendent’ levels, as the 
valuation required for such justifications exceeds the limits of the levelled system which 
proposed it.  In addition, I established that all reified systems are limited, and that all 
systems are necessarily reified, including this very project.  The best any system approaching 
some understanding of the nature of reality, identified as ‘ineffable’, can achieve is to be 
ultimately self-refuting.  My response was to recognise every concept as ultimately ‘empty’, 
and propose a metaphysical framework which is absolutely contingent and devoid of any 
essential ground.  These, I argue, are necessary characteristics of any metaphysical system 
compatible with interdependence, universally applied. 
Interdependence applied metaphysically requires a reassessment of reductionist tendencies 
in contemporary thought, specifically in relation to scientific theory; our method of 
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interpreting phenomenal reality.  To reduce a phenomenon to its constituent parts 
essentialises those parts, which is ultimately untenable.  Problematically, ‘emptiness’ is 
commonly understood as the result of a reductive argument: that an entity is dependent 
upon specific causes and conditions and so is in itself empty, and in effect is those causes 
and conditions.  I term these specific causes and conditions the ‘environment’ of the focal 
entity.  The mistake, I maintain, is to essentialise either environment or focal entity, as both 
are epistemically and causally interdependent.  To reduce one to the other is to lose the 
explanatory power both interdependent aspects allow.  This is particularly prominent in the 
case of ‘mind’. 
The alternative to the reductionist framework, wherein there is some fundamental ground, 
is the groundless ‘bootstrap’ model, wherein the universe continually creates itself.  By 
recognising the metaphysical connection of ‘minds’ in the world, as well as their subjective 
separation, the ‘bootstrap universe’ is seen to be constructed intersubjectively.  Recognising 
the causal efficacy of mind necessitates that any attempt to understand the physical 
function of the world must take into account the states of minds around them.  For the 
enlightened being this amounts to the recognition of a conventional being’s experience of 
suffering and its effects, while also realising the ultimate emptiness of this suffering.  This is 
the metaphysical basis for the possibility of compassion.  The motivation for compassion is 
explained as a result of ‘interpenetration’, derived from the work of Zen master Dōgen. 
The possibility of enlightenment is provided in the framework through an ‘inverted 
metaphysics’.  The reason for this inversion recalls Nishitani’s ‘absolute near side’: 
enlightenment is directly experienced.  If the ‘environment’ of any entity is extended to the 
total universe then the entity is metaphysically identified, either realised as that entity or, as 
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inverted: the total universe minus the focal entity.  Completely realised, these amount to 
the same thing.  If such vision were practically possible, this would entail being able to see 
‘the universe in a single atom’.  Such an understanding allows a different approach to the 
work of Dōgen.   
For Dōgen, every instance of meditation was the ‘awakening of the universe’, he tells us that 
‘blue mountains walk’, that every aspect of reality interpenetrates, connecting every 
meditation practitioner with every other and every aspect of nature.  Furthermore, by 
emphasising that enlightened beings see ‘flowers in the sky’ (a Buddhist phrase commonly 
denoting delusion), Dōgen recognises that they cannot be unaware of conventional cause 
and effect.  More than this, they are not restricted to any particular mode and the 
expression of each and every mode appears to be up for interpretation.  This last point 
indicates the freedom of the enlightened being, the need for a creative response to the 
dynamic diversity of situations they enter.  This freedom is symptomatic of the enlightened 
state, unobtainable by one trapped by a will to power.  To be able to respond to an ever-
changing immanent reality, one’s response must also be dynamic.  In the final chapter I 
proposed that ‘formlessness’ could be adopted as a principle by which to guide one’s 
actions in accordance with interdependent reality, with pragmatically fruitful results.  A 
consequence of this though is the continual reassessment of the goals of any undertaking.  
Dōgen’s response to Nansen’s killing of the cat can be taken as an example. 
Recognition of the universe as interdependent and absolutely groundless indicates that 
conventional morality certainly cannot hold ultimately.  Nevertheless, the convention is 
active in the minds of those who hold it.  I maintain that the Zen concept of ‘absolute 
nothingness’ is not a nihilation of morality, instead every question becomes a moral 
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question.  The freedom of the enlightened being requires that they use ‘skilful means’ in 
their actions and responses to other sentient beings.  While temporarily making use of 
systems is certainly useful, to adopt a single system would be to artificially limit oneself and 
project the limits of that system onto others as universally binding.  The enlightened being 
should not be definable, in accordance with the nature of interdependence, they should act 
formlessly.  As their ultimate nature (‘Buddha-nature’) is formless, their every enterprise 
would be akin to our conventionally constant practice. 
From the conventional perspective, which is to say our own, the metaphysical framework of 
interdependence indicates that there is no ‘other’ realm by which to justify one’s actions or 
motivations, nor those of others.  The result is a direct confrontation with immanent reality.  
At this point, while we can explain phenomenon as a result of interdependence, this 
relationship works both ways.  Every sentient being is ultimately responsible for their own 
response to the world.  In order to understand the world, and one’s place in it, focus must 
first be turned to that common aspect in all experienced reality – one’s own mind.  Far from 
turning away from the world, this is the means by which one can actually come to realise 
reality as it is.  The method is meditation.  This is Zen. 
As this is a philosophy thesis, I have attempted to focus on examining those human 
existential problems that transcend any particular instance of their postulation.  The 
problem of nihilism, as it arises in Zen stems from the groundlessness of the ‘nothingness’ 
found proposed at its heart.  Hisamatsu tells us to ‘Stand exactly where there is nowhere to 
stand’; a position I adopted in the thesis.  Perhaps what scares us about nihilism is not that 
there is no meaning but instead that there is nothing for us to defend ourselves with, nor 
anything to attack the position of others with.  Without ego, nihilism is nullified.  In a great 
301 
 
ocean we may float quite happily; it’s the ships and the sharks and the surf that threaten us.  
It is against reality that we find the shadow of nihilism – it is in contrast with the world that 
meaninglessness becomes a problem - for something must lack meaning.  Yet it is at root 
one’s own mind which projects the problem of nihilism in attempting to ground one’s 
beliefs, to reify its own existence beyond that of an empty, interdependent and contingent 
arising. 
Nietzsche made much of affirming nihilism, recognising the lack of intrinsic meaning in the 
world as an utterly empowering force, a point which Nishitani fondly adopted.  The 
affirmation of ‘absolute nothingness’ though should not lead one to forge one’s own values, 
but rather recognise those values that already persist.  Rather than a nihilist who ‘smashes 
left and right’, to take up a stance in the groundless metaphysics of interdependence one 
must recognise the validity of others in their ‘thusness’.  An enlightened being is not 
determined by conventional norms, but they do not exist in isolation from those 
conventions – they must mindfully engage with them.  Wisdom entails the recognition of 
interdependence, and compassion is an implication of one’s motivations realised 
interdependently. 
In reference to the warrior class’ appropriation of Zen, Suzuki writes in ‘Zen and Japanese 
Culture’, that it was pragmatically useful;  
Zen has sustained them in two ways, morally and philosophically.  Morally, because Zen is a 
religion which teaches us not to look backward once the course is decided upon; 
philosophically, because it treats life and death indifferently.528 
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 Suzuki, D.T., Zen and Japanese Culture, P.61. 
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Victoria takes statements such as this as the core of his arguments against Suzuki.529  In light 
of the interpretation of Zen pursued in this thesis through the metaphysics of 
interdependence, such statements from Suzuki and others should be read in light of the 
complexity of the apparent ‘transcendence’ of the enlightened state, and the ineffability of 
the ultimate truth.  From the perspective of the absolute, neither life nor death can take 
priority.  Existentially applied, this entails that one should accept whichever state they are 
in,530 be it fortunate or otherwise, and continue to move forward.  This emphasis on the 
present moment over the past or future, is a pragmatic tool, as we have seen, but it does 
not eliminate the need for mindfulness.  As Suzuki states: “Zen never teaches one to throw 
one’s life away.”531  Conventionally analysed, Zen is ‘amoral’; it presents no preset moral 
code, and as such its application is contingent upon the characteristics of the present 
instance.  Ultimately such moral codes have no bearing.  I have claimed that the Zen 
practitioner must be formless, as formlessness is the response to the nature of reality as it is 
– interdependent, empty of intrinsic existence and a call to the continual moral enterprise 
driven by the conventional experience of suffering in the world. 
It is apparent that the maintenance of interdependence as the key metaphysical principle 
has implications for fields outside the philosophical study of Zen.  Some of these are already 
being developed, as noted in chapter 4, including the development of epistemic modes 
incorporating two levels of causation to predict and model the interactions of complex 
systems, as well as the attribution of mental effects to metaphysical frameworks.  However, 
the most immediate implication is towards the development of an ethical system based on 
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 Victoria, B., Zen at War, p.106. 
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 In order to be aware of to such a distinction we may assume that the subject will be alive. 
531
 Suzuki, D.T., quoted in Kirita K. ‘D.T. Suzuki on Society and the State’ in Heisig, J. & Maraldo, J. (eds.), Rude 
Awakenings, p.61. 
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the principles developed from this metaphysical framework.532  In addition, chapter 7 
examined the pragmatic application of formlessness using the example of martial arts, with 
further application to any field provided its scope is sufficiently extended.  One field where 
the potential application is particularly interesting is economics; interpreting ‘profit’ as an 
interpenetrating aspect of markets would necessitate a reassessment of the identification of 
capital.533   Of course such applications are beyond the scope of this thesis but present a 
wide scope for further investigation.   
Overall the result of transcending the nihilistic reading of ‘nothingness’ is a confrontation 
with the metaphysics of interdependence – the immanence of reality wherein ‘no-thing’ is 
transcended.  An enlightened realisation is thus revealed to be nothing other than the clear 
recognition of the conventional experience of the world, as it is, unbound by the fetters of 
an essential self.  In this metaphysical reading ‘morality’ is nothing other than cause and 
effect.  We are all responsible for the state of our existence.  The popular kōan, quoted 
below, captures this well. 
A soldier named Nobushige came to Hakuin, and asked: "Is there really a paradise and a 
hell?" 
"Who are you?" inquired Hakuin. 
                                                      
532
 Christopher Ives considers such a move essential to the practical resolution of the Zen moral problem - 
“Without critical reflection on, for example, self-interest, conflicts of interest, power, ideology, and 
sociopolitical suffering in light of core Buddhist moral values - that is to say, unless Zen Buddhists were to 
construct a systemic and rigorous social ethic - self-interest or moral systems not necessarily congruent with 
Buddhist values can fill the void and grant compassion the specificity it lacks.” (Ives, C., ‘What’s Compassion 
Got to Do with It?’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol.12 (2005), p.52.)  In keeping with the principle of 
formlessness, I can only accept any such system as expedient means, as adherence to any system will, 
eventually, lead to further problems (somewhat curbing the spirit of Ives mandate - proclaiming the need for a 
world-wide ‘[insert ideology here]’ superstate for example). 
533
 For example, taking into account ‘national happiness’ (as in Bhutan); or accounting for the impact of 
production in relation to long-term environmental effects.  (See for instance, Stiglitz, J., Freefall: Free Markets 
and the Sinking of the Global Economy, pp.283-284: “Some of the debates that we have concerning the trade-
offs between the environment and economic growth are off the mark: if we correctly measured output, there 
would be no trade-off.  Correctly measured output will be higher with good environmental policies, and the 
environment will be better as well.”) 
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"I am a samurai," the warrior replied. 
"You, a soldier!" exclaimed Hakuin. "What kind of ruler would have you as his guard? Your 
face looks like that of a beggar." 
Nobushige became so angry that he began to draw his sword, but Hakuin continued: "So you 
have a sword! Your weapon is probably much too dull to cut off my head." 
As Nobushige drew his sword Hakuin remarked: "Here open the gates of hell!" 
At these words the samurai, perceiving the master's discipline, sheathed his sword and 
bowed. 
"Here open the gates of paradise," said Hakuin.534 
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 57. ‘The Gates of Paradise’ in 101 Zen Stories, Reps and Senzaki (trans.), Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, p.80. 
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